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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The evaluation of the Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans (Balkans CMAP)
was focused on the key results achieved and lessons learned, with particular emphasis on
validating the design, implementation and effectiveness of the numerous projects that
comprised the programme. The lessons derived from the evaluation are intended to improve
programme development, and project selection, design and implementation. To this end, the
evaluation has defined a number of principles’ that can be used as the basis for the
development of a formal programming framework. The purpose of this framework would be
to provide strategic orientation and design guidance for future CIDA MAP initiatives in the
Balkans or in other mine affected regions of the world.
Overall, the evaluation has shown that the CIDA Balkans CMAP must be viewed as a
significant success. The programme began in response to a push of funding furnished by
the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF) in 1998. It was initially confined to Bosnia and
Herzegovina and was designed to support or complement ongoing CIDA development
assistance initiatives in the country. From a few initial projects, the programme was quickly
expanded a year later in response to the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo and again in 2000
with the change of regime in Croatia. It therefore evolved over a very short period into a
significant regional programme, totaling some $20m (CAD) and included a large number
and variety of projects covering all of the key areas of mine action.
While it was a difficult programme to manage, it did represent successful collaboration
between CIDA and DFAIT in all its stages. As well, it involved beneficial support by the
Canadian Forces and included innovative use of Canadian expertise and capabilities in
institutional support, mine clearance, victim assistance and MDD training. The programme
was responsive to political and local developments, and was consistent with the Canadian
foreign policy goal in the Balkans to promote regional stability after years of strife. The
CMAP raised Canada’s profile and credibility in Europe, promoted Canadian values and
reinforced the Ottawa Convention to Ban Landmines by linkage to Canada’s aggressive
support of mine action in the Balkans.
The CMAP was also supportive of CIDA’s development assistance strategy to secure peace
and prosperity in the region, as well as its related development priorities and crosscutting

themes. The mine action initiatives were undertaken to protect vulnerable populations and
communities, and to facilitate humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socioeconomic development. The programme achieved particular success in the area of
institution building and in the development of sustainable, indigenous mine/UXO clearance
capacity. The CMAP mine awareness and victim assistance projects achieved varied results
although these projects standout for their ultimate success in the areas of reach and
sustainability. The programme’s innovative attempts to employ Canadian demining and
MDD training capabilities also received mixed reviews. Nonetheless, the Balkans CMAP
was widely applauded for its focus, reliability and achievements. The review of the
programme results and key success factors was also very favourable and a number of
important lessons have been derived from this evaluation that will greatly assist in the
design of future programmes of its type.
The design of future CMAPs must first and foremost be informed by a clear understanding
of Canadian foreign policy goals and development assistance strategy in the region
concerned. The value-added dimension is also an important consideration and in most
cases this will lead to a focus on institution building. The creation of an effective mine action
coordination centre is vital to the development and coordination of a successful and
sustainable national mine action programme. This is an area where Canada has achieved a
particular impact and has much to offer. Next in importance is the building of sustainable
indigenous mine/UXO clearance capacity. The use of international NGOs or contractors
should not subordinate the goal of sustainability unless there are emergency requirements
for which they are best suited. Mine awareness and victim assistance initiatives should
normally be considered but should always be coordinated with lead agencies such as
UNICEF and the ICRC, and must be consistent with MAC priorities, themes and standards
as applicable.
There are many lessons learned from this evaluation that bear repeating. Mine action
programming in general benefits from close collaboration and sharing of programme
information between CIDA, DFAIT and DND. Any new CIDA programme initiatives must
include input from DFAIT (foreign policy) and DND/MIC (mine situation assessments) as
well as key international organizations such as UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, ICRC, engaged
NGOs such as NPA, and UN or national MACs. Project selection, design and
implementation must include reliable local partners, and programmes must be regionalized
to the extent possible to reduce the span of control and ease the task of programme
management. Project design and contracts/donor agreements must include precise
milestones, deliverables (outputs) and reporting requirements with tied funding in the form of
progress payments and holdbacks. As well, every project must have a well-defined exit
strategy. Finally, programmes with the magnitude and impact of the Balkans CMAP must
include a clearly defined communication strategy, with a plan that provides guidance for
both reactive and proactive communication. This would greatly assist managers in
responding to incidents or queries, and facilitate international and domestic awareness of
Canada’s contribution in this highly topical area.
Note to Reader: This report was prepared in accordance with the “CIDA Evaluation Guide,
January 2000”. As a result, it includes a project-level review for each of Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Kosovo, as well as a regional programme-level review. Unfortunately,
project similarities lead to unavoidable repetition in the presentation of results. To avoid this
repetition, the reader may wish to focus attention at the outset on the individual
country/province or mine action area of particular interest using the index for Part II as a
guide.
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We envision a world free of the threat of land mines and unexploded ordnance, where
individuals and communities live in a safe environment conducive to development, and
where mine survivors are fully integrated into their societies.1

PART I – EVALUATION OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
GENERAL
The Central and Eastern Europe Branch (CEEB) of CIDA is responsible for Canada’s Official
Development Assistance (ODA) programme in Central and Eastern Europe. A key element
within this area of responsibility has been CIDA’s Canadian Mine Action Programme (CMAP)
in the Balkans. The 1997 Ottawa Landmine Treaty and the resultant government created
$100m Landmine Fund to address mine contamination in affected countries throughout the
world, precipitated this unique five-year programme. The five-year Balkans CMAP (1998-03)
comprised 37 individual projects plus nine sub projects, with a level of investment totaling
some $20m (CAD). The projects were located primarily in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo with
some residual programming support undertaken in Slovenia. The Balkans CMAP was
principally focused on: the provision of direct humanitarian assistance; the enhancement of
peace, security and stability; the building of institutional mine action capacity; and the
creation of indigenous mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance capabilities.
Accordingly, the programme covered the key mine action areas including: mine/UXO survey,
marking and clearance; mine awareness/mine risk education (MRE); institutional capacity
building; and mine victim assistance.

1

A/56/448/Add.1 United Nations Mine Action: A Strategy for 2001-2005 Report of the Secretary-General.
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LINKAGES – CIDA MANDATE AND PRIORITIES
As outlined in the Balkans Memorandum to Cabinet approved 15 March 2001, Canadian
development programming is to be conducted along three strategic axes: peace building and
security; economic cooperation and reconstruction; and social sustainability. The overall
focus of CIDA's CMAP in the Balkans was to reduce the threat of injury and death posed by
mines and UXO in order to: permit the return of refugees and displaced persons, enable
rebuilding and economic recovery to take place, and result in the development of sustainable
indigenous institutions and capacity. By virtue of this approach, the CMAP contributed to all
three Balkans programme priorities (see figure 14). Indeed, the broad objectives of the
Balkans MAP were in keeping with CIDA’s mandate to support sustainable development in
order to reduce poverty and contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world.
The primary aim of the programme was focused on improving the safety and security of
vulnerable populations. This was accomplished by projects designed to identify and mark
dangerous areas, create awareness of the threat and directly clear critical areas of mines
and UXO. CIDA’s corporate priorities were adhered to in the development of the Balkans
MAP and were addressed to the extent possible in all of the individual projects. To this end,
the objectives of the programme were identified as :
a. Enhance the physical security of vulnerable populations and aid workers by
reducing the threat posed by mines and UXO (survey, mark, educate, clear);
b. Address basic human needs and well-being by ensuring that shelter areas,
utilities and social infrastructure are safe and cleared of mines/UXO;
c. Contribute to sustainable development and growth by ensuring that
transportation, systems, utilities, private sector and public infrastructure, and
agricultural and forestry land are safe and cleared of mines/UXO;
d. Enable the protection of the environment by addressing the issue of mine/UXO
contamination;
e. Provide assistance to the victims of landmines/UXO by the direct support of
physical and socio-economic rehabilitation and reintegration projects; and
f. Contribute to sustainable mine action capacity by supporting MAP institution
building and the development of indigenous mine action/clearance capacity in
both the public and private sectors.
These objectives included numerous supporting or enabling objectives such as: the
enhancement of Canadian private sector capacity in the area of mine action; increasing
public awareness of Canada’s international profile in the area of humanitarian mine action,
the Ottawa treaty and the Canadian Landmine Fund; and the development of Canadian
industrial capability in the area of mine/UXO detection and clearance technology.
STAKEHOLDERS
The Balkans MAP involved numerous stakeholders and partnership organizations. These
organizations include:
a. International organizations such as NATO, the UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAS, the
World Bank and UN Mine Action Coordination offices in the affected countries;
b. Local and international NGOs such as CARE Canada, Norwegian Peoples’ Aid
(NPA), Handicap International (HI) and Akcija Protiv Mina (APM);
CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003
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c. Other Government of Canada Departments such as DFAIT and DND;
d. Canadian partners such as Queen’s University, International Centre for the
Advancement of Community-Based Rehabilitation (ICACBR), International
Children’s Institute (ICI), Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC), the
International Demining Alliance of Canada (IDAC), NOTRA Environmental Inc.
and Wolf’s Flat Ordnance Disposal Corp; and
e. Local government institutions such as the Croatian Mine Action Centre
(CROMAC), the Bosnian Demining Commission and the Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mine Action Centre (BHMAC).
REACH AND EXPECTED RESULTS
The participation of these stakeholder organizations covered the full spectrum of involvement
from advisory and coordination status to full project implementation, and responsibility for
results/outputs and reporting. The reach of the Balkans CMAP has been equally diverse,
ranging from involvement in the area of institution building to hands on mine/UXO clearance
and victim assistance with the resultant ability to identify immediate beneficiaries in the target
population. Consequently, the expected results of the Balkans CMAP in terms of impact,
outcomes and outputs also vary considerably. In the case of institution building, the results
are difficult to quantify and must be viewed in terms of increased organizational
effectiveness. Actual mine/UXO clearance projects, on the other hand, are quite easy to
quantify in terms of lethal devices found and destroyed or area cleared. These statistics,
however, must be evaluated with caution, as there are numerous factors that impinge on
demining operations that can render normal comparative analysis invalid. These factors
include; weather, topography, soil conditions, vegetation, type of equipment, and proximity to
worksite, as well as the length and type of conflict, sophistication and lethality of ordnance
and the prevailing political/security situation. Nonetheless, outputs can be quantified and the
impact of these results can be assessed in terms of basic human needs and sustainable
development.

INVESTMENT PROFILE
THE DEVELOPMENT CONT EXT
Transition and conflict are the two main forces that have characterized the development
environment in the Balkans. With the decline of the Soviet Union, countries throughout
Eastern Europe faced the challenge of updating corrupt and inefficient state institutions and
faltering economies. In the Balkans, these economic processes were complicated and
disrupted by a number of conflicts revolving around the break-up of the area’s largest state,
the former Yugoslavia. The tumultuous events during this period have had a significant
impact on the economic, political and social contexts, all of which influenced Canadian mine
action interventions in the region.
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Recent Balkan Conflicts
The former Yugoslavia, which existed as a federation of six republics from 1945 to 1990,
largely disintegrated into its constituent parts in 1991. The non-aligned Socialist government,
sometimes through the use of force, suppressed m inorities within Yugoslavia’s republics.
After free parliamentary elections held throughout the federation in 1990, nationalism flared
and wars erupted along ethnic and religious lines throughout the 1990s. The most significant
of wars occurred in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, a province of Serbia.
However, the war also spilled over the borders into Montenegro, Slovenia and Macedonia,
and NATO conducted bombing on Serbia to stop its role in the Kosovo war.
Croatia was the first country to suffer through significant military conflicts. In 1990, a
parliamentary election in the republic resulted in a large number of Croat nationalists entering
parliament, perhaps as a response to the hard-line tactics being promoted by the Serbian
president Slobodan Milosevic. They pushed nationalist policies that angered the Serb
minority. As a response, the Serbs declared autonomy from Croatia around the same time
that Croatia was declaring independence from Yugoslavia. The result was confrontation
between Croat forces and Croatian Serb rebels.
The sympathetic Serbian government took political and then military actions to aid the Serb
fighters in Croatia. The conflicts resulted in 20,000 deaths. By 1992, approximately one third
of the country lay outside of the Croatian government’s control. At the beginning of that year,
a UN brokered ceasefire resulted in the deployment of an international force on the borders
of Serb-controlled areas, the withdrawal of Serbian troops and the beginning of a fragile
peace. This peace was broken in 1995 when the Croatian government launched assaults on
the Croatian Serb controlled areas of western Slavonia and Krajina. The assaults led to the
displacement of most of the 200,000 Croatian Serbs, amongst allegations that Croat forces
committed widespread atrocities. The country has been fully under the Croatian
government’s control since 1998.
The first Croatian conflict was shortly followed by conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).
Like Croatia, Bosnia’s 1990 parliamentary elections were won by ethnically based parties
representing the Muslims, Serbs and Croats. Bosnian Serbs declared they would remain with
Yugoslavia in response to the Croatian and Slovenian independence motions passed in
1991. They formed autonomous areas to distance themselves from the Bosnian government
and boycotted a 1992 referendum on independence. A declaration of independence made by
the Bosnian Croatian and Muslim parties in 1992 was followed directly by war.
The war lasted for four years, from 1992 to 1995. Armies from Croatia and Serbia attempted
to annex parts of BiH. Bosnian Serbs and Croats, attempting to secede from a greater
Bosnian state, changed the nature of the conflict from a war of aggression to a civil war.
Muslims and Croats fought together against Serbs until 1993, when Bosnian Croats
proclaimed an independent state. This resulted in Muslims and Croat forces turning against
each other until a 1994 US-brokered peace agreement. This peace resulted in Muslims and
Croats again joining forces to fight the Serbs. In total, more than a million people were
displaced across borders and 845,000 were internally displaced. There are allegations that
all sides committed atrocities. In 1995, the three sides agreed to the Dayton Accord, a peace
agreement implemented with the military and institutional support of the international
community. The presence of a NATO-led stabilization force (SFOR) has prevented any
resumption of conflict.
CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003
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Kosovo broke into war in 1998. Serbian nationalism had been growing in Yugoslavia since
the middle of the 1980s, and manifested itself in the election of a nationalistic leader,
Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic prompted nationalist policies such as resuming Serbian
control of Kosovo, a province that had been relatively autonomous since 1945 and whose
majority population were ethnic Albanians. A Serbian crackdown of Albanian protest forced
Kosovo to concede loss of its autonomy in 1989.
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged in 1996 and was determined to gain
independence for Kosovo through war. Serbia refused to agree to an internationally brokered
peace plan, which provided for NATO forces entering Kosovo and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia
intensified its activities in Kosovo and around the same time, NATO conducted bombing
strikes on Serbia. Up to 900,000 Albanians were displaced from Kosovo, hundreds of
civilians died from the bombing and thousands of Serbs and Albanians died in Kosovo. The
bombing ended after 78 days with the acceptance of a G8 plan that included the withdrawal
of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the introduction of the NATO Kosovo force (KFOR).
Kosovo is currently under the administration of the UN (UNMIK) although from a legal
standpoint, it is still a province of Yugoslavia (recently renamed as Serbia-Montenegro).
Transition in the Region
Even before the Balkan wars of the 1990s, Yugoslavia’s government and economy were
facing serious troubles. The country went into a difficult recession during the 1980s. While
Yugoslavia was more economically open and liberalized than the soviet-aligned eastern
European states, it failed to approach the economic development of most of its western
neighbours. Also, the country’s national and federal leaders avoided democratic and
governance reforms, with the first multi-party elections not occurring until 1990.
Political and economic transition from centrally planned economies and socialism to
democracy and liberal economies has proven costly throughout Eastern Europe. In the
Balkans, elections have often resulted in ethnic and nationalist parties gaining power, which
usually exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions. The closure of inefficient industries has increased
unemployment and poverty, at least temporarily. The nationalization of state-run industries
has often led to punitive rents that are not economically sustainable. Transition and conflict
have provoked rapid economic, political and social changes with all of the associated
challenges.
Due to the costs of transition and their participation in wars, Balkan governments were often
reluctant or unable to implement the necessary elements of transition during the 1990s. As a
result, the former Yugoslav states are in various stages of transition.
Economy of the Region
Transition and conflict have extracted a high cost in the Balkans. This is illustrated by the fact
that economies in the region are significantly weaker than they were in 1990. Gross
Domestic Products are a fraction of what they were in the late 1980’s. For example, in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most severely affected
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states, it is estimated that 2000 Gross Domestic Products were only 47 percent of their 1990
level. 2 All statistics fail to include activity in the grey economy, which may be significant.
Kosovo is one of the poorest regions of Europe. Its infrastructure, and economic and political
institutions are severely underdeveloped. These problems were exacerbated by the 1999
conflict that destroyed much of what infrastructure the province did have. The province is
now highly aid dependent. While its GDP has grown at a rate of 16 percent a year, much of
this is dependent on international aid. The large number of refugees and displaced people
also provides a large economic drain.
BiH is also dependent on aid, but to a lesser extent than Kosovo. The result of compromises
made to end the BiH conflicts was a complicated, disjointed political system. The wars also
damaged the country’s physical infrastructure. Both of these factors create significant
economic challenges. Basic government financing functions, such as taxation, are weak and
the lack of infrastructure impedes economic development. Unemployment in 2001 was
approximately 38 percent. 3
Croatia, in contrast, is second only to Slovenia among the former Yugoslav states in terms of
its economic progress. The country has had a coherent political centre since 1998. Since the
2000 election, a moderate political party has been in power, and has shown the will to
accelerate transition. Elections at the end of 2002 resulted in more nationalistic parties being
re-elected, however, they do not have the same hard-line character as the parties of the
1990s. Development in the country is uneven. Lack of physical infrastructure, partially due to
damage caused in the country’s military conflicts, remains a problem. Continued insistence
on the part of the government to take a strong role in the economy, has prompted members
of the international community to insist that it speed up the process of privatization. 4
Unemployment at the beginning of 2002 was 23.7 percent. 5

Politics
Transition and conflict have resulted in different political and institutional frameworks
throughout the former Yugoslav states. Each country’s unique situation created different
development needs.
In the case of Croatia, the 1995 offensive against Serbs resulted in a strong, coherent central
state. This state played an activist role in the economy and remained highly nationalistic until
1999. The death of the country’s president during that year precipitated elections in 2000. As
a result of those elections, a more moderate coalition came into power that pursued
international, especially EU, norms of good governance and economic management. The
new government has made significant progress towards those goals.
The Dayton Peace agreement, which hallmarked the end of the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, involved a number of compromises that led to a complicated political structure.
The country is comprised of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Republica Srpska, and direct international involvement in the administration of the country in
2

Interview with David Mueller, CEE Mine Action Programme Officer 1996-99.
BiH IPRSP
4
Economist 2001
5
Economist, 2002
3
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the form of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Further complicating this political
structure, the Federation contains eleven regional governments. The division of
responsibilities among these governments results in institutions that remain weak and in
need of reform.
Indigenous institutions in Kosovo are even weaker than they are in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In the case of Kosovo, no such institutions existed prior to the 1999 conflict. Their
development was stymied by the fact that the province had never been an independent state,
was not a republic within the former Yugoslav federation and was integrated into Serbia
through most of the 1990s. As a result of the lack of indigenous institutions, the international
community has taken a significant role in the operation of Kosovo and is represented by two
primary institutions, UNMIK and the OSCE, plus the military presence of NATO in the form of
the KFOR.
Social Issues
The economic, political and military turmoil of the 1990s left behind significant social
problems in Kosovo, BiH and Croatia. Unemployment and displacement have contributed to
poverty, growth in social dislocation and other social problems. However, the extent and
nature of these problems is different in each area.
Kosovo is one of the poorest regions in Europe with some of the lowest indicators of human
development, including a 50% poverty rate, low attendance of women in schools and high
levels of corruption. Kosovo’s most immediate problem following the war was resolving the
needs of a massive displaced population. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council,
approximately 288,000 people displaced from Kosovo during the war still live in Serbia and
Montenegro. The majority of these are Serbs that are blocked from returning by ethnic
tensions between them and the Kosovo Albanians. In order for Kosovo’s social infrastructure
to recover and improve, it also needs rebuilt physical infrastructure and developed
institutions.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered through the longest war in the 1990s. Consequently, its
infrastructure was significantly damaged and a large portion of its population was internally
and externally displaced. The BiH PRSP estimates 281,652 internally displaced persons and
624,250 BiH refugees still living abroad, almost half of whom have no permanent solution to
their status. The Poverty Paper concludes that this displaced population is particularly
vulnerable to poverty and low standards of living. In BiH, nineteen percent of the total
population lives below the poverty line, while 30 percent live just above it.
During the 1990’s, Croatia’s social development reflected large disparity between the capital,
Zagreb, and the countryside. Zagreb enjoys a developed infrastructure and government
institutions while the country is less developed. In terms of basic human development, the
country is doing significantly better than the other former Yugoslav states except, Slovenia.
In April of 2002, the Croatian government reported that only 22,000 people from a high of
220,000 remain internally displaced. The majority of the returnees are Croats, while much of
the Croatian Serb population remains outside of Croatia’s borders.7

6

www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Yugoslavia+[Federal+Republic+of]
www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/CroatiaProfile+Summary

7

CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003

7

INVESTMENT OVERVIEW
As outlined in the introduction to this evaluation, the CMAP can be viewed as complementary
and enabling in terms of CIDA’s development priorities in the region. The expected results for
the programme vary based on the differing situations in each country. Within Kosovo, the
primary goal was to remove the threat of mine contamination completely. In BiH, mine
contamination is significant and may take decades to clear. Therefore, the priority was to
clear the highest priority areas for refugee returns and local populations, while building a
sustainable capacity to manage and conduct a long-term mine clearance programme.
Although more advanced, there was a similar need for the building of a sustainable national
institution to manage mine action in Croatia.
ACHIEVEMENTS AND MILESTONES
Balkan countries each have a unique mine contamination and development context. As a
result, the activities undertaken by the CMAP have taken a different character in each
country. Also, many of these activities have been collaborative in nature and the CMAP has
contributed a portion of the mine action efforts of the international community. Therefore, the
milestones of the Balkan CMAP are area specific and often cannot be separated from the
achievements of the entire community. The following are the noteworthy
achievements/milestones that the Balkans CMAP has contributed to:
Kosovo:
• 1999 - The UNMACC was established.
• 1999 - Rapid clearance of priority areas for returning refugees.
• 2001 - Effective removal of the mine threat.
Croatia:
• 2000 – 2001 - Development of the legal background, technical knowledge and
physical infrastructure for the CROMAC to operate as a fully indigenous
organization.
• 2000 – 2001 - Accurate mine surveys significantly reduced the suspected mine
contaminated areas.
• 2001 – A completed mine awareness needs report provided coherent priorities
and implementation strategies.
• 2002 - Law on Demining.
Bosnia and Herzegovina:
• 1998 – 2001 - Establish and consolidated the legal, technical and physical
infrastructure for a BHMAC. The BHMAC replaced the UN and entity MACs to
become the sole body responsible for mine action coordination.
• 2002 - Establishment of a State of Law on Demining.
• 2002 – Transfer of the responsibility for payment of MAC staff to the Bosnian
government, reflecting an increased level of indigenous ownership over mine
action.
• 1998 – 2002 – Increase in the indigenous mine clearance capacity.
• 1998 – 2002 – Clearance of many priority areas for the return of refugees
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PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT INFORMATION
Monitoring and evaluations have played a key part in the Balkan CMAP. CIDA project
officers and management have provided the resources to conduct initial needs assessments
and to undertake periodic evaluations to test the progress, draw lessons learned and
incorporate those lessons into future programming. Field visits have been conducted at
almost every phase of the CMAP and in every area. The CIDA programme officer
responsible carried out these visits for the CMAP along with contracted technical experts.
The process of incorporating the lessons learned into ongoing programme decisions may
have been partially hindered by staff turnover among the CIDA programme officers. During
the five-year course of the programme to date, three individuals have been responsible for
managing the programme, two of which only did so for one year. However, the staff turnover
rate at CIDA was balanced by continuity in senior CIDA management and by technical
experts taking a long-term role in the programme. There have been two such experts, Roger
St. John, the primary author of this evaluation, and George Focsaneanu. Mr. St. John has
played a role in evaluation and monitoring of the CMAP since 2000, while Mr. Focsaneanu
conducted an evaluation of the demining projects undertaken during the emergency phase in
Kosovo in 1999.
Monitoring, needs assessment and evaluation missions were:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

March 1998 - Feasibility Mission to BiH by Stephen Wallace, Director General.
June 1998 - Needs Assessment and Project Design Mission to BiH by David
Mueller, Programme Officer.
May 1999 - Monitoring Mission to BiH by David Mueller.
November 1999 - Evaluation of Mine and UXO Clearance Projects in Kosovo by
George Focsaneanu, Technical Advisor.
July 2000 - Monitoring and Needs Assessment Mission to Kosovo, BiH and
Croatia by Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, Senior Programme Officer, and Roger St.
John, Technical Advisor.
November 2000 - Evaluation of IDAC Demining Project in Kosovo by Roger St.
John, Technical Advisor.
September 2001 - Monitoring mission by Roger St. John, Technical Advisor and
Darcy Demarsico, Programme Officer.
November 2002 - Field Mission for the CIDA/ CEE Balkans CMAP 1998-2003 Evaluation by Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, Senior Programme Officer and Roger St.
John, Technical Advisor.

In addition to these official monitoring, needs assessment and evaluation missions, CEE
Branch senior management conducted numerous visits to evaluate progress, identify
concerns and convey information back to Branch Staff. Hélène Corneau, Director, Stephen
Wallace, Director General and Gilles Rivard, Director General, all conducted such missions.
INVESTMENT RESOURCES

As stated in the introduction to this evaluation, approximately $20m (CAD) was spent on the
CMAP over its first five years of operation. Approximately half of this was spent in Bosnia
CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003
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and Herzegovina, 8 million in Kosovo and 2 million in Croatia. A brief break down of the
areas of spending by country is illustrated below in Table 1 and the allocation of spending is
detailed in Part II - Evaluation Findings.
Table 1. Canadian Mine Action Program Disbursements 1998/99 – 2002/03 (CAD)

MACs

MINE
AWARENESS

VICTIM
ASSISTANCE

MINE/UXO
CLEARANCE

TOTAL

BiH

$ 2.63 m

$ 0.61 m

$ 1.22 m

$ 6.57 m

$ 11.03 m

Kosovo

$ 0.76 m

$ 0.20 m

$ 0.50 m

$ 6.00 m

$ 7.46 m

Croatia

$ 0.97 m

$ 0.06 m

$ 0.17 m

$ 0.80 m

$ 2.00 m

$ 4.36 m

$ 0.87 m

$ 1.89 m

$ 13.37 m

$ 20.49 m

21.3%

4.2%

9.2%

65.3%

100.0%

Total

%

EVALUATION PROFILE
OVERVIEW
As noted above, the Ottawa Convention and the creation of the CLF precipitated the Balkans
CMAP. This unique and multi-faceted programme consolidated ongoing CEE MAP initiatives
in the Balkans in response to significant additional funding from the CLF and the emergence
of compelling needs in the region as the political and security situations stabilized. As a
consequence, the development of the programme was largely responsive in nature,
particularly in Kosovo, and many valuable lessons have been learned.
These lessons resulted in the gradual refinement of the programme and concomitant
increases in effectiveness. Clearly these were hard-won lessons that should be captured
from a corporate perspective. This is particularly important with the recently announced
extension of the CLF beginning in 2003 and in terms of Canada’s current ODA policy focus
on Africa, with its many mine-affected countries. Accordingly, the evaluation of the Balkans
CMAP focused on the key results achieved. The emphasis was on validating the design,
implementation and effectiveness of the numerous projects that comprised the programme.
The lessons derived from the evaluation have been focused on improving programme
development, and project selection and design for similar MAP initiatives in the future. The
aim was to produce programming principles that will provide strategic orientation for future
mine action decisions, including the definition of preferred areas for Canadian intervention,
i.e. Canada’s mine action ‘niche’. Refining project design parameters, monitoring
requirements, reporting protocols and the type of results that should be expected will further
CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003
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enhance programme effectiveness. A flow chart depicting the key activities included in the
evaluation process is shown at Figure 1.
Figure 1. Balkans CMAP Evaluation Project Flowchart

Develop and forward survey
questionnaires to key
stakeholders

TERMS OF REFERENCE
(TOR)

Develop Field Mission Itinerary

Develop Evaluation Workplan
and
Financial Projections

Agreement
On
Workplan

Mission Coordination

Approval
•
•
•
•

Research corporate and external files
Consultations
Review RBM /APPRs
Review programme assessment
reports

Conduct CMAP Field
Evaluation Mission

•
•
•
•
Develop evaluation matrix including
framework of results and key
success factors, key issues,
questions and performance
indicators.

Analyze information
Define evaluation Results
Prepare lessons learned
Develop MAP programming
principles

Prepare & submit final report

Develop & deliver evaluation
debriefing

PROJECT ENDS
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METHODOLOGY
The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the performance of the CMAP in the Balkans
(both in terms of development and operations) and to identify lessons learned challenges
and opportunities for future programming. The work focused on the assessment of the
programme as a whole. A review of the 37 individual projects that comprise the Balkans
CMAP was a relevant part of the work, as they represent the building blocks of the
programme. However, a detailed review of each project at this stage would have been
counter productive, time consuming and expensive. The evaluation was conducted using
CIDA’s Evaluation Guide, 2000, and the Framework of Results and Key Success Factors, as
tools for the assessment of the results. The work was structured to include two distinct but
interrelated parts.
The first was a review of the projects and their progress towards results consisting of a brief
analysis of the 37 projects, grouped by country and type of programme (including MAC’s,
mine awareness, victim assistance and demining). Their results were then assessed, taking
into consideration the following:
a. consistency with CEE’s programme objectives and with crosscutting themes;
b. consistency with CIDA’s priorities of individual security, economic and social
development, and sustainability; and
c. what worked and what didn’t work in terms of project design, planning,
implementation and reporting (management factors and design factors), along
with an assessment of the capacity of the executing agencies, the synergies and
partnerships.
The findings in each country are presented separately, as each country presents different
issues to be addressed and a different context for programme and project design,
management and implementation.
An assessment of the overall programme performance was also conducted consisting of a
review of the programme implemented in each country with comparisons among the types of
programmes across the target countries. The programme review focused on:
a. development results (focusing on the achievement of results, cost-effectiveness,
relevance and the degree of sustainability achieved) and the success factors
(including appropriateness of design, resource utilization, and informed and timely
action);
b. strengths and weaknesses, focusing on what worked and what didn’t work in
terms of programme design, planning, implementation, management and
reporting; and,
c. challenges and lessons learned, focusing on programme-level development and
implementation with a view to recommending a framework for future
programming.
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The background and context, in which the CMAP has been developed, along with key
aspects of demining operations, were also taken into consideration as these had implications
in terms of the design and implementation of a responsive programme. Kosovo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Croatia have significant differences in the nature and extent of mine/UXO
contamination, political and legal structures, military/security situations, MAP structures and
international involvement.
Due to the nature of the projects in the programme, non-statistical analysis was used to
assess the projects’ progress towards results. This involved subjective assessments based
on both qualitative and quantitative information, and the use of informed judgment and expert
opinion where available. Also, because the CMAP focused on results achieved at the
outcome and impact level, the analyses and comparisons will take into consideration the
various stages of project implementation.
To simplify information presentation requirements, evaluation results matrixes were
prepared, based on information contained in the Annual Project Performance Reviews
(APPRs) (complemented with other reports such as end-of-project-reports, annual progress
reports and work plans, project evaluations, etc.). These result matrixes provide summarized
information regarding the expected results performance indicators, actual results and a
performance assessment for each project. These are included in Part II and are intended to
provide a simple and effective illustration of project results.
The sources of information, method of collection and basis of analysis remained relatively
consistent throughout. The sources of information principally included a detailed review of
corporate and related external documentation, as well as site observations and interviews
during afield visit to the programme area. Brief consultations were undertaken with CIDA
personnel, DFAIT, UNDP and UNMAS while more detailed consultations were undertaken
during the field visit with post personnel, beneficiaries, local authorities, project partners and
executing agencies. Information collection methods include: literature searches and file
reviews, consultation, site observations and expert opinion, as well as a survey questionnaire
that was completed by executing agencies and beneficiaries.
THE EVALUATION TEAM
The evaluation team was comprised of the Evaluation Manager, Lisanne Garceau-Bednar,
Senior Programme Officer, Peace and Security, Eastern Adriatic Division, Central and
Eastern Europe Branch; Evaluator/Technical Advisor, Roger St. John from St. John &
Associates Projects Inc; Performance Review Advisor, Claudia Marcondes; plus a Research
Assistant, Jeff Naylor. The evaluation included a thorough review of CIDA project
documentation as well as direct consultation with CIDA HQ and post personnel,
beneficiaries, local authorities, executing agency personnel and other stakeholders. The
detailed responsibilities of the team members were as follows:
a. Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, CIDA Evaluation Manager, has overall responsibility
and accountability for the evaluation. She was responsible for overseeing and
controlling the evaluation process, providing guidance and direction throughout all
phases of its execution and approving all deliverables. She conducted an
evaluation visit to the Balkans to collect information (Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina).
CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003
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b. Roger St. John, CIDA Demining Technical Advisor, was responsible for
conducting the evaluation, including the day-to-day management of operations,
review of programme documentation, development of the work plan, regular
progress reporting to CIDA's evaluation manager, and the preparation of the
evaluation report. As well, he participated in the evaluation site visit to the Balkans
to collect information and provide evaluation technical support (Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo). The work plan elaborated on the broad parameters
initially set out in the evaluation, by adding precision, scope and refinements to
the operational planning.
c. Claudia Marcondes, Performance Review Advisor, was responsible for providing
expert programme evaluation advice to the team in the areas of results
measurement and professional evaluation methodologies. She reviewed relevant
programme documentation to extract key elements such as expectations, results,
issues and lessons learned. She also provided input to the evaluation work plan
and was responsible for the development of a comprehensive evaluation
questionnaire for key project partners in the Balkans, in order to confirm project
results and obtain critical follow up information regarding the impact of the
programme on the defined beneficiary population (See Annexes F).
d. Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant, was responsible for assisting in the review of all
documentation related to projects that comprised the Balkans CMAP, with a view
to providing a comprehensive summary including key project parameters, results
achieved, issues and lessons learned. This review has been reflected in a set of
key results tables that provide a comprehensive summary of results by country
and mine action programme area (see Annex E).
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PART II - EVALUATION FINDINGS
BALKANS CMAP O VERVIEW
GENERAL
The purpose of this section of the report is to relate the evaluation findings regarding the
performance of the CMAP in the Balkans through a review of its 37 projects. The findings have
been derived from an assessment of the achievements, challenges, opportunities and lessons
learned from a detailed review of the information contained in CIDA files and related
correspondence. Corporate memory was tapped through a series of interviews with key
personnel. As well, external sources such as post personnel, partner organizations and
implementing agencies were surveyed by direct interviews during the evaluation field mission
and, where necessary, by an electronic questionnaire.
The file review consisted of an analysis of the Annual Project Progress Reports (APPR’s) for
each of the 37 projects involved in the programme. End-of-project reports and the most recent
annual report prepared by the executing agencies were consulted in specific cases where it
was necessary to collect more in-depth information. This was augmented by a review of all
programme/project monitoring and assessment reports as well as a review of reports prepared
by related external agencies. Following this research phase, a series of information matrixes
were developed to assemble project information and key results into a manageable framework
for analysis and presentation. Ultimately, results matrixes were designed for each of the
Balkans CMAP countries and these were further broken down by the key areas of mine action
(Annex E). A survey questionnaire was then developed to guide the interview process with key
CIDA personnel and those visited during the field mission. As noted above, this questionnaire
was also used in electronic format to access important respondents who could not be
interviewed in person (Annex F). Finally, the information from all sources was synthesized to
complete the results matrixes, and form the basis of the following discussion and findings.
The bulk of the work focused on:
a. assessing the performance of CMAP in the Balkans as a whole (both in terms of
development and operations);
b. identification of the lessons learned, challenges and underlying principles that
should guide future programming; and
c. CIDA’s Framework of Results and Key Success Factors was employed as a tool for
the assessment of results.
The background and context in which the CMAP has been developed along with key aspects
of demining operations are important to consider as they have significant implications in terms
of the design and implementation of a responsive programme. Things to consider include: the
nature and extent of mine/UXO contamination; political and legal structures; the
military/security situation; existing MAP structures; and other international involvement.
Accordingly, a brief historical perspective has been provided in the Investment Profile, Part I
that describes the development context in terms of the origin of the various conflicts and the
resulting political, economic and social conditions that defined the investment profile of the
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Balkans region. From the standpoint of the CMAP, it is also necessary to understand the mine
action context that existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo. This information is
provided in the following background discussion.
BACKGROUND
In order to evaluate the Balkans CMAP, it is essential to understand the nature and extent of
the mine contamination problem. Indeed, the various Balkan regions exhibit great diversity in
terms of ethnicity, culture, religion and geography as well as in the areas of political, economic
and social development. The conflicts that resulted in the widespread and severe landmine
and UXO contamination of the CMAP countries within the region were also extremely different
in terms of their origins, intensity and duration, as well as the source, extent and the very
nature of the contamination. Accordingly, considerable care was required in the design and
development of the individual CMAP projects. In this context, it is important to remember that
a template approach to project design and implementation is not at all appropriate in this or
other mine affected regions.
While there is reported to be residual landmine contamination in Yugoslavia (SerbiaMontenegro), Macedonia and Albania, the 1998-2003 Balkans CMAP focused on those
countries that emerged from conflict in the 1990s with extensive contamination problems;
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Prior to 1998, the UN established mine action
coordination offices in Croatia and in Bosnia. The development of these organizations was
supported by DFAIT, CIDA and DND, particularly in the area of institution building by the
provision of technical expertise, hardware and database development. The five-year Balkans
CMAP originated with the establishment of the CLF in 1998 and began as a modest package
of projects designed to address pressing needs in Bosnia. Bosnia was identified as the most
critical mine affected country and the most suitable for Canadian development investment
given the intransigence of the regime in Croatia at the time. A feasibility mission was
undertaken in March 1998 and this was followed in June 1998 by a needs assessment and
project design mission. This process resulted in the funding and implementation of several
projects covering the full spectrum of mine action with particular focus on demining, and
institution and capacity building. The Balkans CMAP was rapidly expanded at the end of the
Kosovo crisis in 1999 and further expanded in 2000 to include several projects in Croatia in
response to the 2000 elections and the installation of a more moderate government.
THE MINE/UXO CONTAMINATION PROBLEM
As noted above, the mine/UXO contamination in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo varied
dramatically. Table 2 provides comparative information related to the nature and extent of the
problem. In terms of land area, Croatia and Bosnia are comparable with over 50,000 square
kilometres each, while Kosovo is just over 10,000 square kilometres. Compared to Croatia, the
terrain of both Bosnia and Kosovo is extremely rugged with corresponding extremes of
climate, particularly in the higher elevations and mountainous areas. The conflicts that
produced the mine/UXO contamination were also very different in nature:
Croatia. The fighting in Croatia broke out in July 1991 and ended at the beginning of
1992 with an UN-brokered ceasefire. The fighting was concentrated in and around four
Serb-dominated areas in the southern and eastern border regions of Croatia and
consequently, most of the resulting contamination was concentrated in these areas.
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UN protection areas were established and while some clearance took place, another
brief round of fighting occurred in 1995 when the Croats conducted offensive military
operations to restore their borders. During the initial conflict, the Croat forces consisted
mostly of irregulars called into service with a small cadre of ex-JNA professionals. The
Serbs also consisted of irregulars but were backed by professional military units of the
JNA. Extensive mine laying was undertaken by each side in the conflict, however, a
great number of mines were laid in haste by untrained personnel and record keeping
was erratic at best. Some 14,000 records were initially retrieved reflecting a modest
132,000 AP and 79,408 AT mines, and an initial suspected mined area of roughly 4000
square kilometres. A large number of the records were discounted as unreliable and
CROMAC now has 8,300 records on file. Obviously there are still many more mines
than reflected in the records and this is complicated by concentrations of UXO,
particularly in siege areas such as Vukovar. The current suspected mined area in
Croatia is approximately 1,700 square kilometres and with an estimated 500,000 mines
and an unknown amount of UXO.
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fighting in
Bosnia lasted much longer, 1992-95, and took
on the nature of an all-out civil war with three
ethnic groups, shifting alliances and extensive
outside involvement by both Yugoslavia and
Croatia as well as a number of Islamic factions.
The fighting raged along a front that snaked
some 1,600 kilometres through central Bosnia
dividing Serb from Muslim and Croat areas of
the country. The front divided the capital of
Sarajevo that was under siege and surged
back and forth with various offensives leaving
Figure 2. Outskirts of Sarajevo (CIDA file
extensive mine/UXO contamination in their
photo)
wake. Minefields were laid, lifted, re-laid and
sometimes overlaid. Nuisance or random
mining was widespread and mines were also used to support ethnic cleansing, for
intimidation or to prevent refugee returns. This extensive minefield contamination was
exacerbated by heavy concentrations of UXO resulting from heavy bombardments,
particularly in locations such as Sarajevo and Goradze. The war ended in December
1995 with the implementation of the Dayton Accord and the deployment of a large
NATO-led stabilization force (SFOR). Some 17,500-minefield records were retrieved
and initial estimates indicated approximately 4,000 square kilometres of suspected
mined area containing over one million landmines. More recent estimates indicate
about 10,000 contaminated sites totaling about 2,100 square kilometres involving
some 670,000 mines and 650,000 UXOs.8

8

Mine Action Plan of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Year 2003. Note: The reduction in suspected mined area in
both Croatia and Bosnia reflects ongoing analyses and the discounting of suspected areas by the review of
documents for duplication, field investigation and technical survey. It is estimated that the current suspected area
could be reduced by as much as an additional 50-75% by the use of methodical technical surveys thereby greatly
increasing the efficiency of clearance operations and reducing the overall cost.
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Kosovo. The conflict in Kosovo initially consisted of insurgency operations undertaken
by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) beginning in 1996. In response, the
Serbian forces laid mines on border infiltration routes, lines of communication, critical
infrastructure, military installations and domestic infrastructure for the purposes of
denial and intimidation. For the most part, they used a doctrinaire approach and the
majority of these minefields were well recorded. Some random or nuisance mining was
carried out by both sides, thereby increasing the threat and complicating subsequent
clearance operations. The refusal of Serbia to agree to an internationally brokered
peace plan in 1998 resulted in an intensive 78-day NATO bombing campaign intended
to force Serbia to withdraw from Kosovo. This resulted in widespread strike area UXO
contamination throughout Kosovo from Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs). The UNMACC that
was established in mid-1999 obtained a total of 620 Serb minefield records and
recorded some 333 NATO CBU strike areas. In all, approximately 4,000 reported
dangerous areas were investigated and either discounted by survey or cleared
accordingly. All known minefields and strike areas, totaling 32 square kilometres, were
cleared during the period July/August 1999 to December 2001. The total ordnance
found and destroyed included 8,485 CBU bomblets (an additional 7,455 were cleared
by KFOR troops in the same period), 19,457 AP mines 5,515 AT mines and 13,896
items of other UXO.9
Clearly, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo varied dramatically in the nature and extent of their mine
contamination problem. Kosovo presented a unique and manageable situation that was largely
addressed in a mere 2.5 years by amassing significant international and local resources under
a very effective UNMACC. Without local government institutions, the clearance programme
was able to proceed under the auspices of the UN (UNMIK) and KFOR. This was a significant
and highly successful operation, however, the number of mines/UXO, the nature of
contamination and the size of the area amounted to only a fraction of that faced in Croatia and
Bosnia. There are significant differences as well between Croatia and Bosnia. The
contamination in Croatia affects approximately one-third of the country but is largely
concentrated in defined border areas permitting relative freedom of movement in large areas
including the capital, Zagreb, and along the Dalmatian coast thereby allowing revitalization of
the lucrative tourist trade. On the other hand, the contamination in Bosnia is widespread and
affects a very large proportion of the population including those living in the capital, Sarajevo.
Unlike Croatia, infrastructure throughout the country was heavily damaged or destroyed
because of the protracted and intensive nature of the conflict, and many developed areas
were mined to facilitate ethnic cleansing. As well, the effectiveness of the entire mine action
programme in Bosnia has been badly hampered by the complexity of government and public
institutions trying to function in an ethnically divided country. These dramatic differences must
be taken into account when reading the findings, lessons learned and recommendations
contained in this evaluation as well as in the application of lessons learned or ‘principles’ in the
design of future programmes.

9

Willing to Listen – An Evaluation of UN MAP in Kosovo 1999 – 2001, The Praxis Group, Riverside, Geneva, 12
February 2002.
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Table 2. Comparative Landmine Contamination - Balkans Region (2002)
Land Area

BiH
56,610,000 km 2

Croatia
51,129,000 km 2

10,080 km 2

Population

4,381,000

4,400,000

2,100,000

Minefield Records/ Dangerous 10,000
Areas

8,300

Mine fields: 620
CBU Strikes: 333

Estimated Number of Mines

670,000

500,000

Mines found and destroyed:
5,515 Anti-Tank
19,457 Anti-Personnel

Estimated Number of UXOs

650,000

(No Estimate)

15,940 CBU (bomblets)
13,845 Other UXOs

Initial Suspected Mined Area 4,000 km 2
(at end of conflict)

4,000 km 2

361 km 2

2,100 km 2

1,700 km 2

32 km 2 were cleared (only residual
contamination remains)

Mine/ UXO Incidents (total to 4,764
2001)

1,360

456

Mine/ UXO Victims Killed and 1,385
Injured

~1,818**

95

Current Suspected Mined
Area (end 2002)

Kosovo*

*Kos ovo data is from end of the conflict (1999) to the completion of the UNMACC mine action program in
December 2001. Some residual mine/UXO contamination remains and there were a few incidents in 2003 resulting
in 10 casualties mostly from M75 grenades but including one death from a CBU bomblet.
** Total since 1991. The figures prior to 1995 are unreliable.

CONTENTS
The rest of Part II is structured as follows:
a. Balkans CMAP Project Reviews. A detailed review is provided for projects in each
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia. In each case, the CMAP projects
are reviewed by area of mine action (MAC/institutional support, mine awareness,
victim assistance and demining) including a general description of the project, an
assessment of progress towards results and a check of consistency with
established goals. This is followed by a discussion of findings and lessons learned
based on a brief review of the key aspects of project design, implementation and
reporting, focusing on what worked and what didn’t work.
b. Balkans CMAP Programme Review. A brief review of the Balkans CMAP is
provided at the programme level. The discussion includes an assessment of the
programme’s consistency with its stated goals, adherence to CIDA/CEE’s
objectives and priorities, and its consistency with the crosscutting themes of gender
and the environment. This includes findings and lessons learned based on a brief
review of the key aspects of programme design, implementation and reporting,
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again focusing on what worked and what didn’t work. Finally, a review of the CMAP
is provided based in the Framework of Results and Key Success Factors.
The assessment of the 37 projects (see CMAP Project List, Table 3) was conducted taking
into consideration that the projects are in different stages of implementation. The discussion
also takes into consideration the methodologies used in project implementation, including:
a.
b.
c.
d.

expertise transfer and training,
demining operations,
provision of equipment, and
core contributions.

Table 3. List of all Balkans CMAP Projects

Bosnia – Herzegovina
MACs

Mine Awareness
Victim Assistance

Demining

Other: Int’l Donor
Coop/ Leveraging
of Funds

Project No.
Z-011297
Z-011303
Z-020160
Z-020216
Z-020353
Z-020519
Z-010437
Z-011414-001
Z-011464
M-010054
Z-020336
Z-011295
Z-020339-001
Z-020520
Z-011296
Z-020217
Z-020340
Z-011298
Z-020341
Z-011299
Z-020342
Z-020521
Z-011414-002
Z-020232
Z-020351
Z-020518

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Project Title
Institutional Support to MACs I
Institutional Support to MACs II
UNDP Task Manager for Demining
Institutional Support to MACs III
Institutional Support to MACs IV
Institutional Support to MACs V
Mine Awareness
ITF Landmine Victim Assistance
Support to Children Victims of Landmines
Emergency Assistance to Disabled population/Landmine Victims Peer Group
Landmine Victims Peer Counselling Group II
Mine Detection Dog Training I
Mine Detection Dog Training II
Mine Detection Dog Training III
Akcija Protiv Mina (APM) Demining I
Akcija Protiv Mina (APM) Demining II
Akcija Protiv Mina (APM) Demining III
Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance I
Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance II
Entity Armed forces Demining I
Entity Armed Forces Demining II
Entity Armed Forces Demining III
International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds II
International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds III
International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds IV
International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds V

Croatia
MACs

Project No.
Z-020337-001
Z-020337-002
Z-020337-003

Mine Awareness
Victim Assistance
Demining

Z-020337-004
Z-020337-005
Z-020337-006
Z-020337-007
Z-020337-008
Z-020339-002

Project Title
27. Cdn Mine Action Progr/Support to UN-CROMAC Transition Program
28. Cdn Mine Action Progr / CROMAC National Managers & Middle Managers
Training & Development
29. Cdn Mine Action Progr / CROMAC Communications, Database &
Management Coordination
30. Cdn Mine Action Progr / Support to CROMAC Survey & QA Depts .
31. Cdn-Mine Action Progr / Mine Awareness Program
32. CMAP-CMAV Mine Victim Assistance Program
33. Cdn Mine Action Progr / Modest CROMAC Survey & Verification Projects
34. Cdn Mine Action Progr/ Support to NPA’s Demining Program
35. Mine Detection Dog Training II (HR)
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Kosovo
Project No.
MACC
Mine Awareness
Victim Assistance
Demining

Other: Int’l. Donor
Coop/ Leveraging
of Funds

Z-020066
Z-020091
M-0
M-010054
Z-020013
Z-020027
M-0
Z-020200
Z-020350
Z-020233

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Project Title
Canada / Belgium / UNMAS Assessment Mission
Support to MACC in Kosovo- Data Entry Clerks
Institutional Support to MACC in Kosovo
UNICEF Balkans Regional Program
Emergency Assistance to Disabled Population/Landmine Victims Peer Group
Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo Y1999
Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo Y1999
Emergency Shelter & Related Demining Y1999
Canadian Mine/UXO Clearance Project in Kosovo Y2000
Canadian Support to the Mine Action Program in Kosovo Y2001
Int’l Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds II

THE CMAP P ROJECTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
OVERVIEW OF BIH PROJECTS AND RESULTS

General Description of Programme
Bosnia and Herzegovina is described as one of the most heavily mined countries in Europe.
According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2002, the BHMAC has described the situation as a
threat which is generally low density and random in nature. The total area potentially affected
is in the order of 2,100 square kilometres and the bulk of it still requires survey in order to
determine the finite extent of the problem. Current estimates indicate there are approximately
10,000 dangerous (mined) areas containing about 670,000 mines and 650,000 items of
UXO 10. Casualties from mine/UXO incidents have leveled-off since 2000 at some 50 to 60 per
year.
The UNDP and the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance (ITF)
are the institutions that receive most contributions directed to the overall funding of mine
action in BiH11. Most of these contributions are geared towards mine action operations such as
demining but there is also considerable support provided for mine action centre capacity
development by the UNDP. Table 4 below provides an illustration of the amount of overall
funding for mine action in BiH.

10
11

BHMAC Demining Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina by the year of 2010 (Draft).
Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003

21

Table 4. CIDA Canadian Mine Action Program Contributions in Bosnia-Herzegovina
1998/99 – 2002/03 (CAD)
FY
Canadian
Landmine Fund
Other Funding
Sources (CIDA,
CEE Branch)
Total

1998/99

1999/00

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

Total

2,470,000

3,120,000

1,786,750

1,708,643

1,064,607

10,150,000

580,000

300,000

0

0

0

3,050,000

3,420,000

1,786,750

1,708,643

1,064,607

880,000

11,030,000

The CMAP in BiH is a peace building and security initiative that provides support to the four
areas of mine action in the country12. This five-year, $11m (CAD) programme, initiated in 1998
constitutes a significant contribution 13 and places Canada as one of the key donor countries in
this field (see Table 4). In 2002, “the UNDP estimated that approximately $23m (USD) per
year was needed for demining activities in BiH and an additional $3m (USD) to maintain the
Mine Action Centres”14. Interestingly however, the latest BHMAC estimates call for
approximately $60m (USD) per year to tackle the mine contamination problem by the year
2010 15. Table 4 provides the total funding provided by the CMAP in BiH for each year of the
programme since 1998. The CMAP in BiH has been a very balanced programme covering all
four areas of mine action with emphasis on demining and institutional support (see CMAP –
BiH Project List, Table 5).
Table 5. CIDA Canadian Mine Action Program Contributions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by
Project
Project
No.

Project Title

Budget
(CAD
dollars)

Executing
Agency

Start
Date

End
Date

98.12.15
00.01.11
00.03.31
01.04.02
02.11.28

01.12.31
01.01.31
01.06.29
02.03.28
04.02.28

Institutional Support to MACs
1
2
3
4
5
6

Z-011297
Z-011303
Z-020160
Z-020216
Z-020353
Z-020519

Institutional Support to MACs I
Institutional Support to MACs II
UNDP Task Manager for Demining
Institutional Support to MACs III
Institutional Support to MACs IV
Institutional Support to MACs V
Sub-Total “Institutional Support to MACs”

$
$
$
$
$
$

650,000
720,100
75,000
500,000
400,000
290,000

UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP

$2,635,100

12

Canada’s assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina is broader and concentrates on economic and institutional transition
with several areas of emphasis including health, policing, human rights, government administration and the
development of non-governmental organizations.
13
The Canadian Mine Action Programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina is one component of the $100m (CAD) CLF.
14
Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).
15
BHMAC Mine Action Plan for the Year 2003, and BHMAC Strategy to the Year 2010.
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Mine Awareness
7

Z-010437

Mine Awareness ($580,000 non CLF)
Adjustment (CIDA Multilateral Branch)

$
$

0
26,020

IBRD

96.04.05

98.09.30

Sub-Total “Mine Awareness”

$

26,020

ITF Landmine Victim Assistance

$

70,000

ITF

99.04.23

00.03.31

Support to Children Victims of Landmines
Emergency Assistance to Disabled Population/
Landmine Victims Peer Group ($300,000 non
CLF)
Landmine Victims Peer Counselling Group II

$
$

450,000
0

ICI
Queens
U.

01.05.25
99.07.01

03.04.15
99.12.31

$

270,000

Queens
U.

01.03.07

02.07.31

Sub-Total “Victim Assistance”

$

790,000

Mine Detection Dog Training I
Mine Detection Dog Training II

$
$

540,000
700,000

01.03.01

02.05.31

Mine Detection Dog Training III
Akcija Protiv Mina Demining I
Akcija Protiv Mina Demining II
Akcija Protiv Mina Demining III
Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance I
Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance II
Entity Armed Forces Demining I
Entity Armed Forces Demining II
Entity Armed Forces Demining III

$ 402,000
$ 840,000
$ 400,000
$ 422,000
$ 710,000
$ 500,000
$ 1,430,000
$ 450,000
$ 172,500

CIDC
HI
HI
HI
NPA
NPA
SFOR
SFOR
SFOR

02.08.01

03.05.31

00.03.31
00.11.06

01.06.30
02.03.28

01.02.16

02.02.15

01.03.29
02.07.19

02.12.31
03.12.31

Sub-Total “Demining”

$ 6,566,500

Victim Assistance
8
9
10

Z-011414001
Z-011464
M-010054

11

Z-020336

Demining
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Z-011295
Z-020339001
Z-020520
Z-011296
Z-020217
Z-020340
Z-011298
Z-020341
Z-011299
Z-020342
Z-020521

CIDC
CIDC

Other: Int’l. Donor Cooperation /
Leveraging of Funds
23
24

Z-011414002
Z-020232

25

Z-020351

26

Z-020518

7
10

Z-010437
M-010054

Int’l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling
of Funds I
Int’l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling
of Funds II
Int’l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling
of Funds IV
Int’l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling
of Funds V

$

0

ITF

99.04.23

$

19,500

ITF

00.03.31

$

91,410

ITF

01.03.31

$

21,470

ITF

02.07.19

Sub-Total “Int’l. Donor Cooperation /
Leveraging of Funds”

$

132,380

GRAND TOTAL - Canadian Landmine Fund

$10,150,000

OTHER FUNDING SOURCES
(CIDA, CEE Branch, Balkans Program)
Mine Awareness ($580,000 non CLF)
Emergency Assistance to Disabled Population/
Landmine Victims Peer Group ($300,000 non
CLF)

$
$

580,000
300,000

IBRD
Queens
U.

96.04.05
99.07.01

Sub-Total
“Other Funding Sources w ithin CIDA”

$

880,000

GRAND TOTAL
CIDA Canadian Mine Action Program

$11,030,000
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Institutional/MAC Support Projects
The BHMAC was instituted at the national level in
1998 and has been the central policy-making and
coordinating body for all mine action in the country
along with so-called Entity Mine Action Centres
(EMACs) located in each of the Republica Srpska
(RSMAC) and the Federation (FMAC). This mine
action coordination structure functioned under the
direction of a Demining Commission consisting of
Figure 3. BHMAC Headquarters –
Sarajevo (DFAIT/ILX file
senior entity representatives and proved exceedingly
photo)
cumbersome. Allegations of corruption and fraud in
the BiH mine action programme at large erupted in the autumn of 2000 followed by a one-year
inquiry conducted by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The most disturbing finding
of the inquiry was that the three demining commissioners were directly implicated in the
fraudulent activity. It is important to note that Canadian funding contributions were not
involved. As a result of the inquiry, however, Canada and several other donor countries
suspended funding support for almost a year pending the results that were finally published in
the spring/summer 2001. This action and increasing dissatisfaction with the MAC structure led
to a new law on demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina 16 published in February 2002. The
former demining commissioners were removed, a new Demining Commission was created,
and the MAC structure was rationalized to include regional instead of entity MACs with key
mine action authority vested in the BHMAC. This restructured organization includes new
demining commissioners as well as a new manager for the BHMAC, and it is already showing
dramatic signs of improvement over the previous organization. Of the $11m (CAD) contributed
to mine action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, $2.64m (CAD) was spent to improve the capacity of the
MACs through six institutional support projects managed by the UNDP. The first project was a
contribution of $650,000 (CAD) in 1998 which included $500,000 (CAD) to pay for UNDP
expenses and $150,000 (CAD) earmarked to cover incremental costs of deploying five
Canadian Forces 17 (CF) technical experts for a 12-month period.
Following that project, the largest single contribution was made through MAC II - a three-year,
$720,000 (CAD) project initiated in December 1998 which provided a $400,000 (CAD)
contribution to the BHMAC Information Department and $150,000 (CAD) to cover the
deployment costs of the Canadian technical experts. The contribution was used to maintain
and upgrade the national mine information database and minefield mapping systems. The
Canadians provided technical advice and training of local nationals within the BiH and entity
MACs in areas such as management, database development and maintenance, prioritization
of tasks, quality control, certification of cleared sites, development of standard operating
procedures and accreditation of demining organizations. MAC III, MAC IV and MAC V were
subsequently approved, providing UNDP with 1 to 1.5 year contributions at decreasing levels
from $500,000 to $290,000 (CAD)18.
16 Law on Demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, February 2002.
17 These were Canadian Forces (CF) Military Engineers from the Department of National Defence (DND) whose
salaries were covered by DND
18 MAC III’s contribution of $500,000 (CAD) was split into the BHMAC Department of Coordination ($390,000) and
the Information Department ($110,000), the latter being used for the purchase of additional hardware to resolve
serious problems of the network systems. MAC IV’s contribution ($400 000) to BHMAC and the two entity MACs
was channelled through the (ITF).
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In addition to the contributions to build the capacity of the MACs, there was also a contribution
of $150,000 (CAD) to pay for the salary of a demining Task Manager, Mirgo Saltmiras, for one
year who played a key role in establishing a good working relationship between the UN and
the BiH government (governmental interrelations experience, consensus building) and was
instrumental in bringing about the reform of the Demining Commission. CIDA also funded a
UNDP Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), Mr David Rowe who was instrumental in the creation of
the new Law on Demining that included the rationalization of the MAC structure. He was also
heavily involved in the development of the comprehensive ‘BiH Mine Action Plan for 2003’ and
a ‘Demining Strategy to the Year 2010’, as well as the promotion of a comprehensive socioeconomic impact survey planned and funded (USA/Italy) for 2003.
Institutional Support Results - Consistency with Goals
The results achieved by the projects in institutional support have been consistent with the goal
of “improving indigenous demining and institutional capacity”. Indeed, taken together the
projects resulted in significant and progressive improvements in capacity that have been
described as vital in terms of creating the competent national structure that exists today. To
assess the magnitude of the results achieved, it is important to have some contextual
information. In the first couple of years after the conflict ended, there was no functioning state
in Bosnia and UNMACC was set up to coordinate demining operations in the country. As
noted above, in 1998 a decentralized national model was created with a BHMAC and two
entity MACs. Besides the challenges of creating institutions from scratch, there were many
other difficulties and issues to be dealt with. These included; the difficulty of operating between
the entities, the testing and accreditation of the organizations performing demining operations,
as well as the certification and quality assurance of the clearance work being performed. The
lack of regulations and the absence of a framework for quality assurance were central to many
problems (including corruption/conflict of interest) and contributed to overall poor quality of
services provided by the MAC structure in this critical development area and time frame.
Canadian support was key for the development of the MACs as local institutions to coordinate
the national mine action programme. The placement of Canadian technical experts provided
not only for necessary technical advice but also for on-job training and building local capacity
in key areas. Canadian support in the area of database development, mapping and the
provision of hardware was also crucial. The ongoing support provided by CMAP has been
widely applauded for its consistency and reliability throughout the period, permitting a degree
of confidence and stability vital to such organizations. With the continuous support provided by
the CMAP in Bosnia, the capacity of the BHMAC has been greatly enhanced and it has
matured into a sound and effective national structure. Indeed, Canadian pressure related to
ongoing funding contributed in a significant way to the reform of the Demining Commission,
the new Demining Law and the rationalization of the MAC structure. The Demining Law, which
passed in February 2002, mandated centralization of responsibility for mine action with the
BHMAC thereby ending the competition for areas of responsibility between the BHMAC and
the entity MACs.
The capacity of the BHMAC has significantly improved in two key areas: the planning and
coordination of mine action, and the development of a regulatory framework. The
improvements made in coordination range from the development and implementation of key
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information tools (such as plans, detailed maps, task dossiers, survey reports, incident data
reports, data collection, existing minefield data updates, clearance completion reports, task
threat assessments, etc.)19, and the creation of operational systems and procedures
necessary to identify, prioritize, execute and monitor action in the sector. Some examples of
the latter include: higher efficiency of communication and network systems allowing for an
increased level of operations; a management system to simplify accounting and reporting
processes; and the consolidation of a system of priority setting based on identified needs and
broad national objectives that are endorsed by cantonal, regional and entity governments.
In terms of the development of a regulatory framework, BiH national mine action standards
were developed based on an examination of recognized international standards and the
experience of various practitioners in the field. These are being used as the basis for standard
operating procedures, quality control and certification of cleared areas to guide the work of all
NGO/commercial demining organizations operating in the country.
The level of improvement is such that the BHMAC is now fully recognized and has been able
to establish good levels of contact with appropriate government bodies, and interested
national and international organizations. As noted above, the new Demining Law vested
responsibility for all demining operations (including UXO clearance) in the BHMAC and the
salaries of the BHMAC personnel are now to be paid by the BiH government as employees of
the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication. This is a major milestone in terms of
ownership and the building of long-term sustainability. The BHMAC is also “responsible for
formulating and proposing the national mine action plan, which must be approved by the
Council of Ministers” and “will accredit deminers, who must be trained in accordance with BiH
standards”20. As noted above, this plan, which is now in place for 2003, is being supplemented
by a strategic demining strategy to the year 2010. This is an important development and
reflects a substantial improvement in the management, planning and operations capacity of
the MAC, and will serve to reinforce its importance as a vital government institution in the
ongoing process of national reconstruction.
Another key result of the institutional support projects is in the important area of achieving
long-term sustainability. The structure is now almost entirely comprised of local staff. Initially
the BHMAC had 40 foreign advisers and by the end of 2001 there were only six. Locals who
were trained by the Canadians and other donors gradually replaced the international advisors.
They are now highly competent and have produced professional and comprehensive planning
documents with hopes of realizing an ambitious strategy for largely removing the effects of
mines in BiH by 2010. This dramatic reduction in the number of foreign advisers and the
acceptance of responsibility for the pay and allowances of BHMAC personnel by the
government are strong indicators of long-term sustainability for the institution. These are also
good indicators of the cost-effectiveness and the relevance of the improvements made by the
CMAP through its consistent support of MAC institution building projects in Bosnia, in spite of
a difficult development investment environment. Indeed, the UNDP Resident Representative in
Bosnia and Herzegovina cited Canada’s long-standing support as key to the successful
evolution of this country’s mine action work. This was considered instrumental both in
leveraging contributions from other donors and in bringing the demining institutions to the point
whereby UNDP has a plan in place to transfer control and funding support for the BHMAC and

19

The number and quality of plans and reports produced by the MACs is a good indicator of the improvements
made in their planning, management and coordination capacity.
20
Landmine Monitor Report 2002. ICBL.

CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003

26

the Demining Commission to the Bosnian government. 21 Notwithstanding the foregoing, it
should be noted that at the time of writing this report, the BiH government was unable to meet
its salary obligations for the BHMAC and had to be assisted by Canada and other donors. This
situation is a result of difficult macro-economic issues and is not a reflection on the BHMAC or
indeed on the motivation or commitment of the government.
Mine Clearance Projects
Since 1998, the CMAP in Bosnia has included funding support for the implementation of
mine/UXO clearance projects. The goals were to “bring stability and normalcy to peoples’ daily
lives, permit safe development, encourage the safe return of refugees and facilitate the
development of a sustainable indigenous mine clearance capacity”. The total Canadian
contribution in this area to date has been $6.57m (CAD), disbursed through 11 projects that
were managed by four different partners and executing agencies, including Handicap
International (HI)/Akcija Protiv Mina (APM), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the SFOR
Engineer Branch/Entity Armed Forces (EAF) and the Canadian International Demining Corps
(CIDC). All of the projects involved three phases except for NPA, which only had two.
The contributions varied from a one-year period to 21 months. The largest single contribution
was of $1.43m (CAD) to SFOR. The other contributions were somewhat less, ranging from
$400,000 to $840,000 (CAD) for the training of mine detection dogs (MDDs), the purchase and
operation of mechanical mine clearance equipment, and the provision of specialized
equipment for enhancing the capability of demining
teams.
Mine Clearance Results - Consistency with Goals
The results achieved by the Bosnian CMAP projects in
mine clearance have been consistent with their goals
of “increasing security for the people of Bosnia,
providing safe conditions for development and the
return of refugees, and building sustainable
indigenous capacity”. These results are somewhat
easier to measure than those related to institutional
capacity building, because it is possible to quantify the
amount of land area that has been cleared 22. According
to the Landmine Monitor Report (2002), in BosniaFigure 4. CIDC MDD Team (CIDA file
Herzegovina, during 2000 23 a total of 5,545,005 square
photo).
metres of land were cleared, and 3,113 mines and
2,675 items of UXO were found and destroyed, and in
2001, a total of 7,111,000 square metres of land was cleared, with 5,797 mines and 3,408
UXO found and destroyed. 24
21

DFAIT Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund, “Making a Difference”, 2001-02.
Even though it would be possible to also measure the number of mines/UXO cleared, this is not an accurate
measurement of the landmine problem, as even the “perception” of mines still constitutes an impediment/ problem.
23
Housing accounted for the greatest proportion of land cleared in 2001 (51 percent compared with 47 percent in
2000), agriculture for a smaller proportion (15 percent compared with 20 percent in 2000) and electric power for a
lower proportion (7 percent compared with 17 percent in 2000).
24
According to BHMAC database.
22
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Canadian funding support contributed directly to the amount of area cleared through dedicated
contributions to demining organizations such as NPA and APM as well as by the employment
of assets made available by Canadian funding support such as MDD teams and mechanical
clearance equipment. Indirect contributions include the funding of insurance premiums for EAF
deminers operating under the auspices of SFOR and the donation of MDD teams, vehicles
and mechanical clearance equipment to the EAF, the BiH Civil Protection Organization, APM
and NPA. These contributions enabled demining operations to take place and the funding of
insurance for the EAF deminers permitted SFOR to pressure the EAF to also undertake
demining operations in accordance with the Dayton Peace Accord. In this project, CIDA
contributions support demining operations that are carried out by demining teams from the
entity armies of the Federation and the Republika Srpska. The mechanical clearance
equipment and MDD teams are important centralized assets for rapid ground preparation,
quality assurance and technical survey; however, some problems have been experienced by
the EAF in the area of refresher training, maintenance and effective employment of these
resources. Nonetheless, these assets greatly
accelerate the work, and mechanical
preparation reduces the danger of manual mine
clearance by removing vegetation and tripwires,
and by detonating some mines. Solutions
currently being investigated include contracting
mechanical and MDD services thereby
concentrating the EAF effort exclusively in the
area of manual demining.
In some projects, the Canadian contribution in
terms of area cleared has been quantified. 25
Approximately 106,909 and 110,670 square
metres of land have been cleared in 2000 and
2001 respectively by a local NGO, APM
(Demining II & III), funded through HI. 26 In
addition, the EAF Demining II project27 reported
896,000 square metres of land cleared in 2000 28.
Figure 5. SFOR/EAF Bozena Donated by
NPA also contributed with 437,568 and 73,450
Canada (CIDA file photo)
square metres of land cleared in two phases of
the Sarajevo Canton mine clearance project. As well, 187,000 square metres were cleared
directly by contracted CIDC MDD teams. As can easily be seen, these direct and indirect
Canadian contributions comprised a significant proportion of the total area cleared in 2000 and
2001, and the outputs were very comparable to BiH norms.
A more significant measure of impact is the clearance of high-priority land that was not being
used because of the risk or perceived risk posed by mines. This is land that is economically

25

See note 17.
Besides demining, project activities included training of demining teams, community liaison work, mine
awareness and administrative capacity building.
27
The project activities included: (a) mobilization of EAF deminers; (b) a 10-12 month insurance package for all 550
EAF deminers throughout Bosnia; (c) procurement of 3 MDD team vehicles; and, (d) training of an additional six (6)
MDD teams for the EAF demining Programme.
28
This project also contributed to the preparation of 187,226 square metres, which was done by the Bozena fleet
donated by Canada.
26
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and/or socially valuable, or essential to the local residents for access.29. In these terms, the
results reported by one of the projects (APM, Demining III) included 6,568 square metres
cleared along a road serving a school, 13,425 square metres cleared for agricultural purposes,
and 52,746 square metres cleared around 22 houses, power lines and water supply systems
in 2001. Another project (NPA, Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance II) reported land cleared for
35 houses and a local electrical installation. This project alone accounted for 175 direct
beneficiaries, and contributed to the return of many more refugees.
The objective of developing a sustainable local capacity for demining has been well served by
the CMAP BiH demining projects. The SFOR EAF project is having an increasing impact in
terms of the total BiH clearance capacity and in spite of issues such as entity intransigence
regarding supplemental (danger) pay, the EAF will no doubt have long-term responsibilities for
mine clearance within the state. With the approval of the new demining law, the role of the
EAF as BiH’s principal long-term demining resource is likely to be consolidated, and should
provide for an increase in national ownership and hopefully, a proper funding level by the state
and the respective entities. Under SFOR guidance, the EAF demining programme that CIDA
has supported since 1999, now represents almost 50 percent of the indigenous BiH mine
clearance capacity and last year accounted for a significant part of the clearance output. HI’s
local partner, APM, is also taking steps to become self-sufficient. After several phases of
CMAP funding, it is actively engaged in seeking other donor support and has competed
successfully for demining contracts with larger commercial demining firms. Although HI
representatives have expressed some concern over management problems and the risks
posed by bidding too low for commercial contracts, APM cannot depend indefinitely on
Canadian and other donor contributions, and is to be commended for its willingness to
become self-sustaining. The HI partnership with APM was terminated in March 2002.
The CIDC project has also made significant progress toward the creation of a sustainable,
indigenous MDD training centre. All but one of the training centre’s staff are local nationals
and the increasing awareness of the value of MDDs has created revenue opportunities that
include; contracting-out of MDD team services, the payment of fees by clients for refresher
training and re-accreditation, and the lease of facilities for the training and exercising of other
canine organizations.30 The Civil Protection Organization (HELP/EC representative) expressed
dissatisfaction with CIDC; however, this was discounted by the BHMAC as the result of a
misunderstanding. In all, the CIDC MDD training facility in Trebinje has made significant
progress, particularly in recent months, and many of the problems previously reported have
largely been overcome. The CIDC MDD teams enjoy one of the best accreditation pass rates
in the country. As well, the Trebinje area offers a virtually unbroken training season, the
training facilities have been expanded and improved, and the operation enjoys a relatively low
overhead. The project addresses gender requirements by the unique inclusion of several
women as MD D handlers, and excellent project visibility has been achieved including a
National Geographic film segment and project exposure during the Queen’s Golden Jubilee
visit to Canada. Additionally, the UN and SFOR have recognized the project for breaking new
ground by uniting the different ethnicities as students, living and working together on the same
course.

29

Data from Safe Lane. http://www.mines.gc.ca/IV-en.asp
Mine Action Plan of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the year 2003, BHMAC, Sarajevo.
30
It should be noted that information has recently come to light that CIDC has a significant current operating deficit
and this should be taken into account in future MAP programming.
33
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Unfortunately, issues have emerged recently that threaten the long-term viability of the project.
SFOR has concerns regarding the willingness and ability of the EAF demining units to
maintain and effectively employ their MDD teams, particularly in the Republika Srpska. Part of
this problem stems from the reluctance or inability of the entity armies to fund the EAF
demining teams to the required level. The impact of the MDD teams has been significant,
however, and a suitable solution to the problem is currently being investigated by SFOR and
the BHMAC. An even greater issue is a recently announced initiative by the US Department of
State in conjunction with the Bosnian Government to build and operate a regional canine
training centre (including MDDs) in the area of Konjic in southwest Bosnia.31 This is apparently
planned to be a major initiative costing in the order of $2m (USD). Construction is planned to
begin in early 2003 and the US has committed to fund the first three years of the operation
after which responsibility will revert to the BiH Government, Council of Ministers. Interestingly,
a Texas-based US company, Global Solutions, is involved as the prime contractor for the
Department of State and a suggestion of a collaborative effort with the Canadian CIDC
initiative was quickly rebuffed. 32 Clearly this initiative, if it is successful, will seriously threaten
the sustainability of the CIDC project. This is unfortunate considering the progress that has
been made, the experience that has been gained and the possible benefits of collaboration.
Regarding the future of the CIDC project, MDD training methodologies vary significantly and,
in the short term, there will be a continuing need for refresher training and re-accreditation of
the existing teams. The BHMAC strongly
supports the CIDC project and indeed have
questioned the long-term need and viability
of the proposed, US -backed regional MDD
training facility. In the short term, it would be
prudent to continue residual support for the
CIDC project pending an evaluation of the
impact of the new regional training centre.
In the longer term, CIDC must be
encouraged to seek other sources of
funding/revenue if they wish to continue
their current operation.
An important consideration in measuring
the overall success of the above group of
demining projects is the excellent safety
record they have enjoyed and the low
number of incidents that have occurred. Also very relevant is the degree of difficulty in the
projects that have been undertaken. Many of the clearance sites have been in extremely
rugged terrain or around badly damaged infrastructure requiring such a labour intensive
approach that it becomes unaffordable from the standpoint of commercial companies. This
was the case with many of the NPA projects in the Sarajevo Canton and its surrounding
villages.
Figure 6. NPA Deminer Clearing Land Near
Sarajevo (Credit: NPA/Damir Atikovic)

Cost-effectiveness is difficult to assess in these types of projects. Outputs are a function of
many factors such as; the degree of difficulty in terms of vegetation, soil type, terrain, debris,
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Mine Action Plan of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the year 2003, BHMAC, Sarajevo.
CMAP Evaluation Mission meeting with Mr. John Cohen, US Embassy, Sarajevo, November 21, 2003 and
meeting Roger St. John with Mr. Pat Patierno, Director, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programmes, US
Department of State, Washington, DC, February 2002.
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access, weather and the like, as well as the type of ordnance involved and the mine clearance
techniques and equipment being employed. As noted above, NPA working in the Sarajevo
Canton encountered very arduous conditions and comparisons from the standpoint of costeffectiveness would be problematic. In any case, NPA is viewed as a highly effective mine
clearance organization that uses an integrated demining approach to increase outputs.
Indeed, cost effectiveness can be significantly enhanced by using mechanical systems for
ground preparation to ease the task of manual deminers as well as MDDs to complement
clearance, survey and quality assurance. The EAF demining units, for example, experienced a
33 percent increase in productivity in 2000 compared to 1999 and similar increases since then
due to improved administrative capacity and the use of MDD teams and mechanical clearance
equipment. From this, it is obvious that the CMAP-funded provision of MDD teams and
mechanical systems to the BiH EAF demining organizations was an effective way to increase
mine clearance outputs and provide a concomitant increase in cost effectiveness as well as
increasing the safety of individual deminers. While the benefits of these additional resources
are well known and have been demonstrated in this project, recent reports from SFOR
indicate the EAF are having difficulty maintaining the MDD and mechanical systems due to
limited funding, the lack of qualified personnel and the heavy training requirement.
Accordingly, full consideration must be given to the high costs of maintenance and ongoing
training associated with both MDD teams and mechanical clearance systems, especially for
organizations that lack funding and technical expertise. Contracting-in and/or providing these
assets from centralized holdings are possible solutions that could be explored.
Mine Awareness Projects
CIDA’s involvement in mine awareness in Bosnia-Herzegovina was through a contribution of
$580,000 (CAD) made to the World Bank mine awareness programme. The contribution was
made in 1996, prior to the launching of the CLF and the initiation of the Balkans CMAP. The
project funds, however, were not disbursed to UNICEF, the implementing agency, until 1999.
The project supported the delivery of 600 mine awareness education sessions and the
provision of 6,000 posters, 32,000 booklets, 2,000 notebooks, and 1,000 T-shirts in 100
municipalities throughout all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina reaching a total population of
40,000 including; 18,000 pupils, 800 teachers and 400 refugees.
Mine Awareness Results - Consistency with Goals
The mine awareness education sessions along with the distribution of posters and other
informative materials reached a sizable population, and no doubt contributed to the saving of
lives and the prevention of injury. As well, a formal mechanism was used to obtain valuable
participant feedback that assisted in the identification of mine contaminated areas. UNICEF is
an acknowledged lead agency in the area of mine awareness and the results are consistent
with the goals of “individual security and the provision of safer conditions for returnees”. The
unresponsiveness of the World Bank as a funding partner, however, is something that must be
borne in mind for future programme/project development.
Victim Assistance Projects
The CMAP contribution in the area of victim assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina was
initiated with a contribution of $70,000 (CAD) to the ITF, for an 18-month project for the
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medical rehabilitation of landmine victims initiated in 1998. A subsequent contribution of
$300,000 (CAD) non-CLF money was made to Queen’s University for the development of a
landmine victims peer-counseling group, including the practical training of technicians in the
field. In addition, Queen’s University received $270,000 (CAD) for a subsequent phase of the
landmine victims peer counseling for the training of group leaders and local health
professionals on issues such as post amputation care, orthotics and prosthetics, psycho-social
issues, community and family interaction, job creation (small business training) and the
reintegration of landmine victims and other persons with disabilities (PWDs) as productive
members of society and the economy. The largest CMAP victim assistance contribution in
Bosnia was $450,000 (CAD) in 2001-2002 to the International Children’s Institute (ICI) for its
‘Support to Children Victims of Landmines’ project. This two-year project aims to identify best
practices for improving the physical and psychological care of children who have undergone
major medical interventions, such as amputations in the case of landmine victims.
Victim Assistance Results - Consistency with Goals
The results of the victim assistance projects are consistent with their goals of “reintegration of
PWDs into the community” and “increasing access for victims to medical and psychological
support”. The projects also aimed at achieving “greater understanding and support amongst
medical staff, family members and/or policy makers regarding disability issues” and increasing
“local capacity to deliver psycho-social services to victims”.
The ITF project (Z-011414) for the medical rehabilitation of 12 landmine victims was relatively
minor at a cost of only $70,000 (CAD). While the patients received excellent care, the project
did not contribute to local capacity development since the patients were treated in Slovenia,
not Bosnia. The project did, however, strengthen the collaboration between CIDA and the ITF
and had the associated benefit of leveraging additional funding.
Both the Queen’s University and ICI projects suffered from growing pains and required careful
attention in the early stages to identify and correct some project design problems and other
issues such as reporting, management difficulties and insufficient impact. In spite of some
resistance by the partners, however, this early intervention by the CIDA team led to significant
improvements and ultimately to a very successful outcome for both projects.
The ICI project has gained significant momentum during the past year and appears to have
enjoyed remarkable success in recent months. Consultative committees have been
established involving representatives from the BiH Ministries of Health and Education.
Psychosocial rehabilitation programmes were developed with input from child victims and
teachers and health professionals received training in how to deal with children who have
been traumatized as victims of landmines or other serious accidents. Some 150 children, who
have undergone a major medical intervention, as well as their parents and teachers, have
received psychosocial support and relevant training. Facilities have been developed and
discussions are underway to provide teachers who can cater to children who are hospitalized
for extended periods. This approach has not only helped the children cope but also increased
awareness in the community regarding the needs of all children with disabilities. A key
measure of the success of this project is its ongoing integration into the existing health care
system, and the widespread recognition and support that it is currently receiving in
government circles and within the local community as well as from further afield. In this regard,
there is now an active interest in initiating similar programmes in Tusla and Banja Luka, both
within the Republica Srpska, and health professionals from Zagreb visited Sarajevo on
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November 29th to learn more about the programme. This project has taken on a life of it’s own
and should prosper.
Another good example of relevance and sustainability of results achieved is demonstrated by
the peer-counseling programme for victims of landmines undertaken by Queen’s University.
The programmed trained local group leaders and expanded its capacity to serve all PWDs.
Ten groups have been established throughout Bosnia – with an average of 179 people
reached per month through more than 100 peer-counseling meetings based on one-to-one
contact and some 81 PWDs active in the rehabilitation process. Recent activities have
expanded to include women’s groups, job workshops, a fashion show to raise funds and a
small business project focused on mothers of children with disabilities, to make them more
self-sufficient and better able to cope. It is also important to highlight that this project managed
to achieve significant results related to changing attitudes towards PWDs. Public figures,
health professionals and policy makers have been positively influenced resulting in enhanced
understanding of disability issues33 and support for the equal rights of PWDs including
employment and the establishment of a law regarding accessibility. While these latter goals
will be very difficult to achieve in the short term, awareness is increasing and progress is being
made. In any case, it appears certain that the peer-counseling groups will continue to evolve,
facilitating change in society at large and providing support for many more PWDs in Bosnia
(estimated at some 10 percent of the population - approximately 250,000 people). Notably,
this project involves many PWDs/victims in the areas of leadership, counseling, training and
management, including a significant proportion of women.
FINDINGS - PROJECT DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING
Canadian involvement in mine action activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina predates the
Ottawa Mine Ban Convention and the launching of the CLF. In fact, the crisis in Bosnia was
one of the key factors that brought the mine contamination issue to centre stage and
accelerated Canada’s involvement. As noted previously, the advent of the CLF in 1998
precipitated the evolution of the CMAP in the Balkans into a coherent programme, beginning
with Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Annex E for a summary of key results presented in matrix
form for all of the BiH CMAP projects.
Project Design
The CMAP in Bosnia was established as a responsive programme, based on a balanced
approach, that initially emphasized mine clearance operations while still allocating some
resources for institutional support, mine awareness and victim assistance. It was a five-year
programme with planned disbursement totaling 60 percent of the funds in the first and second
year of operations, including immediate support for mine clearance.34 The programme and
project design process was somewhat compressed, due to the need to act quickly because of
substantial funding that became available with the announcement of the five-year, $100 million
CLF in early 1998.
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The Deputy Minister of Health and Social Affairs of the Republica Srpska stressed the importance for the ministry
to participate in the process of policy change to meet the needs of PWDs. Media coverage through television,
newspapers and radio has also enhanced awareness and influenced the attitudes of the public.
34
Interview conducted with David Mueller, November 2002.
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As noted, the initial phase of the Balkans CMAP concentrated exclusively on Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The process began in early March 1998, with a CIDA/CEE Branch high-level
feasibility mission that assessed needs, identified potential partners and projects, and defined
the probable scope of a mine action intervention in BiH. A subsequent project-planning
mission, led by the CEE programme officer, was conducted in June and focused on direct
liaison with key partners and executing agencies, the definition of likely projects, and the
establishment of planning and design parameters including project goals, duration and funding
lines. This was followed by a few months of detailed project design, planning and approvals
and the results were quite good in spite of the crisis-nature of the compressed planning and
programming process.
In order to accommodate the short planning window, the initial CMAP projects in Bosnia and
Herzegovina resulted from proposals put forward by organizations active on the ground in
1998. Fortunately, these included partner organizations with extensive experience in the
region and a solid background in mine action such as the UNDP, ITF, CARE Canada and
SFOR, and executing agencies with a proven capacity in specific areas of mine action such as
HI, Queen’s University, ICI and NPA35. All of these organizations had been operating in the
region for some time and possessed a sound understanding of the local environment and the
most pressing needs. The design process certainly benefited from the experience of these
organizations in establishing realistic project goals and objectives (achievable within the
project timeframe) and, particularly, in setting up monitoring mechanisms to identify risks and
quickly respond to problems. This early design support no doubt contributed to the success of
the individual projects.
The CIDC MDD training initiative was perhaps the only example of a project designed by an
organization with limited experience in the field.36 Despite some significant early problems in
getting established, the results achieved by this project indicate growing competence and
ultimately the appropriateness of its design. Another anomaly was the mine awareness project
funded through the World Bank. As noted in the previous discussion, this project was
conceived in 1996 and was later included under the umbrella of the Balkans CMAP.
Accordingly, it was not designed as part of the package of projects initially included in the
Balkans CMAP but was subsequently implemented by UNICEF and managed as part of the
same programme.
The design approach used in the first round of projects was successfully replicated by CIDA
and the executing agencies in subsequent phases of the projects, as well as for new projects.
This flexibility at the programme level allowed for these agencies to build on their own
experience, maintain necessary momentum in their operations on the ground and mature their
projects to achieve the intended results.
Finding 1. Mine action is a specialized area of expertise and the process of project
selection, design and planning, especially on short-notice, would have benefited
from guidance in the form of basic planning principles or a framework for mine
action programming.

35

The NPA is a good example of a world-class organization. It consistently trains well qualified demining personnel,
uses an integrated approach for mine clearance (manual, dogs, and mechanical), has a very strong safety record
and apart from the management team, is entirely staffed with Bosnians.
36
CIDC’s experience included involvement in a mine survey project in Mozambique.
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Finding 2. The selection of experienced and competent partners and executing agencies
was a major factor in the success of the CMAP in BiH.
Finding 3. To be successful in project selection and design, the programme officer must be
familiar with the area of operations, understand the local issues and have the
opportunity for direct personal contact with the intended partners and executing
agencies, i.e., an early field visit is indispensable.
Project Implementation
For the purposes of this discussion, project implementation covers the full spectrum of project
execution including planning, day-to-day management, monitoring and accountability. In
general terms, the BiH CMAP was very well managed by CIDA, its partners and executing
agencies. Canadian efforts have been universally applauded and the vast majority of recipient
organizations have praised the consistency, reliability and flexibility associated with CIDA’s
CMAP funding contributions. Particularly appreciated is the relative lack of strings or caveats
that are associated with many donor contributions. This aspect was applauded by several of
the organizations that were visited during the evaluation.
Project implementation and management are directly impacted by project selection and
design. The selection of experienced, competent and committed partners, and executing
agencies as noted above, was a major factor in the largely successful implementation and
management of the CMAP projects in Bosnia. With a few exceptions, the projects have
progressed smoothly and good results have been achieved.
Institutional Support. There were several BiH institutional support projects that benefited
from a strong partner relationship and were coordinated on CIDA’s behalf by UNDP. On a
cumulative basis, these projects had an enormous impact and were virtually problem-free from
the standpoint of implementation. The funding of key technical personnel such as the current
Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), David Rowe, produces results out of all proportion to the
investment. The provision of Canadian Forces technical experts, and hardware for mapping
and database development were also particularly useful. This approach takes advantage of a
unique Canadian competency, is very cost-effective and quickly builds sustainable indigenous
capacity in the critical area of mine action coordination, management and planning. This is an
area where Canadian CF and private sector expertise could be tapped by CIDA in terms of inkind contributions. Indeed, the institutional strengthening of the BHMAC that was supported by
CIDA created marked improvements in local staff capacity that has allowed the reduction of
foreign technical advisors from initially around 40 to six at the end of 2001 and only one by the
end of 2002. The formal and on-the-job training brought local staff to the point whereby they
have articulated a realistic strategic plan supported by the government and donor community
that aims to rid the country from the effect of mines by 2010
Finding 4. In the Balkans, the UNDP is a proven partner in the area of Institutional/MAC
support.
Finding 5. While not as visible as mine/UXO clearance or victim assistance, institutional
support builds local capacity and will probably have a more important and farreaching impact in ridding the country of mines/UXO. Canada didn’t shy away
from supporting this area, as other donors did, and its consistent investment is
now paying off.
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Finding 6. Certain development areas such as institution building may require the
commitment of consistent funding over a significant period of time to achieve
effective and sustainable results. Canada has been applauded for its reliability
and consistency of support in this key area and it is widely agreed that this has
been a major factor in the emergence of the CROMAC, BHMAC and the
UNMACC (Kosovo) as sound institutions.
Finding 7. Partnering with the DND/CF is a cost-effective and constructive approach that
CIDA used to good effect in the Balkans CMAP to tap vital technical expertise in
mine action, including the CF Mine Information Centre. This expertise should be
exploited more formally in terms of CIDA and DFAIT development-related mine
action programming.
Finding 8. Canadian niche expertise in the development and implementation of mine action
programmes should be utilized by way of in-kind contributions. This can take the
form of CF technical experts or private sector resources that are retained on
standing offer agreements for emergency situations or through normal
contracting procedures when sufficient time is available.
Mine Clearance. In the area of demining, both the NPA and HI/APM projects were relatively
problem-free in terms of implementation. Some management problems within APM caused
concerns in 2001/02 but these were resolved without significant project disruption. In previous
assessments, APM was criticized for being unable/unwilling to become more self-sufficient,
however, since its partnership with HI terminated, APM has managed quite well as a selfsufficient NGO, having acquired some key
contracts and additional international donor
funding. This project served Canadian interests
by promoting mine clearance in the SFOR/CF
contingent area of operations and by the
development of local, indigenous mine
clearance capacity. NPA has consistently
produced good results: it has outstanding
management, the Norwegian government
funds its overhead, and all but one of its BiH
employees are local nationals, including
several women. Accordingly, both of these
projects made a valuable contribution to
Figure 7. APM Mine Clearance - Sarajevo (CIDA
BiH mine action sustainability and achieved the
file photo)
goal of providing safer conditions for locals,
returnees and future development.
The SFOR/EAF projects were instrumental in pressing the BiH and entity governments to
become more proactive in the development of a significant national mine/UXO clearance
capacity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. This effort, however, has not been without difficulties.
In fact, at the outset, the EAF participated only under duress. It is noteworthy that the payment
by Canada and Norway of the insurance for deminers eliminated their only reason for not
complying with the Dayton Agreement. With the CIDA-funded provision of mechanical
equipment and MDDs, and the perseverance of SFOR, the outputs have increased
dramatically. Problems that have been experienced include: short staff rotations in SFOR (sixmonth duty tours), non-payment of danger pay by the entities causing low morale, and
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difficulties in the maintenance and effective utilization of mechanical and MDD assets. On the
plus side, the new law on demining formalized the role of the EAF deminers and the BHMAC
views this as an important national resource that will become key to the sustainability of the
new strategic demining plan. Furthermore, the EAF demining was viewed as, “among the most
successful, as this contributed directly to CIDA and DFAIT goals such as supporting SFOR,
providing alternative skills to former combatants, democratization of armed forces, peace
building, and confidence and security building. It also contributed to progress in the field of
mine action by showing that former militaries can work to the highest (humanitarian) standards
and be competitive in the mine clearance business.”37
Most problematic in terms of implementation has been the CIDC MDD Training Project. MDD
training is a complex business that requires good training facilities, reasonable weather and
strong staff, not to mention the need to select good quality dogs and handlers. The project was
initially established in northwest Bosnia in the area of Bihac but training site problems and
weather dictated a move to the southwest in the area of Trebinje. This move caused
considerable disruption and delayed the production of MDDs and handlers. Inadequate
management, poor productivity, high staff turnover and poor communications exacerbated this
disruption. Recently, however, the organization has stabilized and shown marked
improvement in all areas. Locals have virtually taken over the operation in BiH. In fact, there is
now only one Canadian in the project, the Chief Instructor, who is running the Croatia project
and only visits Trebinje periodically. Although some challenges remain, communications and
reporting have improved, and the organization is now generating revenue through MDD (Blue
Team) contract work, facility rentals, and refresher training/re-accreditation fees. Also,
according to the BHMAC, the CIDC MDD teams currently have the highest MDD accreditation
rate in the country and they strongly endorse the CIDC organization. Indeed, the project has
resulted in the development of significant local expertise and is close to being self-sufficient.
Unfortunately, the USA-BiH regional dog training centre initiative poses a distinct threat to the
continued viability of the CIDC project. Notwithstanding this, however, there will be an ongoing
need for the CIDC MDD Training Centre to provide services for the refresher training and reaccreditation of the EAF/Civil Protection MDD teams and nominal support should be provided
to ensure this capacity continues to exist. In the meantime, CIDC project staff needs to
consider all options available to build self-sufficiency; for example, focus on contracted MDD
services to the BHMAC, EAF, CROMAC and other mine clearance organizations.
Finding 9. Proven partner organizations like NPA should be selected for funding dedicated
to mine/UXO clearance. NPA in particular, has vast and proven experience in
mine action, a positive policy on gender issues, a strong record of sustainable
capacity building and no overhead funding component.
Finding 10. Care must be exercised in the selection of projects to develop local mine
clearance NGOs. A plan to develop self-sufficiency and well-defined exit strategy
must be included at the front end to prevent creating an all-or-nothing funding
dependency.
Finding 11. Supporting the development of humanitarian demining capacity of national
military elements can be tricky from philosophical, security and practical
perspectives. It must be considered on a case-by-case basis and not be
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CMAP Evaluation, Questionnaire Response, DFAIT Mine Action Team – Alison Clement, Programme
Coordinator, et al Mine Action Team, DFAIT-MAECI.
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discounted out-of-hand. With the proper conditions in place, it can constitute a
major contribution in capacity building.
Finding 12. Canadian-based mine action organizations such as CIDC, will invariably
experience difficulties establishing complex projects in remote or far-away
locations. Careful project planning, clear output goals, constant monitoring and
timely interventions are the keys to successful development of Canadian ‘niche’
expertise and the related local indigenous capacity. If the development of
Canadian capacity is a complementary goal, then the additional investment in
project design and management effort may well be worthwhile. It must be
remembered, however, that sufficient lead time must be allowed, a clear exit
strategy must be defined, risks such as the proposed regional MDD training
facility must be thoroughly assessed, and the balance between achieving the
most cost-effective results and developing Canadian capacity must be carefully
weighed.
Mine Awareness. The mine awareness component of the BiH CMAP was a carry-over from a
project initiated in 1996 through the World Bank. While reasonable results were ultimately
realized through UNICEF, the project was flawed from a design and implementation
standpoint. As a CIDA partner, the World Bank was unresponsive and considerable delay was
experienced in initiating the funding for UNICEF and the achievement of results. Accountability
problems were also experienced in terms of identifying the total disbursements. UNICEF is a
recognized leader in mine awareness/MRE, and a direct partnership and funding arrangement
would have been more suitable. In terms of mine awareness project selection and design,
however, it is advisable to confer directly with UNMAS/UNDP and the responsible MAC, to
ensure that any proposed project is valid, coordinated with other initiatives, properly targeted,
consistent and conforms with established priorities. Finally, mine awareness is a normal
component of demining and should be included as an output goal for reporting purposes for all
CIDA – funded mine/UXO clearance projects. This would help to identify the true extent of
CIDA’s contribution in this important area. It is noted that NPA, CIDC and APM have routinely
conducted mine awareness training as part of their demining operations.
Finding 13. The selection and design of mine awareness projects should be informed by
advice from UNMAS/UNDP, UNICEF and the responsible MAC.
Finding 14. Funding for mine awareness should be direct to a major partner such as UNICEF
or ICRC for a clearly defined project including identification of the executing
agency (e.g. local NGO) and the expected results or output goals.
Finding 15. The complementary mine awareness activities undertaken by demining
organizations funded by CIDA, should be clearly identified as output goals and
included in project reporting.
Mine Victim Assistance. The Balkans CMAP victim assistance projects in BiH took
considerable perseverance to overcome slow start-ups and other difficulties, but have
generated excellent results. A nine-month funding delay in Z-020036, Queens’ Peer
Counseling project threatened successful implementation. This resulted from key issues
identified in an evaluation of the first phase that needed to be addressed prior to moving
forward on phase II. In any case, the ICI Support to Child Victims and the Queen’s Peer
Counseling projects have matured to achieve a high degree of sustainability, excellent reach
and quality outputs. They have strongly addressed the crosscutting gender theme, heightened
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public awareness of the needs and rights of PWDs, and tapped resident Canadian niche
competencies. As noted previously, the ITF project was relatively minor in scope and did not
improve local capacity although it did serve to strengthen collaboration with CIDA and the
associated leveraging of funds.
Finding 16. Victim assistance is an area where it appears Canada can make a valuable
contribution. A comprehensive listing of Canadian institutions with niche
competencies in psychosocial and physical rehabilitation should be maintained
and considered when planning future mine action development initiatives.
Finding 17. The benefit of leveraged funding through the ITF must be weighed against project
management requirements; however, in most cases process was efficient and
resulted in significant matching contributions that often augmented specific CIDA
initiatives.
International Donor Cooperation / Leveraging of Funds. " Canada has enjoyed close
cooperation with the Slovenia-based International Trust Fund (ITF) for Demining and Victim
Assistance. The ITF was announced in March 1998 at the “Workshop on Mine Action
Coordination’ held in Ottawa. While the ITF undertakes its own mine action programming, it
also acts as a flow-through mechanism to allow donors to double their contribution through a
matching fund. This fund established by the United States totaled $14M (USD) in FY 2002/03.
The matching funds may not often be directed to the project in question, but to other mine
action projects that are selected according to ITF criteria.
The ITF has an executive office based in Ig, Slovenia and is run by a Management Board
comprised of seven members (three from Slovenia, three from BiH and one from Croatia). It
also has a 22 member Board of Advisors made up of 19 donor and 3 SEE states. This Board
meets semi-annually and Canada’s representative is the DFAIT Ambassador for mine action,
presently Mr. Ross Hynes.
The ITF organizes and finances demining activities and the rehabilitation of mine victims in
South East Europe. Initially established to support programming in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the ITF has since expanded its operations to include Kosovo, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and
Serbia-Montenegro. The ITF’s programming activities for 2002 included: demining (76%),
mine victim assistance (4%), support to MAC’s (7%), regional activities (8%) and landmine
impact surveys (2%). In 2002, the key ITF programme country recipients were Bosnia and
Herzegovina (39%) and Croatia (40%).
Following the creation of the ITF, Canada and Norway were the lead countries to indicate their
support for the ITF by the commitment of important donor contributions. Of the $20M (CAD)
disbursed over the past five years by CIDA’s Balkans CMAP, five contributions have been
channeled through the ITF totaling $7.5M (CAD), thereby activating dollar-for-dollar matching
contributions. Of that amount, over half of the CMAP Bosnia amount ($6M) was channeled via
the ITF. The ITF charges a three percent administrative fee for donor’s flow through
contributions.
For Canada, there are three compelling reasons to make a contribution to the
ITF: (1) it provides the opportunity to double the size of financial contributions to mine action in
South East Europe; (2) it encourages incremental progress in the area of regional cooperation
on mine action in the Balkans; and (3) it helps to further integrate Slovenia into the global mine
action community.
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Canada, along with other donors, has sought to have the matching funds that are released by
its flow through contributions earmarked to related Canadian projects. Until recently, this has
met with little success; however, this initiative is welcomed by CIDA’s key partners in the
region such as UNDP and should continue to be pursued as an objective of the programme.
Notwithstanding this, Canada has enjoyed a very cooperative relationship with the ITF and
recently it was learned that $2M (CAD) worth of matching funds was utilized in 2001 and 2002
to support mine action projects also supported by the CMAP. As well, efforts are currently
underway to formalize this collaboration by including a written clause in future flow through
funding agreements with the ITF that will stipulate that a portion of the matched funds will be
directed towards projects supported by CIDA’s Balkans CMAP.
Finding 18. A sizable proportion of the total CMAP contributions in the Balkans have been
matched by the ITF resulting in a significant increase in the development
assistance benefit for the people of the region. This and other forms of donor
assistance collaboration are valuable mechanisms for realizing greater results
and cost-effectiveness for projects that support Canadian development objectives
and goals.
Project Reporting
Results are important but it is also necessary to have a reliable monitoring and reporting
system to capture and document not only the quantity but also the quality of results. The
reporting found in the CMAP in Bosnia varies from well established reporting frameworks and
high quality reports to an obvious lack of knowledge of Results Based Management (RBM)
and cases in which the partners have not been able to set up effective management and
reporting systems. Examples of the first include NPA and HI, whose quality of reporting was
consistently excellent. The quality of reporting by the UNDP has been variable at times but
overall has been good to excellent. The reporting by CIDC, however, was sub-standard, and
reflected a general lack of attention and poor administration. This deficiency was brought to
the attention of CIDC on several occasions, including during annual monitoring missions and
lately CIDC reporting has improved.
In any case, project reporting is the one area where there is room for improvement. It is
necessary to fine tune aspects related to establishing appropriate goals and indicators related
to those goals. For example, in cases where a project involves training (e.g. training of MDD),
it is important to make a distinction between primary and secondary objectives. While training
of MDD teams will ultimately have an impact in terms of area cleared of mines, the primary
objective is enhancing the capacity of the teams. Therefore, it is more important to collect
indicators directly related to the capacity that is to be developed such as recruitment, failure
rate, number of dogs trained and certified and the like. Also, in cases where the objective of
the project is related to capacity building, measuring the results would also be enhanced if the
stages of development (knowledge-systems, policy development, organizational change, local
improvement) were captured and translated into a results-chain.
It is also important to acknowledge that some indicators are going to be difficult to obtain and
special effort will be required during the project design phase to develop clear and concise
output goals with unambiguous reporting indicators. A good example relates to victim
assistance programmes and the difficulty of acquiring information disaggregated into victims in
general versus mine victims. This further applies if information is required to indicate the
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impact broken down by age and gender in terms of all aspects of mine action and the
reporting of outputs that include discrete information in these key areas.38
Finally, some frustration was expressed by a few BiH CMAP partners with the amount and
complexity of reporting required for CIDA-funded projects. While the flexibility of the funding
was applauded, organizations such as UNDP, UNMACC and NPA complained about the time
required to complete the required reports. Efforts should perhaps be made in the project
design phase to streamline MAP project reporting.
Finding 19. CIDA MAP project reporting should be simplified and key information
requirements need to be clearly indicated. It is important to identify at the outset
what information must be reported as well as the required format and frequency.
Key information like gender statistics, quantified outputs or impact areas such as
refugee returns or restored land use, need to be clearly specified.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS – BiH CMAP
Overall, the CMAP in BiH must be considered as a qualified success. The programme was
developed quickly in response to a key government policy and funding initiative, and
succeeded due to the careful selection of partners, deliberate planning and consistent
monitoring. Some components of the programme, however, suffered growing pains and other
projects have a doubtful future related to issues beyond the control of CIDA.
Setting realistic project goals and development objectives was an important element of
success in the projects assessed. The establishment of goals and appropriate implementation
mechanisms required a sound understanding of the local environment. The project design
used in most cases allowed for flexibility and for accommodating necessary revisions. This
was an important factor in responding quickly to emerging needs and changing contexts in
Bosnia.
Canada’s goal was to develop the capacity of national institutions, to coordinate mine action
and to encourage the Bosnian state government to take greater ownership of its mine action
programme.39 To that end, Canada made its assistance conditional on evidence of increased
BiH ownership and this approach proved successful, although BiH macro-economic difficulties
must be addressed to minimize threats to increased local responsibility for mine action.
The landmine contamination problem remains a challenge. Continuation of mine clearance
efforts is crucial in a country with such a high level of contamination. In this context, Canada’s
priority support of institution building and the clearance of high-risk areas combined with some
support of mine awareness and victim assistance was appropriate. At this point, effort needs
to shift to the socio-economic impact survey and area reduction through technical survey. This
will optimize the clearance effort and allow permanent marking of low-risk areas for clearance
in the future, with the concomitant and necessary reduction in risk and increase in
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In terms of the crosscutting themes impact on gender and the environment, very little information was available in
the CIDA CMAP files.
39
CIDA Memorandum to the Minister CEE Garceau-Bednar, May 31, 2002.
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effectiveness. Canada has made a significant impact and the CMAP projects accounted for a
sizable proportion of the overall mine action funding in BiH. 40

THE CMAP P ROJECTS IN KOSOVO
OVERVIEW OF KOSOVO PROJECTS AND RESULTS

General Description of Programme
The UNMACC was established in Pristina, Kosovo on June 17, 1999, and undertook an
ambitious and very successful mine action programme that relied on a combination of
bilaterally funded and UN-contracted mine action assets. “On December 15, 2001, the UNMIK
mine action programme in Kosovo was completed and the MAC that operated as the focal
point for all mine action activities in Kosovo since June 1999 was closed.” 41. According to the
UNMACC final report, all known minefields and Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU) strike areas had
been cleared 42 and the overall responsibility for mine action was handed over to the UNMIK managed Department for Civil Security and Emergency Preparedness (DCSEP), Directorate
for Civil Protection (DCP). The DCP is now the coordination body for all mine action activities
in cooperation with the Public Health Institute (incident data collection), Ministry of Education
(mine awareness in schools), Social Welfare (support to mine victims) and the Cadastral
Agency (land status mapping). The task of implementing the clearance of any residual
mine/UXO contamination was assigned to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) utilizing mine
action teams that were trained by and continue to operate under the tutelage of HI.
The UNMACC demining operations in Kosovo cost approximately $85m (USD) for the
clearance of “more than 32 million square metres of land and the destruction of more than
50,000 mines, CBU bomblets and other unexploded ordnance”. Canada’s contribution to
address the problem included $1,571,761 (USD) via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for
Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) between 1999 and 2001. 43 In addition, Canada contributed
$3,200,000 (USD) in bilateral support. 44 Table 6 provides a breakdown of CMAP funding for
the projects in Kosovo from 1999 to 2001.
Canadian mine action support in Kosovo began as an emergency programme designed at the
end of the conflict in June 1999. When a UN Resolution called for the help of the international
community, “Canada was one of the first nations to respond to the declared need for rapidresponse mine clearance in Kosovo.”45 Quick response was required to enable the return of
900,000 Kosovar refugees to their homes. This need for action was made more urgent
40

Canada’s ranking as a donor in UN reports and the Landmine Monitor is derived from limited sources and
doesn’t account for related contributions in all mine action programme areas. Consequently, these listings must be
viewed with caution. This is a problem that CIDA has attempted to address but has met with little success.
41
Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).
42
UNMIK, Mine Action Programme, Final Report 2001
43
According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2002 “The VTF is described as the MACC’s “financial backbone;”
funds channeled through the VTF totaled US$9,967,135. The total for 2001 was $1.18 million. Over half the VTF
funding came from donations by European Union countries and Canada.
44
Landmine Monitor Report 2002.
45
www.acdi-cida.gc.ca
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because the onset of winter would restrict demining operations and greatly increase the
misery of the refugees if they could not safely return.
Table 6. CIDA – Canadian Mine Action Program Contributions in Kosovo, by Project
Project No.

1

M-0

2

Z-020066

3
4

Z-020091
Z-020350001

5

M-0

6

M-010054

7

Z-020013

8
9
10

Z-020027
M-0
Z-020200

11

Z-020350002

12

Z-020233

Project Title

Institutional Support to MACs
Canada-Belgium UNMAS Assessment
Mission
Supp. to UNMACC in Kosovo - Data Entry
Clerks
Institutional Support to UNMACC in Kosovo
Canadian Support to the MAP in Kosovo
(Institutional Support)
Sub-Total “Institutional Support to MACs”
Mine Awareness
UNICEF Balkans Regional Program
Sub-Total “Mine Awareness”
Victim Assistance
Disabled Pop / Landmine Victims Peer
Group
Sub-Total “Victim Assistance”
Demining
Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo

Budget
(CAD dollars)

Executing
Agency

Start
Date

End
Date

$

75,000

UNMAS

99.06.07

99.11.30

$

65,000

DND

99.07.30

00.01.31

$
$

500,000
120,000

UNMAS
UNMAS /
UNMACC

00.01.04
01.03.30

01.01.04
02.03.31

$

760,000

$
$

200,000
200,000

UNICEF

99.06.16

99.11.30

$

500,000

Queens U.

99.07.15

00.03.31

$

500,000

$

530,000

CIDC/ Wolf’s
Flats
IDAC
CARE
IDAC/NOTRA

99.07.22

00.01.31

99.07.30
99.08.06
00.06.15

99.12.10
99.11.30
00.12.20

UNMAS/
UNMACC

01.03.30

02.02.28

Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo
Emergency Shelter & Related Demining
CDN. Mine/UXO Clearance Project in
Kosovo
Canadian Support to the MAP in Kosovo
(Mine/UXO Clearance, Survey, QA)
Other: Int’l. Donor Cooperation/
Leveraging of Funds
Int’l Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) –
Channelling of Funds II
Sub-Total “Demining”

$ 1,290,000
$ 300,000
$ 2,200,000

GRAND TOTAL

$7,475,230

$ 1,680,000

$

15,230

99-12-09

$ 6,015,230

Similar to the CMAP in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo programme also focused on all
four areas of mine action, including institutional support, demining activities, victim assistance
and mine awareness. This project initiated in 1999 provided a significant contribution to
address the mine/UXO contamination problem in Kosovo. All of the projects of the CMAP in
Kosovo are now completed and are discussed below.
Institutional/MAC Support Projects
As noted above, the UNMACC in Kosovo was established at the end of the crisis in June 1999
as the focal point for all mine action activities in the province. Its responsibilities included the
accreditation of all mine clearance and awareness organizations operating in the province,
along with the planning and assignment of clearance tasks, and quality assurance over all
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operations 46. The MACC also had responsibilities related to the coordination of mine
awareness and victim assistance programmes including the collection of mine incident and
victim statistics.
The institutional capacity building projects of the CMAP began in 1999, with a very early
contribution ($75,000) to UNMAS to help underwrite an assessment mission to define the
scope of the mine problem in Kosovo, identify priority areas for mine action and initiate the
establishment of the UNMACC. This was followed by a project ($76,000) to support the
secondment of a CF Military Engineer LCol to provide a critical liaison function between KFOR
and the MACC and another project $65,000, to support the provision of CF technical experts
to assist in the development of a mine action database and to train local staff. In 1999, a twoyear contribution of $500,000 (CAD) was provided to enable the UNMACC to conduct surveys
in Kosovo to determine the extent of remaining contamination and to conduct quality
assurance to verify that clearance operations were undertaken in accordance with established
UN international standards 47. This contribution was channeled through the ITF. 48 Also, a sum of
$1.8m (CAD) was contributed in 2001 to significantly increase the operational capacity of the
UNMACC. This funding permitted the UNMACC to contract important specialized centralized
assets (MDD, mechanical, manual and EOD) and support specific clearance projects that
required additional funding to achieve success.49
Institutional Support Results - Consistency with Goals
The results achieved by the institutional support projects were consistent with the goal of
“enhancing the capacity of the UNMACC.” The contributions in 1999 helped facilitate the early
definition of the contamination problem, the development of a plan of action and the actual
establishment of the UNMACC. Critical UNMACC liaison with KFOR was catered for and
resources were provided to establish an effective database and trained staff. The subsequent
Canadian contributions provided key resources for technical survey and quality assurance that
were greatly appreciated for their certainty and the stability afforded in these important areas.
Finally, the operational capacity of the MACC was greatly enhanced in 2001 by the acquisition
of Canadian-funded centralized mine/UXO clearance and survey assets that were
instrumental in achieving the target of December 2001 for the completion of the UNMIK mine
action programme. These centralized assets were described as critical to the ability of the
MACC to accelerate the clearance efforts and contend with a broad range of survey,
verification, quality assurance and other support tasks that otherwise would likely have
delayed the completion or the thoroughness of the mission.
The Canadian institutional support projects played a significant part in the overall success of
the UNMACC. The early contributions helped to develop the capacity of the MAC as a
professionally competent organization. With only eight UN internationals, seven in-kind
internationals and 33 locals, the UNMACC coordinated 1,000 personnel in 17 mine awareness
organizations, and mine clearance activities involving an investment of approximately $85m
(USD) by the donor community over three years. This amounts to excellent value for the
46

UNMACC. 2001. Final Report on the Z-020350 CMAP in Kosovo Y 2001.
www.acdi-cida.gc.ca
48
The ITF, established by the government of Slovenia, acted as a channel for international funding in the region,
with the benefit that matching funding from the US effectively doubles most donations.
49
While classified as institutional support, this project was essentially a mine/UXO clearance activity through the
provision of centralized assets to the UNMACC to permit flexibility by reinforcing priority tasks. This was similar to
the 1999 project Z-20091 Provision of UNMACC Centralized Assets.
47
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donors and the Canadian contribution was praised for its reliability, lack of caveats and
timeliness.
Mine Clearance Projects
The CMAP contribution for mine clearance in Kosovo involved approximately $6m (CAD) for
five projects beginning in 1999, implemented by several different executing agencies. The goal
was “to contribute to the removal of a key impediment to the return of refugees and displaced
persons by clearing priority areas of landmines and UXO” and “to reduce the threat to life and
loss of limb.” The projects began with the rapid contracting and deployment of Canadian
companies with expertise in ordnance disposal, mine clearance and surveying to assist in the
emergency phase in 1999. This was followed in 2000 with the deliberate contracting of a
Canadian company to provide an integrated demining capacity and ultimately in 2001 by the
contribution of funding to enable the UNMACC to contract specialized centralized assets and
reinforce funding of critical clearance projects.
The projects undertaken in 1999 were developed at very short notice in response to a UN
appeal for assistance. Only a few weeks were available to assess the requirement, complete
project design and contract the necessary resources. In fact, two projects were undertaken
simultaneously: Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo I and II. CIDC and the Wolf’s Flat
Ordnance Disposal Corp implemented the Rapid Response I project. This project involved
funding contributions from CIDA ($528,000) and DFAIT ($200,000), and saw the deployment
of a mixed, five-person demining/EOD team. In Rapid Response II, CIDA funded ($1,290,000)
the International Demining Alliance of Canada (IDAC) to provide two EOD teams of two
persons each, and three demining teams of three persons each plus locally hired and trained
deminers. Both projects involved the provision of support teams in the field as well as the
acquisition of mine clearance, EOD and other
support equipment. While some success was
achieved, these projects both encountered
numerous problems in the areas of management
technical qualifications, partnerships and reporting.
These projects were ultimately subject to a detailed
evaluation.
Consequently, in 2000 CIDA undertook a deliberate
and rigorous Request for Proposal (RFP) process to
select and contract a Canadian company to provide
a fully integrated, self-sufficient mine/UXO clearance
organization to be employed by the UNMACC. This
Figure 8. CIDC/Wolf’s Flat EOD,
process of project design was very inclusive and
Operator
RogerGumbrill
input was sought from the UNMAS, the Kosovo UNMAC and from senior partner
(CIDA file photo)
organizations.
A consortium led by IDAC won this $2.2m (CAD) contract.50 The organization was comprised
of a management team, two manual teams, two MDD teams and a mechanical (Bozena)
clearance team. The project involved nearly 50 personnel, including nine Canadians and 24
Kosovar deminers.51 The EOD team operated under direct control of the UNMACC and the
50

The consortium also included NOTRA Environmental Services, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and Hyaton.
This project has been the subject of much discussion and the difficulties experienced during the implementation
phase provided many lessons for CIDA that will be referred to later in this report.
51
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rest of the organization was employed under the designated UN senior partner, Defence
Systems Limited (DSL), in the Multi-National Brigade (MNB) South sector in the area of
Prizren. Overall, a reasonable degree of success was achieved in terms of outputs but
numerous problems were experienced, once again resulting in a detailed evaluation that led to
a modified approach to the funding of mine/UXO clearance in 2001.
The Canadian contribution in 2001 consisted of $1.8m (CAD) to fund the acquisition by
UNMACC of specialized centralized assets to enhance its operational capability. This
contribution was supplemented by the donation of mine/UXO clearance equipment ($536,411)
that was procured as a part of the previous CIDA projects in 1999 and 2000. This project
involved a wide range of support activities including the provision of MDD teams, level I/II
survey, EOD teams, and a joint manual/mechanical team for survey, verification, quality
assurance and clearance operations as well as the provision of critical institutional support to
the UNMACC.52
Finally, it must be noted that mine/UXO clearance and survey/verification capacity was a key
component of the Y1999-2000 institutional support project Z-020091 that also provided
centralized assets to the UNMACC. Outputs for those projects are detailed at Annex E.
Mine Clearance Results - Consistency with Goals
The results achieved by the CMAP mine clearance projects in Kosovo were consistent with
their defined goals of “increasing cleared land for refugee resettlement” and “reducing the
threat to life and loss of limb.” As noted above, however, the earlier projects were not without
difficulties.
In the first two projects in 1999, it took the contracted organizations considerable time to fully
deploy their personnel and equipment, conduct necessary training and prepare for operations.
As a consequence, they only became effective late into the demining season and although
they achieved reasonable results in the time available, there were enough problems that a
technical consultant was engaged to undertake an evaluation of the projects. The evaluation
revealed problems in the areas of management, technical qualifications, improper procedures,
inadequate reporting and difficulties in partnership cooperation. No doubt, the crisis
environment faced by the donors and programmers caused some of the problems. Indeed, the
very short lead time led to an ‘emergency’ contracting process that only included very broad
terms of reference and resulted in three companies providing two disparate Canadian
mine/UXO clearance organizations without a clear reporting relationship or common command
structure. This was exacerbated by the difficulty of assembling and deploying the necessary
personnel and equipment on short notice into such a far-off location and the general confusion
encountered during the initial stages of the UNMACC operation. It is also worth noting that the
CIDA programme officer changed just as the emergency phase in Kosovo was beginning.
While ultimately a good deal was achieved, the results were not considered adequate and the
numerous problems that were identified led to a detailed evaluation and a more holistic
planning approach for the CIDA mine clearance contribution in 2000.

52

The donation of Canadian mine/UXO clearance equipm ent, valued at $536,411 (CAD) included: a mechanical
clearance system (Bozena mini-flail); 8 vehicles; a 10-ton truck w/ trailer; a generator; protective mine/UXO
clearance suits; detectors; tools; MDD equipment; as well as office, communications, medical and camping
equipment.
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The RFP development referred to above began in earnest in January 2000, after detailed
consultation with the UNMAS and the Manager of the Kosovo UNMACC. The RFP was aimed
at selecting a suitable Canadian company to provide an integrated demining capability to be
employed by the UNMACC consisting of manual clearance, MDD and mechanical teams as
well as a rapid response EOD capability. The objective was to deploy the organization to begin
work at the beginning of the demining season in April; however, delays in the tendering and
contracting process (including appeals) delayed the contract award until mid-June.
Consequently, the selected organization, IDAC, was not deployed until the end of June. While
the EOD team commenced operations almost immediately, the manual teams had to be
locally hired, trained and accredited, and did not begin operations until the beginning of
August. The mechanical clearance equipment (Bozena) needed even longer for delivery,
testing and accreditation, and was not operational until mid-August. The MDD teams
experienced similar problems and were not operational until the end of August. Once fully
established, however, the organization proved to be very effective. The EOD team worked
directly for the MACC, and the mechanical and MDD capacity was employed for the most part
by DSL in areas of suitable terrain. In the meantime, the manual teams tackled minefields in
some of the most difficult terrain in Kosovo and to increase their effectiveness, they employed
field camps to support remote sites in order to reduce the amount of time required for travel
each day. In the end, the IDAC organization produced very good output results; however,
once again the operation experienced problems.
The most serious problems involved leadership,
technical standards and safety, and could be
traced to one individual, the Deputy Project
Manager. His unorthodox approach is cited as a
factor in two ‘preventable’ accidents and the
MACC’s refusal to certify some of the project’s
clearance results. Interestingly, the UNMACC
stressed that the difficulties created by this
individual did not overshadow the excellent
achievements and contributions of the project.
While this did not make the deficiencies more
Figure 9. IDAC Minefield Sites in
palatable, it did offer some assurance that the
Mountainous Area Near Brod,
overall project design and execution were sound,
Kosovo (CIDA / IDAC file photo)
and underlined the likelihood that the results could
have been outstanding if the contracting process had not been held up awaiting the results of
the formal evaluation of the 1999 projects. Indeed, it has been suggested that the lateness of
the deployment may have caused some haste on the part of the organization to ‘catch up’ with
their counterparts. It has also been noted that the results achieved by the technical teams in
spite of the situation was a strong endorsement of the leadership, professionalism and
technical skills of the individual team leaders, most of whom were Canadian. Other problems
were experienced including communications, reporting and finances, but these were dealt with
promptly and aggressively by the CIDA programme officer, and brought to timely resolution
underlining the effectiveness of the project management that was in place at the time.
The problems experienced and lessons learned in the execution of the CMAP Y2000 Kosovo
mine/UXO clearance project led to a different funding strategy for 2001. In consultation with
UNMAS and the UNMACC, it was decided that all of the specialized demining equipment,
vehicles and other equipment amassed by CIDA in the previous two years would be offered as
a donation to the MAP in Kosovo This was to be accompanied by sufficient funding to facilitate
the contracting of established mine clearance organizations to employ the equipment as
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UNMACC centralized assets. Ultimately, this permitted the MACC to greatly accelerate the
final phase of clearance by supporting various organizations with specialized assets,
increasing survey and verification capacity and facilitating innumerable small clearance tasks.
This Canadian donation is cited as “the decisive factor in enabling the MACC to complete the
objectives in 2001, in that it was the funding source for the majority of MACC centralized
assets. In fact, the ability of the MACC to directly control the centralized assets through
UNOPS contracts versus the situation that exists when the organizations are bilaterally funded
was a significant contributing factor in the success that was achieved.”53 It is also worth noting
that part of the Canadian contribution was channeled through the ITF. Significantly, the
matching funds were used to contract additional assets that enabled clearance of an additional
527,394 square metres and destroyed a total of 1,699 mines. This represents 28 percent of
the mined area cleared and 22 percent of the mines
found and destroyed during 2001. 54 In all, the 2001
project has been hailed as a resounding success
and a very important contribution by Canada. While
some problems were cited, such as delays in
finalizing the donation of the Canadian equipment,
these are overshadowed by the good results.
Another beneficial result cited on behalf of the
Canadian contribution is the fact that the equipment
donation was multiplied in effect by its further
donation: the mechanical clearance equipment was
passed on to the Albanian MAP; some equipment
Figure 10. Bozena Donated by Canada.
(CIDA file photo)
was passed on to the South Lebanon MACC; and
the bulk of the assets were passed to the DCP for
subsequent use by the KPC mine action teams throughout Kosovo. This can be viewed as an
important contribution in terms of the development of sustainable indigenous capacity as well
as improving the capacity in other mine-affected areas.
As noted above, results in mine clearance were also achieved with the 1999-2000 institutional
support project Z-020091, contribution provided to the UNMACC that was in turn used to fund
a company called Mine Tech. This funding enabled the company to provide MDD teams as a
MACC centralized asset to support a number of organizations including NPA, Danish Church
Aid (DCA), HI, DSL and the HALO Trust. This resulted in a total of 101 hectares of land
cleared of 768 mines and 6 items of UXO. Mine Tech also cleared 61 minefields and
conducted survey tasks on a further 76 areas to verify or discredit the presence of mines. The
land cleared through this contribution provided access to prime agricultural and grazing land
along with access to the main water reservoirs for two towns.
Victim Assistance Projects
The CMAP in Kosovo provided a victim assistance contribution of $500,000 (CAD) to Queen’s
University for the implementation of the ‘Disabled Population and Landmine Victim Assistance
Project’. Similar to the BiH CBR initiative, this project involved expanding the capacity of 10
existing community-based rehabilitation centres operated by the ‘Association of Disabled
People in Kosovo’ (HANDIKOS). Also, a number of activities were conducted to strengthen the

53
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UNMACC Final Report on the Z-020350 CMAP , Y2001, December 12, 2001.
Ibid ….
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capacity of existing centres including the provision of several educational sessions55 in Kosovo
and Albania, client assistance and educational sessions in south-western Kosovo56 along with
activities related to health care policy development and advocacy.
Victim Assistance Results - Consistency with Goals
The project results are consistent with the stated goal of “strengthening the quality and scope
of existing services for the disabled.” The project contributed to the well being of persons with
disabilities at the community level. These people realized an improvement in their mental and
physical health as well as a marked improvement in their overall quality of life. This was
achieved through improving the skills of rehabilitation workers and increasing the scope of
services available. The enhanced capacity of HANDIKOS enabled participation of the disabled
in all levels of the development and implementation of activities promoting the rights of
disabled persons. The profile of disability issues and public awareness has also been raised
with input being provided by Queen’s ICACBR to assist in the drafting of a world Health
Organization (WHO), Health Care Policy. The actual impact of this project on the disabled
population, however, was very difficult to quantify. The bulk of information available was from
project performance reports and previous interviews with project partners. The project has
since terminated and no one was available to seek input from during the recent field mission.
One should be able to assume, however, based on positive results of the Queen’s ICACBR
project in Bosnia that equivalent results were achieved.
Mine Awareness
Canada supported various projects in south
eastern Europe that were intended to broaden
the awareness of the general population and
refugees in target areas including Kosovo,
regarding the dangers posed by landmines and
UXO. These regional programmes were
generally coordinated by UNICEF and involved
local NGOs. The aim in Kosovo was to sensitize
local populations by supporting information
sessions in schools, refugee camps, villages
and community centres. In Kosovo, the project
produced 400,000 mine/UXO warning posters
Figure 11. Primary School Mine Awareness
Training, Sojeva, Kosovo (Credit:
and leaflets that were distributed through local
ICRC/Diffidenti)
NGOs and government institutions, and three
TV/radio spots. As well, UNICEF conducted a
study to better understand the attitudes and behaviour that resulted in mine/UXO accidents.

55

This included: three 5-week educational Programmes delivered to 50 HANDIKOS personnel; 3 seminars for
rehabilitation professionals from Pristina Hospital and various community clinics (50 participants); and 16 classes
focusing on care of war and landmine victims taught to 100 physiotherapy students at Pristina Medical Secondary
School. It also included activities in Albania; a 3-day education seminar for rehabilitation staff held on CBR
principles and clinical physiotherapy techniques.
56
ICACBR staff worked in southwestern Kosovo with caseworkers from ICRC and other NGOs. Activities included,
15 seminars with NGO CBR workers (241 participants), 62 client site visits and 48 case conferences to review
challenging cases (240 participants).
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Mine Awareness Results - Consistency with Goals
As this was a multilateral, regional programme, no detailed results were available to the
evaluation team. In general terms, however, UNICEF was the lead agency for the mine
awareness effort in Kosovo and the overall results were rated as excellent. Mine awareness
was a component of all clearance operations and UNICEF assisted the efforts of 17 different
organizations operating in support of mine/UXO clearance activities.
UNICEF also supported the Department of Education with the delivery of school programmes,
as well as assisting in the implementation of a UNMACC exit strategy programme known as
operation ‘Normal Life’. This programme was undertaken to ensure that local communities
were aware of and satisfied with the clearance work completed in their areas, to advise on
residual dangers, reinforce awareness and indicate how to obtain assistance after the
departure of the MACC. Notwithstanding the lack of details, Canada’s contribution was no
doubt instrumental in terms of facilitating the very effective mine awareness programme that
was undertaken in Kosovo.
FINDINGS - PROJECT DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING
Because of the need to respond quickly with a programme in response to the UN Resolution
and request for mine action assistance, the CMAP in Kosovo was somewhat unique. The
project definition and design phase was quite compressed and consequently was very reactive
in nature. See Annex E for a summary of key results presented in matrix form for all the
Kosovo CMAP projects.
Project Design
It must be noted that the initial Kosovo CMAP project design was undertaken in a crisis
environment. Consequently, it was significantly abbreviated and was further complicated by
external requests and the Canadian Government’s position regarding the utilization of
Canadian resources. UN requests precipitated support for a mission to define mine action
requirements that ultimately led to the establishment of the Kosovo UNMACC. Follow-on
institutional support was approved in the form of CF technical experts for database
development and an in-kind CF contribution to provide for critical UNMACC liaison with KFOR.
Emergency demining support was accomplished by the selection of Canadian companies in
an abbreviated contracting process that provided only broad terms of reference. Finally, mine
awareness was supported through funding of UNICEF on a regional basis and victim
assistance was addressed through a Queen’s CBR project that was split between BiH and
Kosovo, and built on previous success. It is also noteworthy that the CIDA programme officer
changed in June 1999 and the new programme officer was faced with a very steep learning
curve as a result of the emergency response requirement and had no opportunity to visit the
area or meet with potential project partners. However, a humanitarian assistance officer was
deployed in 1999 and did work on behalf of the bilateral programme.
Because of numerous problems with the rapid response demining projects in 1999, a more
deliberate project design process was adopted to provide an integrated mine clearance
capability to support the UNMACC in 2000, and take advantage of CIDA purchased mine
clearance equipment, vehicles and supplies from the 1999 projects. A comprehensive RFP
was developed in consultation with UNMAS and the UNMACC in Kosovo. As described
earlier, however, although considerable success was achieved, the contract was late being
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awarded because of unavoidable delays and the project experienced several problems.
Consequently, a new design approach was adopted for 2001, which entailed the provision of
critical centralized mine clearance assets for the UNMACC. This project included the donation
of CIDA-purchased mine clearance vehicles, specialized equipment and supplies. The design
of this project was customized to satisfy critical UNMACC requirements and achieved
outstanding results 57.
Institutional support to the UNMACC was also provided in 1999-2000 with a significant project
that included a major funding component for the provision of specialized mine clearance
assets. The design of this project was driven by the UNMACC and significant success was
reported.
Finding 20. Institutional support is a niche area where Canada through the use of CF or
private sector technical experts and organizations with niche capabilities, can
make an important contribution. Mechanisms should be established to monitor
these resources, coordinate short-notice availability (e.g. through MOU’s or
standing offer agreements) and facilitate ongoing mine action liaison between
CIDA, DND and DFAIT.
Finding 21. Normal Canadian government contracting processes are not suitable for rapid
response or emergency mine action situations. As well, CIDA programme officers
have limited capacity beyond their normal workload to handle rapid project
design, contracting, implementation and the demands of hands-on contract
management. For emergency situations, CIDA should focus on institution building
and any support of mine/UXO clearance; mine awareness or victim assistance
should be through established organizations. As noted above, however, the
provision of Canadian resources in niche areas could be facilitated by the use of
Standing Offer Agreements to achieve timely, cost-effective and efficient
response.
Finding 22. While Canadian private sector mine/UXO clearance capabilities do exist, they are
somewhat limited and should not be contracted without special care in the
definition of the scope, terms of reference and deliverables in the tendering
process. It is also important to obtain the input of a mine action technical expert
to assist in the development of RFP and contract documentation.
Finding 23. Deliberate contracting utilizing a comprehensive RFP requires sufficient lead-time.
Experience has shown that at least six months is required from the start of project
design/RFP preparation to contract award including the possibility of appeals. It
should be noted, however, that the timeliness of contracting certain niche
capabilities could be facilitated by the use of Standing Offer Agreements.
Finding 24. For larger, more complex projects involving Canadian resources, as was done
with the 2000 IDAC demining contract, a careful needs assessment and detailed
input into project design is required at the outset from the supported agency– in
this case UNMAS and the UNMACC.
Finding 25. Direct, untied funding of the UNMACC in Kosovo to acquire critical centralized
assets by in-theatre contracts was very effective, however, this approach may not
57

UNMIK – Final Report on the Z-020350 CMAP in Kosovo Y2001 dated 12 December 2001.

CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003

51

be transferable to other situations based on the capabilities of the MAC to let and
oversee contracts, availability of suitable resources, local laws and the like. Direct
funding contributions for national MACs to let contracts for centralized resources
or demining activities must be very carefully considered due to often questionable
or non-existent contracting regulations, the likelihood of preferential selection and
the lack of management control.
Finding 26. The extension of existing projects such as UNICEF mine awareness and Queen’s
Victim Assistance was an effective way to cover these important areas of mine
action on short-notice, with experienced and effective partners.
Finding 27. Changing of key CIDA management personnel should be avoided during periods
of heightened/emergency response. If unavoidable, however, MAP planning
principles and technical expertise would be beneficial.
Project Implementation
During the emergency phase, CMAP project implementation in Kosovo was impacted by the
general confusion that marked the first six months of the UNMACC mine action efforts. The
early institutional support projects were timely and very effective in helping the UNMACC get
established, define a mine action plan and coordinate the activities of numerous clearance and
awareness agencies in the midst of a tight security situation and a crush of returning refugees.
The later institutional support projects in 2000 and 2001 were well-contrived and managed
throughout their implementation with UNMACC as the partner and solid executing agencies
like Mine Tech and DSL.
The mine awareness project coordinated by UNICEF was regionally based, well-managed and
produced reasonable results as far as can be determined. The mine victim assistance project,
likewise produced fair results that mirrored its parallel project in BiH and did not present any
management or reporting problems to speak of.
The greatest project implementation problems for the Kosovo CMAP were generated by the
emergency demining projects in 1999 and the integrated mine/UXO project that was planned
and implemented in 2000. The problems are discussed above, however, the two projects in
1999 suffered from short-notice and poorly defined contracts resulting from urgency of the
situation and the crisis nature of the programming and project development process. The
contracted personnel and equipment were late in arriving, and poor leadership, a flawed
organization, poor technical skills and faulty management exacerbated this. The 2000 project
was much better designed but suffered from unavoidable contracting delays, late deployment,
poor leadership and on-site management, and a poor safety record. Some of the problems
such as late contracting and deployment were beyond the control of the executing agency but
the overall implementation of these projects was poor.
In the end, reasonable results were achieved 58 and many valuable lessons were learned.
Indeed, the 2000 Kosovo mine/UXO clearance project was an ambitious undertaking and
despite the problems, the outputs were credible, cost-effective and beneficial. The project
paved the way for the UNMACC centralized assets project in 2001, demonstrated the effective
58
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use of remote support camps and provided a set of environmental guidelines (SOPs) for
mine/UXO clearance operations. Also on the positive side, it demonstrated Canadian
capabilities in the mine/UXO clearance arena such as, rapid response EOD, MDDs,
mechanical mine clearance, and the training of deminers, that should be considered in future
programming. Finally, the CIDA management of these projects was diligent including
aggressive and timely trouble shooting, and problem resolution. CIDA’s project management
involved monitoring missions to the field as well as detailed project evaluations by technical
experts 59. CIDA post personnel in Pristina provided invaluable support in the management,
coordination and evaluation of these projects.
Finding 28. Early familiarity with the area of operations, frequent monitoring, annual field
visits and ongoing close scrutiny by CIDA post personnel are indispensable
elements of successful project implementation.
Finding 29. The Y2000 Kosovo CMAP integrated mine clearance project demonstrated
significant Canadian niche mine action capabilities such as rapid response EOD,
MDDs, mechanical clearance, QA and the training/supervision of deminers, that
should be surveyed by CIDA and considered for future interventions.
Finding 30. The RFP format used for the 2000 Kosovo mine clearance project should be
considered as a draft model for future niche programming of this type.
Finding 31. The mine action ‘development’ approach currently used by Norway, the United
Kingdom and the USA, should be reviewed by CIDA for methodologies that may
be suitable to the Canadian context, such as streamlined contracting or
government funding through an implementing agency or NGO such as NPA.
Finding 32. The ‘environmental SOPs’ developed for the Y2000 Kosovo CMAP mine
clearance project have been adopted by UNMAS as a technical note to the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to define environmental protection
protocols for all mine/UXO clearance operations. This beneficial result follows
from Canada’s leadership in the area of environmental protection and the need to
undertake impact assessments for Canadian overseas development projects.
Project Reporting
As for Bosnia, the Kosovo CMAP projects varied significantly in the quality of reporting. The
UNICEF mine awareness project was regionally based and only reported outputs in terms of
products produced and distributed. The Queen’s victim assistance project, likewise reported
on programme services delivered but did not provide statistics on total beneficiaries let alone
any disaggregation by gender or other categories.
The projects in direct support of the UNMACC were very well reported on and the MACC also
supplemented reporting by the Canadian demining organizations that were generally deficient
in this area. Reporting during the emergency phase was difficult but the 2000 project had well
defined reporting requirements that were not adhered to.
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Finding 33. Partners and executing agencies expressed frustration with CIDA’s complex and
demanding project reporting requirements. Accordingly, CIDA reporting
requirements should be reviewed and streamlined in the context of exceptional
working conditions.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS – KOSOVO CMAP
Considering the emergency nature of the project development for the CMAP in Kosovo, the
results achieved are very reasonable and the lessons learned are invaluable. CIDA’s response
to institutional support requests was timely and effective, reflecting a useful partnership with
DND that should be maintained. The un-tied funding of the UNMACC permitted strong
centralized assets to be acquired that greatly accelerated the overall mine clearance effort,
well beyond the outputs that would have been achieved through direct funding of a mine
clearance NGO or contractor; indeed, the $1.8M (CAD) funding in 2001 was viewed as a
lifeline that facilitated the successful completion of the mine/UXO clearance in the province.
The extension of regional projects to provide specialized mine action support in Kosovo was
also an innovative and effective approach to a short-notice requirement. Finally, important
lessons were learned from CIDA’s foray into contracting Canadian mine/UXO clearance
capabilities. CIDA should review the approach to mine action programming used by key allies
such as the United Kingdom, USA and Norway with a view to defining a Canadian approach
that builds on key areas of expertise and a resource base of niche competencies. Again, these
are countries that have innovative approaches that are worth examining such as crisis
contracting and a government sponsored NGO such as NPA.

THE CMAP PROJECTS IN CROATIA
OVERVIEW OF CROATIA PROJECTS AND RESULTS
General Description of Programme
According to the Landmine Monitor Report, 2002 “during the conflict in Croatia, mines were
laid mainly to protect defensive positions on the lines of confrontation, which changed
frequently, and also in areas of strategic importance, for example, along railway lines, and
around utility installations such as power stations, and pipelines”.60 Minefields and areas
suspected of being contaminated with mines and UXO are located in 14 of the 21 counties of
Croatia”, totals an estimated 1,700 square kilometres 61 of suspected mined area in 2001, of
which “it is thought that only a percentage is actually contaminated” by some 500,000 mines.62
The affected area potentially consists of: “infrastructure, 236 square kilometres (14 percent);
agricultural areas, 566 square kilometres (33 percent); houses and yards, 87 square
60

Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).
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kilometres (5 percent); economic infrastructure, 82 square kilometres (5 percent), and
pastures, meadows, and forests, 29 square kilometres (3 percent)63. When compared to
Bosnia, the situation is considerably better because all of the 14 mine affected counties have
been provided with precise danger area maps and as noted previously, the worst
contamination is confined to the four former Serb enclaves (UNPAs). Approximately $26.4m
(USD) was spent to fund mine action activities in 2001. 64 It is noteworthy that 78 percent
came from Croatian State funding with the bulk of the remaining amount (approximately
$5.8m USD) coming from international donor agencies.65 Canada is a significant donor with
contributions via the UNDP Trust Fund and the ITF. 66 The CMAP in Croatia is also a peace
building and security initiative and as with the programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it
includes projects covering aspects of mine action in the country. 67 This 2.5 year, $2m (CAD)
Table 7. CIDA – Canadian Mine Action Program contributions in Croatia, by Project
Project No.

1

Z-020337-001

2

Z-020337-002

3

Z-020337-003

4

Z-020337-004

Project Title
Institutional Support to MACs
CMAP/ Support to UN- CROMAC Transition
Program
CMAP/ CROMAC National Managers &
Middle Managers Training & Development
CMAP/ CROMAC Communications,
Database & Management Coordination
CMAP/ Support to CROMAC Survey & QA
Depts.
Sub-Total “Institutional Support to MACs”

Budget
(CAD dollars)

Executing
Agency

Start
Date

End
Date

$ 300,000

UNDP

00.11.06

03.12.31

$ 30,000

UNDP

00.11.06

03.12.31

$ 185,000

UNDP

00.11.06

03.12.31

$ 450,000

UNDP

00.11.06

03.12.31

$ 965,000

5

Z-020337-005

Mine Awareness
CMAP/ Mine Awareness Program
Sub-Total “Mine Awareness”

$ 60,000
$ 60,000

UNDP

00.11.06

03.12.31

6

Z-020337-006

Victim Assistance
CMAP/ Victims Assistance Program
Sub-Total “Victim Assistance”

$ 170,000
$ 170,000

UNDP

00.11.06

03.12.31

7
8
9

Z-020337-007
Z-020337-008
Z-020339-002

Demining
CMAP/ CROMAC Survey, Verification Pjcts.
CMAP/ Support to NPA’s Demining Progr.
Mine Detection Dog Training II
Sub-Total “Demining”

$ 300,000
$ 148,000
$ 350,000
$ 798,000

UNDP
UNDP
CIDC

00.11.06
00.11.06
01.03.01

03.12.31
03.12.31
02.05.31

GRAND TOTAL

$ 1,993,000
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According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2002, these contributions come from the United Kingdom, Germany,
Canada, and Norway (via the UNDP Trust Fund); the United Nations Associations of the UK and USA, and AdoptA-Minefield, for demining; the European Commission (via the ITF); Switzerland; and, the USA (via the ITF), among
others.
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A donor conference “Humanitarian Demining – Support to the National Mine Action Programme in the Republic of
Croatia” on 24 September 2001 was co-organized by the government, CROMAC, World Bank and UNDP.[48] The
main reason for the conference was the closure of the World Bank Loan Programme and the need to find new ways
of financing mine action. Present at the conference were 150 people from 34 countries. Donations (USD) were
announced by the United Kingdom ($250,000), Austria ($80,000), Norway ($504,000), Japan ($317,311) and INA
oil industry (an office building for CROMAC).
67
Canada’s development assistance to Croatia is also broader and concentrates on economic and institutional
transition with several areas of emphasis including; health, policing, human rights, government administration and
the development of NGOs .
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programme is a significant contribution and places Canada as one of the key donor countries
in this area (see Table 7). CMAP’s contribution aims at strengthening CROMAC institutional
capabilities through funding in the areas of training and development, equipment and the
support of technical surveys for area reduction. Mine victim assistance and mine awareness
programmes are also supported along with equipment acquisition (mini-flail, protective suits,
marking and fencing equipment). In addition, CMAP has also provided support for the
establishment of a Croatian MDD training facility implemented by CIDC.
As noted previously, the CMAP in Croatia is a fairly new programme. It was initiated in 2000
as a result of the state elections and the advent of a more moderate and cooperative regime in
Zagreb. It is therefore early to assess the progress made in some of the projects, particularly
at the outcome and long-term sustainability levels.
Institutional/MAC Support Projects
The Government of Croatia established CROMAC in 1998 to be responsible for managing all
mine action programmes in Croatia. Prior to that, mine action coordination was carried out by
a UNMACC established in 1996. With the creation of CROMAC, the UNMACC “changed its
name to the UN Mine Action Assistance Programme (UNMAAP), and until December 2001
when it was dissolved,68 it supported the CROMAC in a capacity-building role” 69.
Of the total CMAP funding in Croatia, $1.7m
(CAD) was allocated to improve the capacity of
CROMAC through multi-year institutional support
projects managed by the UNDP. The
implementation of five projects that began in
November 2000 involved contributions ranging
from $30,000 to $450,000 (CAD) for a two year
period including; the UN/CROMAC transition
programme ($300,000); development and
delivery of training to managers ($30,000);
automation and office equipment ($185,000);
support to Survey/QA Departments ($450,000);
and survey and verification projects ($300,000).
Institutional Support Results - Consistency with
Goals

Figure 12.

MV-3 Donated to CROMAC by
Canada (CIDA file photo)

The recent CMAP evaluation field mission clearly confirmed that the CROMAC institutional
support projects are consistent with the goals of “improving indigenous demining and
institutional capacity”. While some of the projects are in the early stages and final results are
yet to be reported, 70 a great deal of progress has been made in the development of CROMAC.
Indeed, a recent evaluation of the UNDP project that supported the development of the
68

During 2001 its functions included: assistance in interpreting and introducing IMAS into the Croatian mine action
system, assistance in planning and prioritization including socio-economic impact factors, and liaising with the
international community in raising funds for mine action.
69
Landmine Monitor Report 2002.
70
These include Z-020337-001 ($ 300,000 Support to UN/CROMAC Transition Programme), Z-020337-002
(CROMAC National Managers Training and Development) and Z-020337-007 ($300,000 CROMAC Survey,
Verification Projects).
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CROMAC concluded, “CROMAC has now developed into one of the most – and possibly the
most – successful national mine action coordination centres anywhere in the world.” 71 In this
context, the Canadian contributions to the institutional support of CROMAC are significant. In
fact, some of the projects have served to directly address some of the institutional shortfalls
identified in the above noted evaluation report. For example, the evaluation cited the need for
improvements to general assessments and technical surveys with emphasis on area
reduction, and this was directly addressed by Z-020337-004 & 007, support to CROMAC
survey and verification. Also detailed was the need to develop and apply international
standards and improve county, regional and national planning processes. These requirements
were addressed by Z-020337-002 & 003, support to the development and training of national
mine action managers and improved automation and office equipment, including the provision
of equipment for a Decision Support System (DSS) for enhancing communications and
database coordination. 72 Also, the support to CROMAC’s Survey and QA Department included
the purchase of a mini-flail (MV-3), protective equipment for deminers, marking and fencing
supplies, and MDDs. These contributions greatly improved the technical survey and area
reduction capacity of CROMAC. The mini-flail has proven useful for verification and area
reduction work. It has been used extensively to support the construction of a highway to the
coast that is important to the tourist industry and commercial traffic from Zagreb to Zadar. As
well, tangible results have been achieved through the development of the DSS including the
development of sound mine action priorities based on the definition of social, political,
economic, safety, legislative and environmental parameters to drive operational planning. This
system has also been used to accelerate the reduction of suspected areas thereby greatly
increasing transparency and cost-effectiveness of clearance operations.
Overall, the projects have been highly successful in achieving their primary aim of developing
a sustainable indigenous mine action capacity and their secondary aim of reducing the threat
that mines/UXO pose to the country. Only one project has experienced difficulty and it
involved the provision of protective equipment for deminers –embarrassing delays were
experienced in the replacement of helmets furnished by Med-Eng of Ottawa. In any case,
CROMAC is now at a point where it is mostly self-sufficient and sustainable. In broad terms,
the capacity building efforts have: increased the competence of the Croatian staff in the
technical aspects of mine action; increased the competence of the Croatian staff in general
management and administration; and developed a sustainable national system to address the
mine action issue within Croatia.73
Mine Clearance Projects
Support for mine clearance has been provided by the CMAP in Croatia through the
implementation of a MDD training project. The goal is “enhanced personal safety for deminers,
residents and visitors in the area”. The MDD project was partly funded by Belgium and Austria
and is being undertaken by CIDC by building on their experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The purpose of the project was to assist CROMAC in the establishment of a local MDD
training and evaluation facility, and the development of a national programme. The project
started in March 2001 and was supposed to be completed in May 2002. Delays have occurred
based on a number of factors including the unsuitability of the selected Croatian partner
71

Joint Evaluation Mission, Review of the UNDP Project “Support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre” (Projects
CRO/00/001 & CRO/00/Q01, Report Dated – 16 October 2001)
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This project included training on new database applications.
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organization, unusually bad weather and poor candidate selection. While a detailed MOU was
signed that defined the partnership responsibilities, the Croatian company (PHD) would not
live up to its obligations and CIDC had to make up the shortfall by creating a training facility
and recruiting candidates. The project should be completed by early 2003.
Mine Clearance Results - Consistency with Goals
While considerable progress has been made, this project has not, to date, achieved the
intended results. A suitable MDD training facility has, however, been established including
good kennels, support infrastructure and equipment as well as the necessary training sites
(boxes). The facility is in the area of Skabrnja, near the city of Zadar. There are currently 10
MDD with handlers undergoing training and graduation/certification is tentatively scheduled for
the end of February 2003. Except for the MDD training and testing facilities, there obviously
has been no capacity added to the resources of CROMAC and consequently, no
“enhancement to the personal safety of deminers, residents and visitors to the area.”
However, the project will deliver up to 10 MDD teams early in 2003 and the training facilities
will be available to support the refresher training and accreditation requirements of CROMAC
MDD teams.74 What remains to be seen is whether the Croatian government and CROMAC
will honour their commitment to take over the programme and if they are capable of building a
sustainable national MDD programme. This must be considered in light of the fact that the
project does not, at this point, include a ‘train-the-trainer’ component due to the termination of
the Croatian partner’s involvement. Other complicating factors include the forthcoming
creation of a regional canine/MDD training facility in Bosnia, variations in training
methodology, the question of state or donor funding, and the future of CIDC in the region. In
fact, it is too early to tell if the intended objectives will be achieved and whether this project will
result in a sustainable indigenous MDD training capacity.
Mine Awareness Projects
A CMAP project was used to fund a needs assessment survey for communities living in mine
suspected areas and to prepare a Croatian mine awareness needs assessment report. The
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) undertook this UNDP
project at a modest cost of $80,000 (CAD). The final report was completed in May 2002 and
was subsequently translated and distributed to all key stakeholders in the Croatian mine
awareness sector.75 The project funding also permitted the production of some mine
awareness materials as well as the funding of a small mine awareness project in the form of a
play that will be performed in schools by a local theatrical group.
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Croatian infrastructure for Mine Detection Dog training include: the initial construction of training facilities and
kennels near Novigrad, Croatia, relocated (in Dec. 2001) to Skabrnja-Zadar and Pridraga respectively, with training
areas that comprise 81 training and testing boxes occupying 8,100 square metres with an overall area of 11,000
square metres, seeded with 100 AP mines, 12 AT mines and 5 pieces of UXOs; the establishment of a Croatian
office with a national administrative assistant, and communications tools; and procurement of project vehicles.
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Mine Awareness Results - Consistency with Goals
There is every indication that the results of this mine awareness project will meet or exceed
expectations in terms of, “reducing the number of preventable mine incidents and improving
long-term donor enrolment.”
In fact, the project is well on its way to achieving its expected results and will no doubt have a
significant and lasting impact. The "Mine Awareness Needs Assessment Report" is already
being used as a strategic planning tool to coordinate scarce mine awareness resources, for
the development of programmes and to guide programme delivery. Improved collaboration
has already been realized between the key stakeholders, the Croatian Red Cross76, the
Ministry of Education and CROMAC. The long-term focus of the report is to encourage and
enable a new array of planning, priority setting and implementation strategies. These will in
turn contribute to a higher level of programme concentration with a view to maximizing impact
and donor cognition. The report will no doubt be used as a strategic planning tool for years to
come, which underlines the positive capacity building and sustainability achieved by this
project.
This project is a good example of achieving results that are both relevant and cost effective. It
was a relatively low-cost undertaking that will have a disproportionate impact and useful
complementary projects were achieved with the remaining funds. This needs assessment will
enhance the overall performance of mine awareness programmes in Croatia and will no doubt
precipitate more donor funding. Obviously, it is an important contribution to saving lives and
preventing the loss of limbs in Croatia.
Victim Assistance Projects
The CMAP mine victim assistance project in Croatia funded a comprehensive victims survey
and the completion of a “Mine Victim Needs Assessment
Report.” The Centre for Disaster Management and the
Croatian Association of Mine Victims (CAMV) undertook
these important projects. The survey was also expanded by
CROMAC and CAMV into a complete database of mine
victims that provides information about the current status of
individual. The funding also provided for the conduct of
physical and psychosocial workshops for mine victims, one
for children and one for adults. These were held at a seaside
hospital complex known as the Rovinj Centre where the wing
of a building was renovated to accommodate the workshops.
The workshop’s curriculum has been refined and plans have
been made to conduct four children’s workshops in 2003,
each of three-weeks duration and involving 20 candidates.
Figure 13.

76

Mine Victim (Credit:
John Rodsted)

Madame Plestina, the wife of the Prime Minister and a
Special Mine Action Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
is currently the force behind this project. She has apparently

The Croatian Red Cross is the principal implementer of mine awareness in Croatia.
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leveraged additional funds (USA) and plans are being made to expand this project into a yearround, regional and perhaps, international, mine victims/PWDs rehabilitation centre.
Victim Assistance Results - Consistency with Goals
The “Mine Victims Needs Assessment Report” and the victim’s database will serve as
important strategic planning and decision-making tools for all issues, programming needs and
support related to the rehabilitation, care and reintegration of mine victims. It will also assist in
raising public and government awareness of the needs and rights of the disabled, particularly
in the areas of employment and accessibility. The survey, report and mine victim database are
sustainable results, as they will serve the long-term needs of the disabled population and
continue to have a positive impact for years to come.
The Rovinj rehabilitation workshops offer many tangible benefits to participating children and
adults. Although only twenty-four landmine victims have benefited from these workshops to
date, the potential exists to expand this initiative. The participants are furnished an opportunity
to overcome trauma, and to gain confidence and self-esteem through music and sports. These
results are consistent with the project goals of “advances in mine victim’s quality of life and
raised expectations of future economic opportunities,” and of “increased level and quality of
care for Croatian mine victims”.
In addition, the project also serves the secondary goals of “long-term management by the
Croatian health system and the Union of Institutions for Disabled Persons,” “informed
decision-making as concerns Croatian mine victims” and “representational advocacy on behalf
of Croatian mine victims.” This has been facilitated to a large degree by the involvement of
Madame Plestina who has embraced the cause and is raising both funds and awareness.
Unfortunately, the large-scale expansion of the project into a year-round regional centre for
mine victims does not appear to be well thought out or sustainable. While capital funding can
likely be secured, no sponsor or implementing agency (government/NGO) has been identified,
professional staff requirements have not been addressed, and no source of long-term
operations and maintenance funding has been secured. As well, the need has not been
quantified nationally, regionally or from further afield. On the other hand, the current workshop
initiative would benefit from a limited expansion in order to serve more victims and their
families. This would provide relevant and cost-effective results in a sustainable programme
framework. The large expansion envisaged, however, seems overly ambitious and is not likely
to be sustainable without significant donor support or government intervention.
FINDINGS – PROJECT DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING
The CMAP in Croatia is modest by comparison with Bosnia or Kosovo. This reflects the
relatively late start of the programme for the reasons noted above as well as the fact that the
Croatian government has demonstrated an impressive degree of ownership of its mine
problem. State funding makes up the majority of mine action spending in Croatia: CMAP
funding was focused on addressing deficiencies identified in the UNDP institutional capacity
development project, “Support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre.”
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Project Design
In terms of design, the projects funded by the CMAP in Croatia were consistent with the
programme’s balanced approach and together they represented a complementary package
addressing all areas of mine action. Once again, the UNDP was a valuable partner in the area
of institution building, suggesting projects with maximum impact, sustainability and costeffectiveness. Project design was easily facilitated and the positive results are reflected in the
glowing assessment of the CROMAC in the UNDP project evaluation. 77 The capabilities of
national managers have been enhanced and a broad range of other tools and equipment has
been introduced to significantly improve the planning, management effectiveness and
operational capabilities of the CROMAC. The mine awareness and the victim’s needs surveys
and reports, are valuable strategic tools that will guide policy development, agency
coordination and programme delivery for years to come. The victim assistance project
generated valuable visibility and coordination through the Croatian mine victims association,
and the physical/psycho-social workshops produced good results but the current plans for
large-scale expansion are not supportable. Finally, the CROMAC MDD Training Centre project
being implemented by CIDC should have been able to simply build on the experience gained
in Bosnia. The inability to identify a suitable Croatian partner, output delays and the lack of
identified, follow-on funding support raise serious questions about the design and
sustainability of this project. As well, the project was undertaken in spite of the ongoing efforts
of the mine action community including CROMAC to regionalize activities such as MDD
training.
Finding 34. Once again, the selection of strong, established partners and executing agencies
was a key ingredient in project success. The UNDP has proven to be a valuable
and reliable partner in institutional capacity building, particularly in the selection
and design of high impact, priority projects.
Finding 35. Professional analyses such as a mine awareness needs assessment, the mine
victim needs assessment and socio-economic impact surveys and socioeconomic impact surveys have great value in guiding policy and programme
development, coordinating resources and increasing mine action programme
effectiveness. Their value far outweighs their cost and they should be undertaken
in the early stages of any mine action programme.
Finding 36. Limited expansion of the physical/psycho-social rehabilitation project in Rovinj is
justified but the large expansion project outlined during the evaluation field
mission by Madame Plestina should be viewed with considerable caution.
Finding 37. Due to the intransigence of the Croatian partner, the CIDC project to develop a
MDD training programme in Croatia experienced difficulties from the outset. The
partner was ultimately deemed unsuitable and while considerable progress has
been made, follow-on staffing and funding support have not been identified. As
well, the project is threatened by a regional canine training facility that is planned
for development in 2003.

77
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Project Implementation
As for project design, the UNDP has proven to be a reliable and effective partner in guiding
the implementation of CMAP-funded institutional capacity building projects in support of
CROMAC. These projects all benefited from useful CROMAC input and positive involvement
in their execution. The Canadian support was well-acknowledged by CROMAC during the
recent field mission and good project visibility has been afforded by Canadian/CIDA flags and
logos on donated equipment, in particular, the MV-3 mechanical clearance system. Only one
project suffered difficulties and it involved lengthy delays in the supply and delivery of
replacement helmets for the deminer protective ensemble (supplied by Med-Eng). The mine
victim physical/psycho-social rehabilitation project in Rovinj enjoyed considerable success and
a modest expansion of this project planned for 2003 is worthy of support. On the other hand,
the proposed major expansion of the programme that includes significant capital costs does
not appear to be well thought through or supportable. In addition, it was felt that the Canadian
contribution in this area in particular and mine action in general, was not well known or
recognized and that better CMAP communication planning and effort are required.
Finally, the CIDC project to develop a CROMAC MDD training programme has suffered
significant implementation problems and delays. Key factors in the delay included poor
handler and MDD candidate selection and the unsuitability of the proposed Croatian partner
organization. Consequently, the programmed 10 MDD teams will not be accredited until the
end of February 2003, approximately one-year late. As well, sustainability is in question and a
competing regional canine training centre is being developed in Bosnia. On the plus side, the
training facility seems to be very good and the MDD teams will add a valuable resource for
CROMAC’s 2003 demining programme. This project fell short in the key areas of costeffectiveness, partnerships, appropriate use of resources, and informed and timely action.
Finding 38. Close and active collaboration between CIDA, UNDP and CROMAC was the key
to the successful selection and implementation of high-impact, well targeted,
projects to build the sustainable national institutional mine action capacity needed
by CROMAC.
Finding 39. The involvement of a high-profile personage such a Madame Plestina had a
beneficial impact on the mine victim project in terms of its visibility, impact and
obvious success, and her involvement leveraged valuable resources and
facilities. On the other hand, her enthusiasm may result in an overly ambitious
and unsustainable expansion that must be viewed with caution.
Finding 40. CIDC experienced considerable difficulty in terms of achieving established project
timelines. Accordingly, CIDA should carefully review the timelines and
deliverables of any future CIDC proposals.
Finding 41. Major programmes such as the Balkans CMAP must include a communication
strategy and plan to better exploit success and respond to any identified media
queries resulting from project implementation issues or problems.
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Project Reporting
In general terms, UNDP’s project monitoring and reporting was viewed as inadequate. This
was discussed during the field evaluation mission and it was noted that due to staffing
reductions, the UNDP Croatian office lacked the resources to conduct extensive monitoring
and reporting. Possibly this situation could be helped to some degree by the use of a more
abbreviated reporting format.
CIDC’s project reports were consistently of poor quality, lacking in substance, incomplete and
often late. Serious problems and project delays were not communicated to the programme
officer in a timely fashion and these difficulties were often revealed by other sources. Until
recently, similar problems were experienced with the CIDC project in BiH.
Finding 42. Abbreviated report formats or additional funding should be considered for
organizations lacking the required staff capacity to complete full reports.
Finding 43. Funding increments in the form of progress payments or holdbacks may be a
suitable approach for organizations that fail to produce satisfactory and timely
deliverables such as annual reports. This approach has shown good results in
recent dealings with CIDC
Finding 44. The delay in the replacement of the Med-Eng protective helmets caused
considerable embarrassment.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS - CROATIA CMAP
The design of the CMAP in Croatia benefited from the experience of the UNDP in
orchestrating the CROMAC transition project as well as the active involvement of the
CROMAC staff. Of note is the fact that the institutional support projects were selected for their
capacity building value prior to the termination of UNMAAP. As a consequence of the
UNDP/UNMAAP institutional support project, the CROMAC has matured into an effective
national institution with competent and professional staff. It now has the tools such as the
DSS, needs assessments and physical assets to coordinate an effective mine action strategy.
Area reduction surveys, marking and clearance efforts will be prioritized based on multi-criteria
analysis. There is also the likelihood of a socio-economic study to further assist planning and
the establishment of priorities. Canada has made a major contribution to this success through
the Balkans CMAP and the tailored project funding that was provided. The only questionable
project has been the CROMAC MDD training programme undertaken by CIDC. Poor
partnership selection, significant delays and sustainability questions indicate poor design and
poor implementation, not to mention consistently poor reporting. The victim assistance project
produced good results and deserves continued support, however, any large-scale expansion
will require a comprehensive plan that includes a Croatian government ministry or equivalent
sponsor/implementing organization. In summary, the CMAP in Croatia was well contrived,
cost-effective and highly productive from the perspective of sustainable capacity building.
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BALKANS CMAP – PROGRAMME LEVEL REVIEW
GENERAL OVERVIEW
From a development perspective, mines/UXO are first and foremost, a humanitarian concern
and must be addressed from this perspective. Accordingly, priority in mine action must be
afforded to those who are most vulnerable and to reducing the immediate threat to the well
being of mine affected communities. Mines/UXO also constitute a major impediment to
rehabilitation and sustainable socio-economic development. Therefore, in order to be effective,
mine action programmes in countries recovering from violent conflicts should be integrated
into comprehensive strategies designed to support humanitarian action, peace building,
reconstruction and development.
In countries where the scale of contamination is widespread and severe, and a broad range of
support is required, the international community is usually called upon to assist in the
development of a national mine action programme. Where mines/UXO present an immediate
threat to local populations or an obstacle to socio-economic development, emergency mine
surveys, marking and clearance as well as mine awareness should be the principal
requirements of the central mine action effort. These are essential to prevent loss of life or
injury and allow the beginnings of socio-economic development. An efficient response to the
landmine threat also requires government, international organizations, NGOs and civil society
to cooperate closely and this dictates the priority development of a strong and technically
competent mine action coordination institution. Mine victims also need to be accounted for and
supported, and the state of the local health system will define the nature and extent of
development assistance required in this area.
BALKANS CMAP – CONSISTENCY WITH PROGRAMME GOALS
Mine action is primarily concerned with assisting people and communities that are exposed to
the dangers of mines/UXO. The purpose of mine action is to recreate a safe environment
conducive to normal life and development. To this end, the overall objectives of CIDA’s
Balkans CMAP were to: reduce the threat of injury and death posed by mines/UXO; remove a
key impediment to the return of refugees; enable rebuilding to take place; and support the
capacity development of indigenous institutions and expertise. To accomplish these goals, the
Balkans CMAP was designed to include the key mine action activities geared towards
addressing the problems faced by populations as a result of mine/UXO contamination. The
programme encompassed four complementary components: mine awareness; mine clearance
including survey, mapping and marking; victim assistance; and institution building.
As noted previously, the Balkans CMAP was developed in three distinct phases by country;
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia. This programme development process was in
response to local and regional situations/events, however, the overall programme goals
remained consistent and were reflected in the selection and design of individual projects. Most
of the projects met or exceeded the results expected and in a few areas, CIDA funding
produced significant and long-term impacts. This was particularly true in the vital area of
institutional support and capacity building. In Bosnia and Croatia, Canada’s support was a
major factor in the progressive development of self-reliant and competent national mine action
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coordination institutions. In Kosovo, CIDA’s institutional support projects were described as
critical to the success of the UNMACC. CMAP mine awareness and clearance projects
protected significant numbers, facilitated returns, and enabled reconstruction and development
to take place. And, mine victim assistance projects in all three countries provided vital physical
rehabilitation and psychosocial support to victims as well as sustainable capacity in the health
and education sectors.
BALKANS CMAP – CONSISTENCY WITH CEE OBJECTIVES AND CIDA PRIORITIES
The Balkans CMAP was designed in the larger context of CIDA/CEE’s development
assistance strategy which has been constructed along three main axes as a means of
securing peace and prosperity in the region: peace building and security (governance);
economic cooperation and reconstruction (economic well-being); and social sustainability
(social development). As noted above, in seriously mine-affected countries, mine action must
be an integral part of humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socio-economic
development. In this regard, the Balkans CMAP was designed to support CEEs assistance
strategy, and the overall goals of the programme are consistent with CIDA’s development
priorities and crosscutting themes. This notion is graphically depicted in the diagram at Figure
14. This diagram effectively illustrates how the key components of a mine action plan are
related to the components of the development assistance strategy. As discussed above, in
countries suffering from severe and widespread contamination, mine action programmes must
be undertaken to facilitate humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socioeconomic development. The diagram shows how the mine action outputs and their impact
results facilitate development assistance and progress in the key areas of the development
assistance strategy. The goals and achievements of the Balkans CMAP are reflected in the
CMAP activities diagram. The diagram also illustrates how the crosscutting themes of gender
and the environment are recognized and served by the CMAP. This is an important dimension
and it should be noted that mine/UXO clearance of itself is an important environmental
remediation activity. Also, women (and children) make up a significant proportion of mine
victims, refugees and displaced populations that are directly targeted by the key areas of mine
action, particularly mine awareness, mine clearance and victim assistance. Mine/UXO
clearance priorities are also driven by the needs of special groups and moreover, a number of
women and PWDs are employed by many of the project organizations funded by the Balkans
CMAP.
BALKANS CMAP AND CIDA’s “CANADA-IN-THE-WORLD” POLICY
The CMAP in the Balkans developed in 1998 respects many of the principles and
programming approaches outlined in CIDA’s new policy statement on strengthening aid
effectiveness, “Canada: Making a Difference in the World” (September 2002). Indeed, this
consistency may be one of the underlying reasons why the Balkans CMAP has been
successful and effective. For example, the Balkans CMAP has consistently focused on the
encouragement of local ownership and the building of indigenous capacity in the four key
areas of mine action. The successful development of capable and self-sufficient local national
mine action institutions, indigenous demining capacity and local health/support services to
victims of landmines have all been hallmarks of the Balkans CMAP. Consistent support in
these areas has resulted in substantial progress towards ensuring the local ownership,
capacity and sustainability of individual country mine action programmes. In the area of
improved donor coordination, the Balkans CMAP included significant effort and considerable
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success in the coordination of key projects with like-minded donors thereby reducing risk,
avoiding duplication and greatly increasing the overall impact of the Canadian programme.
Country focus is another principle that applies to the Balkans CMAP. Although the programme
does not include any of the nine identified CIDA focus countries, the Balkans CMAP has
followed the principle of geographic concentration. The programme was concentrated in only
three of the seven Balkans countries/provinces, and in future it will have a single country of
focus, Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the outset, the programme also adhered to the principle
of untied aid. During all phases of programme design and implementation, partnering with
multilateral, international or foreign organizations was readily undertaken if it was assessed
that project effectiveness and results would be improved. In terms of results based
management, the Balkans CMAP included regular and thorough of monitoring throughout its
implementation as well as prompt and detailed evaluations of specific projects when the need
was identified. Finally, with respect to CIDA’s six priority development sectors (health,
HIV/AIDS, education, child protection, agriculture, and private sector development), the
Balkans CMAP either directly or indirectly addressed four of these areas. These were: health,
through its landmine victim assistance projects and overall savings to the health care system
through prevention of injury etc; child protection, through the provision of a safe and secure
post-conflict environment for children; agriculture, by restoring agricultural land to production;
private sector development, through the rehabilitation of public and private sector
infrastructure, utilities and services, and some local private sector capacity development in
demining.
FINDINGS – PROGRAMME DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING
As noted previously, Canada and CIDA’s involvement in mine action in the Balkans predates
the Ottawa Convention and the advent of the CLF. A CIDA contribution was made to a World
Bank mine awareness programme in 1996 as part of a regional economic revitalization
project. The linkages between development and security issues were becoming more
apparent and it was clear that for the region to develop, the landmines issue needed to be
addressed.78
The Ottawa Convention was signed in 1997 and the resulting CLF apportioned $10m (CAD)
for mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This resulted in a BiH MAP assessment mission
followed by a design mission consisting of staff from DFAIT, DND and CIDA in June 1998.
After extensive consultations with other donors and with several organizations operating on
the ground (including the UNDP, NPA, SFOR, Care Canada, HI and the Mines Advisory
Groups/UK)79, the Canadian team produced a conceptual design for a programme.
The product was a responsive programme based on an integrated approach which
emphasized mine clearance operations heavily, while assuring some resources for institutional
support, mine awareness and victim assistance, also perceived to be important
complementary elements of the programme. It was a front-end loaded, five-year programme
with the disbursement of 60% of the funds in the first and second year of operations, and it
included immediate support for mine clearance.
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According to Stephen Wallace, former Director of the Balkans Programme in CIDA-CEEB, the creation of the
Peace Building Fund was based on the same principles.
79
Some of these organizations formed the international coalition (6 NGOs) that allied with the Government of
Canada to push the Ottawa Convention forward.
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Key Agency Development Result:
Economic Well –Being
“Equitable economic growth and improved standards of
living for the poor”
Figure 14. CMAP Results Relationship to
CIDA Development Objectives
CMAP Activities and
and Priorities
CIDA’s
Development
Output/Outcome Results:
- Key social and economic
Results
infrastructure cleared of
danger
- Locals and returnees
educated about mines/UXO

Impact Results:
- Vulnerable populations can
safely return home, rebuild
lives
- Economic and social
infrastructures can be rebuilt

Mine Action Areas:
Mine Awareness
Demining

Gender Cross
Cutting Results:
Impact
Results:

- Mothers/ women mine
victim’s lead/attend
workshops/training

- Mine victims
reintegrated into

Outcome/Output Results:
- Provide medical and
psychological support to
mine victims
- Improve understanding of
disability issues among
government, education/
health professionals and
general population
- Increase services for PWDs

Gender/ Environment Cross
Cutting Results:
- Environmental contamination
(mines/UXOs) removed
- Women trained/hired in
demining orgs at many levels

Improved
Social, Economic
and Institutional
Environment for
Development/
Transition

Mine Action Area:
Institutional Support
for Mine Action
Coordination Centres
(MACs)

Gender Crosscutting
Results:
Outcome/Output Results:
- Women hired at
- Needs assessments and surveys
MACs
conducted National MAC centres
- MACs identify mine
set up and equipped
action needs of
- Legislation for mine coordination
vulnerable people,
established Indigenous staff
including women and
trained
children

Mine Action Area:
Victim Assistance

Key Agency Development Result:
Social Development
“Improved quality of life of the poor through enhanced
social services; management of the social impact of
reform; and progress toward gender equality [a
crosscutting theme of all development results]”

Impact Results:
- Indigenous capacity
for managing mine
action coordination
created

Key Agency Development Result:
Governance
“Improved governance structures and
institutional capacity in partner countries;
strengthened civil society; and enhanced
respect for rights and democratic principles”
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The success of this initial phase of the Balkans CMAP was due in large measure to the strong
partner organizations that greatly assisted in project selection and design. The UNDP guided
the key institutional/MAC support projects and CARE Canada was instrumental in the
selection of good projects and strong partners in the area of victim assistance.80 The
collaborative relationship between Canada and Norway led to mutual cooperation, and the use
of NPA as a valuable partner and executing agency in mine/UXO clearance of high-value
areas in the Sarajevo Canton. 81 HI was also a strong partner in the development of APM as a
local demining NGO. Unfortunately, the CIDC projects did not include a strong and
experienced in-country partner. This is believed to be a major factor in terms of the delays and
difficulties that were encountered with the MDD training projects. Finally, the SFOR EAF
demining project has produced good results over time but has suffered problems due to SFOR
military staff turnover. The subsequent phases of CMAP design included the emergency
response requirement in Kosovo in 1999 in response to UN appeals and the more deliberate
design of a programme for Croatia in 2000.
Finding 45. The CMAP in the Balkans was consistent with most of the programming principles
defined in CIDA’s recent policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness,
“Canada: Making a Difference in the World” (September 2002).
Finding 46. The design of the initial phase of the Balkans CMAP (BiH) was greatly assisted
by the CEEB project design mission including DFAIT and DND representation, as
well as by input from experienced partners such as UNDP.
Finding 47. The formal interaction of DFAIT (Mine Action Team), CIDA (Mine Action Unit) and
key programme officers, and DND/NDHQ (J-3 Engineer Branch/Mine Information
Centre) on a routine basis would be useful for sharing resources, information,
contacts and lessons learned that would aid in programme planning.
The design of the Kosovo programme included a deliberate focus on mine/UXO clearance and
institutional support. While the institutional support projects were very successful and vital to
the success of the UNMACC, the Canadian Government’s choice was to contract Canadian
companies for the provision of emergency mine action response. Due to the crisis situation,
however, there was little or no time available for proper programming or project design. Also,
because of the urgency and resulting time constraints, these companies were engaged using
an abbreviated process, the contracts were vague and inadequate, and the results were
unsatisfactory. This situation was not helped by a coincident change in the programme officer.
The mine awareness and victim assistance projects achieved good results and uniquely, they
were extensions of projects being undertaken by experienced organizations elsewhere in the
region. The follow-on projects in Kosovo built on successes and included an innovative
attempt to contract and deploy an integrated Canadian mine/UXO clearance organization that
achieved noteworthy success while experiencing some key problems. The UNMACC in
Kosovo proved to be a strong and valuable partner that ultimately used the CMAP mine/UXO
clearance contribution in 2001 to directly contract vital centralized demining assets that
achieved outstanding results. In hindsight, it may have been better to provide the money
directly to the United Nations in 1999 as opposed to sending Canadian teams, however, it was
a Canadian Government decision to contract and deploy Canadian resources, and the crisis
nature of the situation obviated a more deliberate programming and project design process.
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Interview with David Mueller, CEE Mine Action Programme Officer 1996-1999.
The subsequent phases.

CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003

68

Finding 48. Rather than dismiss the use of Canadian private sector capabilities, CIDA/DFAIT
should, with input from UNMAS, UNDP and other partners, try to define ‘niche’
areas of mine action expertise that could be exploited. It would also be useful to
review other national models for development funding in the area of mine action
such as; Norway/NPA, the UK/DFID and the US Department of
State/Humanitarian Demining Programmes. As well, it must be noted that the
Canadian contracting process does not easily lend itself to emergency or shortnotice scenarios.
Again, the design of the Croatian component of the CMAP benefited from strong partnerships
with experienced organizations. The projects concentrated on institutional support and the
development of sustainable capacity in some key areas, including management, QA and
survey, database and mapping improvements, and a decision support system. The mine
victim and mine awareness projects, while modest, were very successful and will have a
lasting impact. Unfortunately, the MDD programme undertaken by CIDC experienced serious
difficulties and has questionable sustainability. Additional focus on institution building would
have been more beneficial and would have respected the ongoing dialogue at the time, which
was supporting the development of a regional MDD training centre in BiH. 82
Finding 49. From a foreign policy perspective, more utility may have been realized by
focusing the Balkans CMAP funding on fewer niche areas involving Canadian
competencies such as reinforcing institutional capacity and with targeted
initiatives in mine clearance aimed at increasing indigenous capacity such as the
SFOR/EAF, APM, and NPA projects including key equipment donations.
Overall, the programme design was a significant success and the results achieved are
impressive. Some problems occurred as a result of changes in the Programme Officer at
critical points in the five-year programme but were minimized by senior staff continuity and the
use of a technical expert (consultant). The design of the programme also had to account for
significant differences in the three programme countries. Kosovo had a permissive
environment for mine action (UNMIK/KFOR control) but Croatia and Bosnia had various
constraints that had to be accounted for, such as legislation on demining, restrictions on
international companies/NGOs and evolving national institutions. Accordingly, taking
advantage of local experience and strong partnerships was essential. In this regard, regionally
based organizations such as UNDP, NPA, Care Canada and the like were helpful in
expanding the Balkans CMAP to Kosovo and Croatia, and could serve a useful purpose in
developing a more regional approach to programme design and implementation.
Finding 50. The Balkans CMAP would have benefited from a more regional approach
particularly from the standpoint of programme management and span of control.
This could be achieved through programming partnerships with strong, regionally
based organizations. This would reduce the number of individual projects that
would require direct management by the programme officer.
From the standpoint of implementation and reporting, the Balkans CMAP was overall a
success. A number of assessment and monitoring missions were conducted as well as two
project evaluation missions. These provided direct oversight by the programme officer, who
was able to correct problems, engage partners and executing agencies, assess progress and
review future programming options. The programme officer made effective use of CIDA post
82
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personnel and senior partners to monitor projects, and aside from a few problems identified in
previous sections, was able to manage the programme effectively. Project implementation
innovations were also evident in the use of the ITF to leverage matching mine action
contributions for the region and the development of partner donor funding to facilitate larger
projects such as the MDD programme in Croatia. The focus of Canada’s Y2000 Kosovo
mine/UXO clearance project to provide centralized assets to the UNMACC was also an
innovative approach that was effectively exploited again by the MAC in 2001 using CIDA
funding.
Finding 51. The high level of monitoring, assessment and detailed project evaluations greatly
assisted the programme team to respond effectively, adapt lessons learned and
manage the CMAP efficiently. This level of hands-on familiarity is indispensable
for effective programme design and implementation.
CMAP – FRAMEWORK OF RESULTS AND KEY SUCCESS FACTORS
Achievement of Results
The “Key Results Tables” provided in the foregoing country reviews provide a concise
illustration of results achieved for each of the CMAP projects. These tables resulted from a
wide variety of inputs including a file review, APPR’s, mission reports, interviews and
questionnaires. For the most part, the results achieved are either acceptable or they exceeded
expected results based on accepted norms. A few projects failed to achieve expected results
but in some of these cases the results were simply achieved later than agreed upon. In the
above discussion, the CMAP was related to CIDA’s development strategy and priorities
indicating the relationship of the results achieved. The CMAP projects have left a powerful
legacy of indigenous capacity in all areas of mine action and the results are highly sustainable,
particularly in the areas of institution building. The measurement of results in most areas of
mine action, however, is difficult. Institution building for example, is an area where the
measurement of results is necessarily subjective. Improvements in management, planning,
administration, reporting and operational effectiveness can be observed but are difficult to
measure. There is no question, however, regarding the dramatic improvements in the
CROMAC and BHMAC over the past three years. They have both matured into very
professional and effective institutions that are now purely national organizations. The
UNMACC in Kosovo proved its worth by completing its mine action programme on time in
2001. Mine awareness can be measured in numbers trained and materials produced,
however, it is only one of many factors that contribute to a reduction in victims. Again, mine
victim assistance results depend on the programme and what is being measured; number of
prosthetics, number counseled, advocacy results etc. Finally, mine clearance is easily
quantified but again, one must be careful with regards to what is being measured and
compared. Area cleared (m2) and unit cost ($/m 2) are the most common measurements used,
but these also include certain limitations.
Cost-Effectiveness of Results
The CMAP was a large programme with many disparate projects that made cost accounting
and detailed monitoring difficult. Nonetheless, very few variances occurred and which largely
due to the aggressive monitoring by the programme officer and the partner agencies. In the
vast majority of the projects, the relationship between costs and results was favourable. In
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fact, in a few cases, the planned projects cost less than anticipated and the surplus money
went to funding supplementary projects (e.g. mine awareness needs assessment – Croatia).
In the case of the Kosovo 1999 demining projects, the results were definitely unsatisfactory
from the standpoint of the late deployment and limited demining outputs in relation to the
costs. In most other demining projects, however, the results were quite favourable in
comparison with other organizations. Finally, a few organizations, such as CIDC, experienced
delays and cost overruns, however, in most cases there was shared responsibility or the
executing agency was forced to make up the shortfall from other sources. While the ITF victim
assistance project was relatively minor in terms of cost, it was not very effective from the
standpoint local sustainability or capacity building.
Relevance and Sustainability
Regardless of the results achieved, every CMAP project must be viewed as relevant since
they were based on the key areas of mine action and addressed an identified need. The
projects usually focused concentration on threat reduction and the development of capable
mine action institutions. As noted above, these CMAP initiatives were tied to CEE Branch
objectives and CIDA's development priorities as enabling or complementary activities, and
were consistent with the needs and priorities of local stakeholders and partner organizations.
As well, one of the key hallmarks of the Balkans CMAP has been its high degree of
sustainability. The national mine action institutions that required so much assistance at the
start, have emerged as strong, largely self-sustaining indigenous institutions. This is less so in
Kosovo, but the KPC/DCP is gradually improving with the help of HI. Substantial indigenous
mine/UXO clearance capacity has been nurtured by CIDA’s contributions. The SFOR/EAF and
APM are two good examples and the CIDC MDD project has enhanced both these
organizations as well as the Civil Protection Organization (CPO). Finally, the victim assistance
projects in BiH, Kosovo and Croatia have generated substantial physical and psychosocial
rehabilitation capacity within the health and education sectors respectively, and the number of
direct beneficiaries continues to grow.
In terms of CIDA’s cross cutting development themes, all the CMAP mine clearance projects
contributed to the welfare of women by providing safe areas for communities to live, manage
their households and raise their children. All victim assistance projects contributed to social
welfare by promoting the health of the victims, and teaching proper care and rehabilitation to
avoid further injury. A significant proportion of the beneficiaries were women and children.
And, the SFOR/EAF project built non-combative employment skills for military personnel,
which is a major contributor to peace and stability that will directly benefit women, children and
the environment.83 In terms of the environment, it is particularly noteworthy that the guidelines
developed from the environmental assessment of the Canadian Y2000 mine/UXO clearance
project in Kosovo were adopted by UNMAS and will be included in the IMAS as a technical
note (SOP) for all future mine clearance operations conducted under UN auspices.
Partnership
As noted throughout this report, effective partnerships have been the foundation of success for
the Balkans CMAP. With a few minor exceptions, those projects that involved a partnership
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with a strong and experienced international agency already established in the country
achieved the expected results and generated few problems in the areas of implementation and
reporting. As well, most of the CMAP projects included the active participation of local
partners, recipients, employees and beneficiaries in many areas of the project design and
implementation. This is particularly so in the case of institution building where locals, including
women, are trained in management and operations, in order to gradually take over completely.
The same applies to the victim assistance programmes, demining and mine awareness. The
Canadian companies contracted for mine/UXO clearance in Kosovo were exceptions; like
most other operators, locals were only involved as deminers, MDD handlers or in a support
capacity. CIDC on the other hand, has evolved to an organization comprised fully of locals,
except for one Canadian as the Chief Instructor. It is also noteworthy that CIDC trained
several women as MDD handlers. Partnership innovations included shared funding of projects
with other donors and key agencies such as UNDP, other countries and UNICEF, as well as
leveraged funding opportunities through the ITF.
Appropriateness of Design and Resource Utilization
As discussed earlier, the programme design approach used for the Balkans CMAP was based
heavily on needs assessments and project selection input from key partners and agencies
with extensive experience in the local area. Each project involved a risk assessment and
mitigation analysis, and ongoing monitoring was accomplished through field visits, post
personnel and regular reporting requirements. The Balkans CMAP evolved through three
distinct phases, with different degrees of urgency and only limited opportunity to extend
existing successful projects on a regional basis. This is an approach that deserves further
consideration in future programme design, however, since the span of control/number of
projects could conceivably be greatly reduced. Interesting opportunities were presented during
these programme expansions to try innovative approaches to project design and
implementation. A case in point was the evolution of the Kosovo mine/UXO clearance projects
that involved Canadian companies. As discussed in the Kosovo project section, a consultant
carefully evaluated the 1999 emergency contracts and a more deliberate contracting effort
was undertaken for 2000 using a comprehensive RFP. The 2000 project was also subject to a
detailed evaluation, resulting in a new approach for 2001 that was highly successful. The
major lesson from the Kosovo experience is that normal Canadian contracting processes are
not well suited to emergency requirements and CIDA is not well equipped for contracting
Canadian resources during crisis situations. Mechanisms such as Standing Offer Agreements
or a government-supported agency/NGO may be a useful approach to address this
requirement.
The CMAP record with regard to resource utilization is also excellent. In the area of prudence
and probity, the programme officer demanded accountability through diligent project financial
reviews. This approach resulted in a comprehensive audit of the 2000 IDAC demining project
and a formal investigation of CIDC’s BiH accounts based on a local allegation of fraud that
was proven to be unfounded. The CMAP has exploited Canadian capabilities and niche
competencies in many areas, most notably: DND/CF partnerships in the provision of technical
experts for institution building; ICI and Queen’s University in victim assistance; CIDC MDD
training; and Med-Eng for mine/UXO clearance equipment. Variable results were achieved by
the Kosovo mine clearance contracts but this is an area worthy of more investigation. Indeed,
the 1999 demining contracts were flawed due to an imposed abbreviated process and key
lessons were learned and applied the following year. Overall, CMAP resource utilization has
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been very good and is aptly illustrated by the management, utilization and final disposition of
the CIDA mine clearance equipment from the Kosovo projects valued at over $550,000 (CAD).
Informed and Timely Action
The CMAP was created in the context of a need for timely action and was expanded into
Kosovo on an even tighter timeline. Thorough preparation and knowledgeable partners
contributed to the success of the programme and minimized any risks involved. Annual
monitoring and assessment missions, good project oversight and timely evaluation kept the
programme on track. Several examples have been citied of proactive intervention by the
programme officer, and CIDA post personnel played a valuable role in day-to-day surveillance
and timely response. Notwithstanding this effort, some projects were challenging to manage at
a distance and without a strong local partner. CIDC reporting was persistently poor and
particularly in the case of the Croatia MDD centre, problems were not reported in a timely
fashion. The same was true for the Kosovo demining contracts, which also had to be managed
directly by CIDA. The majority of projects within the Balkans CMAP, however, were managed
without difficulty, and good mechanisms existed to mitigate risk and ensure timely response to
problems, needs or opportunities.

Figure 15.

Mine Awareness – Saving Lives and Limbs
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PART III – CONCLUSIONS
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following lessons learned and recommendations derive from the list of findings in Part II
as well as from experience with the CMAP and other similar programmes (related findings
are shown in brackets):
•

Lesson Learned 1. Programme Officers (3, 24, 28, 44)
Successful programme/project selection, design and implementation demand that
the responsible programme officer be thoroughly familiar with the development area,
the local issues, and the potential partners and executing agencies. A timely field
visit or programme/project design mission is indispensable. Expert technical input is
advisable as well as DFAIT and DND involvement as applicable. Programme officers
should also maintain an annual contingency amount that can be used to provide
flexibility, respond to key opportunities, reinforce success or address problems.
Recommendation. Programme officers must be afforded an early opportunity to
become familiar with their development area of responsibility and undertake a
programme/project design mission for defined CMAP initiatives (with
technical/DFAIT/DND support as applicable). The programme officer should retain
an annual programme contingency amount, however, it should be committed early
enough to achieve effective results.

•

Lesson Learned 2. Programme Design (2, 6, 28, 34, 39, 40 45)
Strong partners and executing agencies with extensive experience and a functioning
organization in the development area can provide valuable assistance in project
selection and programme design. This is aptly demonstrated by CIDA’s successful
CMAP working relationship with UNDP, HI, NPA, SFOR, ITF, HELP, DSL, Mine Tech
and the Kosovo UNMACC.
Recommendation. CMAP project selection, design and implementation should take
full advantage of strong partner relationships to provide advice, local management,
project monitoring and roll-up reporting.

•

Lesson Learned 3. Programme Planning Principles (1)
Mine action is a specialized development area and the process of project selection,
design, planning and implementation would no doubt benefit from a detailed
programming framework or set of basic planning principles for programme officer
guidance. These tools would be particularly useful in short-notice development
scenarios such as Kosovo.
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Recommendation. The mine action programming principles are provided later in
this report and should be refined to provide the basis for the development of a
framework for mine action programming, in accordance with CIDA’s “Guide for
Developing Programming Frameworks.”
•

Lesson Learned 4. Monitoring (28, 51)
Regular field visits by the programme officer to monitor and evaluate projects,
assess needs, and coordinate with post personnel and partners, was instrumental in
the effective management of the Balkans CMAP. This was critical to smoothing the
transition for new and replacement (temporary) personnel. Hands-on familiarity and
monitoring are indispensable for effective programme design, implementation and
day-to-day management.
Recommendation. The programme officer must be afforded the opportunity for
regular monitoring and assessment field visits.

•

Lessons Learned 5. Stability of Key Personnel (27)
Changing of key CIDA programme management personnel should be avoided during
periods of heightened activity or emergency response. If unavoidable, MAP planning
principles/guidelines, technical support and key resource/contact lists are essential.
Recommendation. Avoid changing key programme management personnel during
critical activity or transition periods, such as the Kosovo emergency phase and
ensure guidelines, technical expertise and key resource/contact lists are available.

•

Lessons Learned 6. Interdepartmental Cooperation (7, 45, 46)
The Balkans CMAP benefited by successful collaboration between CIDA and DFAIT
programme officers in all stages of its development, and by the support of DND in
assessment missions and the provision of technical experts. This relationship should
be formalized to facilitate better mine action coordination, and the sharing of
information, resources and lessons learned.
Recommendation. An inter-departmental mine action committee should be
established to include: DFAIT/ILX (Mine Action Team); CIDA/MAU and
branch/geographic mine action programme officers; and DND (NDHQ/J-3 Engineer
Branch). This committee should meet semi-annually or as needed to review ongoing
mine action programmes, share lessons and learned, facilitate the exchange of
information, and share resources and contacts.

•

Lessons Learned 7. DND Mine Information Centre (46, 47)
A Mine Information Centre (MIC) is located in DND, NDHQ, J-3 Engineer Branch.
This is a little known ‘local’ resource that can provide useful mine situation
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summaries, briefings, background information and research on mine contamination
and mine action programmes throughout the world.
Recommendation. All mine action programme officers should be aware of and
make use of this valuable resource. Personnel departing on deployment to mine
contaminated areas would also benefit from an up-to-date assessment.
•

Lesson Learned 8. Institutional Support (2, 4, 5, 20, 34, 49)
The critical first step for any mine action programme is the establishment of an
effective mine action coordination institution (MAC) capable of national planning,
donor coordination, enforcement of standards, database development and priority
setting. The Balkans CMAP has excelled in the area of institutional building utilizing a
close, collaborative approach with UNDP (Croatia, BiH) and UNMAS (Kosovo) to
select and fund projects critical to the development of national and UN mine action
coordination structures. While not as visible as mine/UXO clearance or victim
assistance, institutional support builds local capacity and will undoubtedly have a
more valuable and far-reaching impact in ridding a county of mines/UXO. This is an
area where Canadian management, technical, and mine action expertise and
experience can make a real difference.
Recommendation. Canadian mine action interventions should focus initially on
ensuring the development of strong, capable national or UN mine action coordination
institutions. This will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the overall mine action
programme and thus the utility of Canadian investments in other areas of mine
action. The Balkans CMAP experience also demonstrates the value of institutional
support in terms of achieving local sustainability.

•

Lesson Learned 9. Canadian Capacity for Institutional Support (6, 7, 8, 20)
A wealth of technical expertise, and MAP management skills and experience are
available in Canada within the DND/CF and the private sector. CF technical experts
have made an extremely valuable and cost-effective contribution to MAC institutional
capacity building in the Balkans. Private sector expertise includes individuals
possessing extensive experience in UN/international mine action operations as well
as companies that specialize in geographic information systems, database
development and mapping. These resources should be surveyed and considered for
inclusion as in-kind contributions in the area of MAC institutional support and
capacity building in future CMAPs.
Recommendation. The CIDA/MAU should take the lead for all mine action in CIDA
and should be the focal point for liaison with DFAIT and DND, coordination of
support for geographic units, consolidation and distribution of lessons learned, and
the scheduling of joint coordination meetings. It should maintain an up-to-date list of
MAC institutional support and capacity building resources within the DND/CF and the
private sector. These resources should be considered during the design and
development of future mine action programmes.
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•

Lessons Learned 10. Institutional Support – Surveys/Assessments (35)
Early professional surveys and assessments by recognized professional
organizations such as HI, NPA or GICHD have a valuable impact on institutional
capacity to focus and coordinate mine action programmes. These include a socioeconomic impact survey, mine awareness and mine victim needs assessments and
technical surveys for area reduction. Despite their valuable long-term impact and
relatively low cost, these surveys and assessments are usually generated quite late
in the evolution of country mine action programmes.
Recommendation. Canada should focus early support on these valuable mine
action institution support tools to generate general efficiency and cost-effectiveness
in mine action programme planning, priority setting and clearance operations.
Particular attention should be given to an early socio-economic impact analysis and
the provision of technical survey for rapid area reduction.

•

Lesson Learned 11. Partnerships (2, 4, 7, 12, 17, 18, 33, 34, 37)
As noted in Lesson Learned 2, strong partnerships are invaluable for project
selection and design. This is also true for project implementation, management,
reporting and timely response, and good partnerships can effectively reduce the
span of control for programme officers. As a note of caution, however, a strong
partner organization in the Balkans, such as the UNDP, may not have the same
responsibilities or capacity in other mine-affected areas of the world.
Recommendation. Strong partner organizations should be selected to reduce span
of control, ensure timely response, and assist project management, monitoring and
reporting. CMAP partner selection must be carefully considered in each programme
country.

•

Lesson Learned 12. Mine Clearance (8, 9,10, 11, 48)
For best development assistance value, mine clearance projects should be aimed at
building indigenous capacity as well as reducing the threat posed by mines/UXO.
The SFOR/EAF, NPA and APM projects are all good examples of direct support
providing valuable clearance outputs while increasing vital indigenous mine
clearance expertise.
Recommendation. For best value in terms of development assistance funding, mine
clearance projects should have a strong indigenous capacity building component.

•

Lesson Learned 13. Mine Clearance – Outputs (8, 10, 11, 19, 22, 23, 24)
Where rapid and effective mine/UXO clearance is a high priority for refugee returns,
vulnerable populations or critical rehabilitation/reconstruction, then proven NGO
organizations such as HI, HELP and NPA, or capable contractors like DSL and Mine
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Tech, produce the most reliable results. CIDA should not attempt to contract
Canadian mine/UXO clearance companies for emergency response requirements.
Recommendation. Where urgent mine clearance is required, proven organizations
with experience and an established base in the region should be selected for
funding.
•

Lessons Learned 14. Mine Clearance – MAC’s (9, 11, 25, 49)
Direct funding of MACs for centralized assets or mine clearance by in-theatre
contracts worked well for the UNMACC in Kosovo. This may not be transferable to
other operational areas based on the capability of the MAC to let and manage
contracts, availability of suitable resources, local laws and the like. This approach
should not be used for national MACs such as CROMAC or the BHMAC due to
questionable contracting procedures, uncertain reliability and inability to monitor
performance and outputs.
Recommendation. Direct funding of UNMACC’s for centralized assets or in-theatre
mine clearance contracts has great potential benefit but must be weighed on a caseby-case basis. National MACs should not be directly funded for contracting local
mine/UXO clearance organizations.

•

Lesson Learned 15. Mine Clearance – National Organizations (11)
Supporting the humanitarian demining capacity of national military organizations can
be tricky from philosophical, security and practical standpoints. There is a traditional
international reluctance in this area. Under certain circumstances, however, it can
serve foreign policy and development goals such as the democratization of armed
forces, providing alternative skills for former combatants, peace building, and
confidence and security building. The overriding requirement is the ability to exert
some measure of control over the military organizations involved, as is the case with
SFOR and the EAF, and KFOR and the KPC.
Recommendation. Under the right circumstances, support to national military
organizations to develop humanitarian demining capabilities should be pursued.

•

Lesson Learned 16. Mine Clearance – Canadian Capabilities (8, 9, 12, 21, 22,
23, 24, 30, 37, 40, 48)
Canadian-based mine clearance organizations will invariably experience difficulties
establishing complex projects in remote locations. Nonetheless, some unique
Canadian private sector mine/UXO clearance and other mine action capabilities do
exist and should be exploited. Careful planning, including a well-defined scope, clear
outputs/deliverables and detailed reporting requirements are needed. User agency
design input is also required (UNMAS, UNDP, UNOPs, MAC) and contracting using
the RFP process normally required a minimum of six months. Significant Canadian
‘niche’ capabilities exist in the area of mine action and these should be exploited.
The Kosovo Y2000 Cdn mine clearance RFP could be used as a model for larger
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projects, or portions of it for smaller contracted undertakings. As well, consideration
should be given to the use of ‘standing offer agreements’ to acquire Canadian ‘niche’
mine action capabilities particularly in rapid response situations. Finally, any
Canadian contracted organization should be tied to a partner organization such as
the UNDP or UNMACC for local reporting and oversight.
Recommendation. The engagement of Canadian mine action
resources/capabilities should be considered as part of mine action programme
planning. A minimum of six-months lead-time should be allowed for normal
contracting and standing offer agreements should be investigated to facilitate
acquiring niche capabilities in emergency situations. This needs to be supported by a
comprehensive, countrywide survey of current Canadian private sector and
institutional mine action capability.
•

Lesson Learned 17. Mine Clearance – CIDC (12, 37)
The CIDC MDD project has experienced ongoing problems and the extension of the
project to develop a MDD programme for CROMAC encountered difficulties the
outset. Also, the pending US Department of State–funded creation of a BiH regional
canine/MDD training centre, significantly jeopardizes the viability of the CIDC project.
Ironically, the operation in Trebinje is beginning to show definite signs of
improvement. Management and reporting are better, outputs have increased,
revenues are being realized and the CIDC BHMAC MDD accreditations are amongst
the highest of all organizations. On the other hand, the SFOR EAF ability to utilize
and maintain their MDD teams has been questioned and CROMAC has no plan for
sustaining the 10 MDD teams that it will receive in the near future.
Recommendation. While this project has developed significant specialized
indigenous mine clearance capacity, its sustainability is in serious doubt. The
existing MDD teams will continue to need refresher training and re-accreditation
support; however, this may not be a sufficient level of effort to sustain the operation.
The impact of the new BiH regional MDD facility should be followed closely, CIDC
should seek additional revenue opportunities such as contracting out to the SFOR
EAF, and CIDA should carefully evaluate the provision of support beyond the current
project.

•

Lesson Learned 18. Mine Awareness (13, 14, 15, 26, 35)
Mine awareness is a vital component in the early stages of a mine action programme
to protect vulnerable populations, mine affected communities and returning refugees.
To be effective, however, it must be centrally coordinated, targeted, and consistent
and employ the right delivery mechanisms. A mine awareness needs assessment is
an invaluable tool if professionally done (e.g. GICHD Croatian assessment) and an
organization such as UNICEF is best equipped to help coordinate a national
programme. Finally, local mine awareness is an integral component of most
demining operations and should be tracked as an output in CMAP funded mine
clearance projects.
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Recommendation. The selection and design of CMAP funded mine awareness
interventions should be informed by advice from UNDP/UNMAS, UNICEF and the
responsible MAC as appropriate. For local coordination, QA and oversight, mine
awareness funding contributions should be through a senior partner such as
UNICEF. And, mine awareness undertaken by demining projects should be reported
as a separate output, including the number of recipients.
•

Lesson Learned 19. Mine Victim Assistance (16, 26, 35, 39)
Victim assistance appears to be an area where Canada can make a valuable
contribution. The ICI and Queen’s ICACBR projects have developed strong local
networks; sustainable capability, advocacy and good reach in terms of beneficiaries.
The ITF project, on the other hand, had few beneficiaries and achieved no
sustainable capacity. The Rovinj mine victim project in Croatia has achieved good
visibility for mine victims because of the patron but it likewise has had limited impact
in terms of beneficiaries. The current plan for its significant expansion doesn’t appear
to be sustainable and should be viewed with caution. ICRC is the leading
international agency in the area of mine victim assistance and any future CMAP
projects in this area should be informed by ICRC advice and partnership, and include
local national disabled persons’ associations.
Recommendation. CIDA should continue to monitor the results of the ICI and
Queen’s CBR projects with a view to including them as a component in future CMAP
planning. ICRC input and/or partnership as well as local national disabled persons’
associations should routinely be included in the design and implementation of mine
victim assistance projects.

•

Lesson Learned 20. CMAP – Regional Approach (26, 44, 49, 50)
The Balkans CMAP would have benefited from a more regional approach particularly
from the standpoint of programme management and span of control. This could have
been achieved through programming partnerships with strong regional organizations.
This would serve to reduce the number of individual projects that must than be
directly managed by the programme officer (e.g. UNDP sub-projects in support of
CROMAC). This would also facilitate any need for a rapid regional expansion of the
programme, as in the case of the Kosovo emergency phase. This approach could
also work in other areas such as Africa where there are mine-affected countries
bordering each other, straddled by the same international agencies and NGOs.
Recommendation. Planning for future mine action programmes should include a
review of opportunities for employing a regional approach to reduce the span of
control and simplify project management. This approach could be extended to
contracting mine action resources to provide services on a regional basis.

•

Lesson Learned 21. Reporting (19, 33, 42, 43)
Inadequate project reporting was a recurring theme from the CIDA perspective and a
source of frustration for many of the partners and executing agencies. Some of the
reporting needs were also not satisfied in terms of key statistics such as outputs
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(number of mines/UXO, area cleared, beneficiaries), which were usually not
disaggregated to show gender impact and the like. Some of the Canadian
organizations experienced problems with the reporting requirements so it is
understandable that local organizations found it difficult.
Recommendation. Reporting requirements should be reviewed and simplified
where feasible. As well, specific requirements, such as output statistics, must be
expressed in precise terms and quantified where possible.
•

Lesson Learned 22. ITF – Leveraged Funding (17, 18)
The use of the ITF to channel CMAP project funding triggered matching funds that
increased the overall mine action effort and in some cases complemented the
Canadian initiative. The results for the ITF landmine victim project in Slovenia were
less satisfactory but, for the most part, this was a successful partnership approach
that accomplished the aim of increasing donor support.
Recommendation. Future leveraged funding mechanisms such as the ITF, should
be utilized to the extent possible as long as it meshes with or complements CMAP
priorities and key partner relationships.

•

Lesson Learned 23. Foreign Policy Perspective (45, 47, 49)
From a foreign policy perspective, the utility of the CMAP may have been enhanced
by concentrating on niche areas of Canadian competency, particularly institutional
capacity building. This should have been combined with specific, targeted initiatives
in mine /UXO clearance aimed at building indigenous capacity such as the
SFOR/EAF projects, support of HI/APM and NPA, and the provision of UNMACC
centralized assets and key equipment donations.
Recommendation. CMAP planning must be informed by foreign policy goals, as
well as CIDA development objectives and priorities. These parameters must guide
how the programme is to be tailored and how the outputs will be achieved.

•

Lesson Learned 24. Project Planning – Milestones and Exit Strategy (10, 39, 40,
43, 44, 51)
CMAP contracts and funding agreements should clearly define key milestones,
outputs/deliverables and reporting requirements. Funding contributions should be
tied to deliverables in the form of progress payments or holdbacks and a defined exit
strategy should be included for all projects. This would have motivated Med-Eng in
the replacement of equipment and CIDC in terms of appropriate planning, reporting
and achievement of outputs.
Recommendation. CMAP funding agreements and contracts should include key
milestones, deliverables and reporting requirements as well as a holdback
mechanism for payments and a defined exit strategy. The exit strategy should be
geared to terminate unsuccessful projects and to the achievement of output
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objectives or sustainability in all projects in order to avoid ‘all-or-nothing’ funding
dependencies.
•

Lesson Learned 25. Multi-Year Funding Reliability (5, 6, 31, 38)
Funding predictability, consistency and the lack of strings or caveats were described
as the hallmarks of CMAP funding contributions. In a few cases, however (Queen’s
CBR II, NPA), delays in the notification of funding jeopardized project
implementation. To the extent possible, projects should be designed with funding
commitments over a two to three-year period to enable projects to mature and the
results to be achieved, including sustainability. This commitment should be tempered
by the need to achieve defined deliverables, and satisfy reporting and accountability
requirements as outlined above.
Recommendation. CMAP project funding should be designated in annual
increments in advance to, allow longer-term projects to mature and achieve results
subject to the achievement of defined deliverables.

•

Lesson Learned 26. Communication (39, 41)
Major development initiatives such as the CMAP should include a comprehensive
communication strategy and plan. This plan should provide guidance for responding
to incidents and other queries, and it should define proactive mechanisms for raising
awareness of the programme and CLF.
Recommendation. Comprehensive mine action programmes should include a welldefined communication strategy and a plan for reactive and proactive media and
public relations communication.

•

Lesson Learned 27. The Mine Action Approach of Canadian Allies (31, 48)
Canadian allies such as Norway, the USA and the UK have all developed unique
mechanisms or approaches to provide support for international mine action needs.
These range from Norway with a government sponsored NGO to various funding,
contracting and in-kind donations sponsored by the UK (DFID) and the US
Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programmes. It would be
instructive to review these different approaches to determine if it would be beneficial
to adapt successful mechanisms for Canadian use.
Recommendation. CIDA should undertake a review of different national
approaches to mine action programming and funding to determine if there are
successful mechanisms that can be adapted for Canadian use.
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CONCLUSIONS
The evaluation of the Balkans CMAP was focused on the key results achieved and lessons
learned, with particular emphasis on validating the design, implementation and effectiveness
of the numerous projects that comprised the programme. The lessons derived from the
evaluation are intended to improve programme development, and project selection, design
and implementation. To this end, the evaluation has defined a number of principles’ that can
be used as the basis for the development of a formal programming framework. The purpose
of this framework would be to provide strategic orientation and design guidance for future
CIDA MAP initiatives in the Balkans or in other mine affected regions of the world.
Overall, the evaluation has shown that the CIDA Balkans CMAP must be viewed as a
significant success. The programme began in response to a push of funding furnished by
the CLF in 1998. It was initially confined to Bosnia and Herzegovina and was designed to
support or complement ongoing CIDA development assistance initiatives in the country.
From a few initial projects, the programme was quickly expanded a year later in response to
the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo and again in 2000 with the change of regime in Croatia.
It therefore evolved over a very short period into a significant regional programme, totaling
some $20m (CAD) and included a large number and variety of projects covering all of the
key areas of mine action.
While it was a difficult programme to manage, it did represent successful collaboration
between CIDA and DFAIT in all its stages. As well, it involved beneficial support by the
DND/CF and included innovative use of Canadian expertise and capabilities in institutional
support, mine clearance, victim assistance and MDD training. The programme was
responsive to political and local developments, and was consistent with the Canadian
foreign policy goal in the Balkans to promote regional stability after years of strife. The
CMAP raised Canada’s profile and credibility in Europe, promoted Canadian values and
reinforced the Ottawa Convention by linkage to Canada’s aggressive support of mine action
in the Balkans.
The CMAP was also supportive of CIDA’s development assistance strategy to secure peace
and prosperity in the region, as well as its related development priorities and crosscutting
themes. The mine action initiatives were undertaken to protect vulnerable populations and
communities, and to facilitate humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socioeconomic development. The programme achieved particular success in the area of
institution building and in the development of sustainable, indigenous mine/UXO clearance
capacity. The CMAP mine awareness and victim assistance projects achieved varied results
although the ICI and Queen’s CBR projects standout for their success in terms of reach and
sustainability. The programme’s innovative attempts to employ Canadian demining and
MDD training capabilities also received mixed reviews. Nonetheless, the Balkans CMAP
was widely applauded for its focus, reliability and achievements. The review of the
programme results and key success factors was also very favourable and a number of
important lessons have been derived from this evaluation that will greatly assist in the
design of future programmes of its type.
The design of future CMAPs must first and foremost be informed by a clear understanding
of Canadian foreign policy goals and development assistance strategy in the region
concerned. The value-added dimension is also an important consideration and in most
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cases this will lead to a focus on institution building. The creation of an effective mine action
coordination centre is vital to the development and coordination of a successful and
sustainable national mine action programme. This is an area where Canada has achieved a
particular impact and has much to offer. Next in importance is the building of sustainable
indigenous mine/UXO clearance capacity. The use of international NGOs or contractors
should not subordinate the goal of sustainability unless there are emergency requirements
for which are the best suited. Mine awareness and victim assistance initiatives should be
considered but should always be coordinated with lead agencies such as UNICEF and the
ICRC, and must be consistent with MAC priorities, themes and standards as applicable.
There are many lessons learned from this evaluation that bear repeating. Mine action
programming in general benefits from close collaboration and sharing of programme
information between CIDA, DFAIT and DND. Any new CIDA programme initiatives must
include input from DFAIT (foreign policy) and DND/MIC (mine situation assessments) as
well as key international organizations such as UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, ICRC, engaged
NGOs such as NPA, and UN or national MACs. Project selection, design and
implementation must include reliable local partners, and programmes must be regionalized
to the extent possible to reduce the span of control and ease the task of programme
management. Project design and contracts/donor agreements must include precise
milestones, deliverables (outputs) and reporting requirements with tied funding in the form of
progress payments and holdbacks. As well, every project must have a well-defined exit
strategy. Finally, programmes with the magnitude and impact of the Balkans CMAP must
include a clearly defined communication strategy, with a plan that provides guidance for
both reactive and proactive communication. This would greatly assist mangers in
responding to incidents or queries, and facilitate international and domestic awareness of
Canada’s contribution in this highly topical area.

PROGRAMMING PRINCIPLES – MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES
GENERAL
As discussed in the evaluation, there are many factors that must be considered in designing
an effective mine action programme. Most important, it must be remembered that there is no
mine action template available that will suit all situations or be easily adapted from one
contaminated country to another because the variables are too diverse. This was aptly
demonstrated by the differences between individual Balkan states in what amounts to a
relatively small regional footprint. These differences are magnified when one looks at other
mine-affected countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia or Afghanistan. Nonetheless,
there are some fundamental considerations that can serve to guide future mine action
programme development. A number of these have been derived from the lessons learned
and recommendations above and are presented below as proposed ‘principles’ for the
development of Canadian mine action programmes. These principles can also form the
basis for the development of a mine action-programming framework. As recommended
above, it may be desirable to review the approach some of our allies use (NOR, UK, USA)
for developing and implementing development assistance initiatives in the area of
humanitarian mine action.
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The principles are necessarily general, as they may need to be applied in a broad range of
circumstances. Many mine-affected countries in the world have some degree of international
and local intervention initiatives already underway. At the same time, mine/UXO
contamination continues in areas of strife and some countries have only recently emerged
from years of conflict. The maturity of mine action in a given area will greatly influence the
focus, urgency and design of Canada’s possible mine action assistance.
PRINCIPLES
1.

The development of mine action programmes must be: guided by Canada’s
foreign policy goals, consistent with CIDA’s development assistance strategy and
objectives, and informed by a realistic mine situation analysis and needs
assessment. This implies a collaborative effort between CIDA, DFAIT and DND
including use of the CF/MIC and other expert technical support as required.

2.

Input and guidance should be obtained from key international organizations and
lead agencies including UNMAS, UNDP, UNOPS, UNICEF, GICHD, ICRC, UN
or coalition military, and engaged international NGOs.

3.

Mine action programme officers must make themselves thoroughly familiar with
the proposed programme area, the mine action structure in place, the principal
international organizations engaged in mine action, the status of the mine action
programme, the key issues and the identified areas of greatest need. A field visit
is indispensable and should include DFAIT and DND representation, and
technical support as required. When a programme is first initiated, especially in
short- notice planning situations, strong consideration should be given, if feasible,
to the use of established, experienced and competent in-place partner
organizations to assist in project definition, design and implementation. As well,
programme officers should not be changed at critical junctures during the design
and implementation of significant mine action programmes.

4.

In highly technical areas such as mine action, it is highly desirable that the CIDA
programme management team be provided with the services of a technical
expert/advisor.

5.

Experience has shown that strong partner organizations with extensive
experience in the area should be engaged to assist in project selection and
design as well as implementation and monitoring. Every attempt should be made
to reduce the span of control and where applicable, to develop programmes on a
regional basis.

6.

Canadian mine action programming should always focus on the ‘value-added’
dimension; the most benefit for the development assistance investment. In most
cases, Canada should concentrate on institutional capacity building as a first
priority. It is a proven area for Canadian intervention that achieves far reaching,
and highly cost-effective results and impact. This support could involve CF and/or
Canadian private sector technical experts as in-kind contributions, and should
include management and technical expertise, the provision of database and
mapping support including training and equipment, technical survey and area
reduction support, QA, standards, vital needs assessments and support for a
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socio-economic impact survey. Mine/UXO clearance support should be focused
on the development of sustainable indigenous capacity and could include the
provision of specialized equipment, vehicles and other assets. Mine victim
assistance and mine awareness projects must be carefully considered in terms of
value and impact, and should be approached through multi-lateral channels such
as the ICRC and UNICEF to ensure adequate coordination. The use of Canadian
organizations such as ICI and Queen’s ICACBR and the proper selection and
training of local executing agencies should also be vetted by these lead agencies
to ensure coordination and best value.
7.

Canadian mine action capabilities should not be dismissed out-of-hand; a
successful operation will provide enhanced visibility, develop Canada’s unique
private sector capabilities and contribute to the economy. To this end, CIDA
should develop and maintain a list of related Canadian mine action capabilities
including CF technical experts, private sector organizations, public institutions,
NGOs and qualified individuals/consultants.

8.

Crisis situations require a timely response to unpredictable events. This can be
facilitated by the development of mechanisms to quickly fund critical resources to
meet the most important needs in response to the inevitable pressures that will
be brought to bear. Such mechanisms could include up-to-date inventories of
Canadian mine action resources, emergency contracting provisions, Standing
Offer Agreements and government supported agencies with standby
agreements.

9.

Any plan to contract Canadian capabilities will require care in the development of
a suitable RFP/Request for Expressions of Interest. Ample time should be
allocated for the contract process – a minimum of six months lead-time to the
desired contract award date. The use of a standing offer agreement should be
investigated to facilitate the timely engagement of Canadian resources/niche
capabilities in rapid response situations.

10.

The Y2000 Kosovo Mine Clearance RFP or portions of it could be used as a
model for future mine action contracting initiatives.

11.

Any mine action contract or project contribution agreement should include
definite milestones, clearly defined deliverables (outputs), and simplified but
precise reporting requirements (with explicit guidance on statistics such as
amount and type of area cleared, ordnance destroyed, number of beneficiaries
including age and gender information, and environmental impact). Grants should
also be considered on a case-by-case basis, particularly for clearly defined
requirements with a reliable partner where timeliness and simplicity are
paramount considerations.

12.

Every mine action project should have a clearly defined exit strategy included as
part of the contract or contribution agreement to avoid funding dependency. This
demands the definition of an objective output such as the completion of a report,
acquisition of equipment, training completion or the attainment of
sustainability/self-sufficiently.
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13. In addition to an exit strategy, mine action projects should have progress
payments and holdback amounts tied to key milestones, deliverables and
satisfactory project reporting. This is common practice in industry and would
encourage better performance.
14.

Projects should be designed to ensure predictable and secure funding
commitments of reasonable amounts and duration to permit projects to mature
and achieve the expected results without lapses in funding that could jeopardize
the initiative as a whole.

15.

Projects should be designed with sufficient built-in flexibility to respond to
changing circumstances, exploit opportunities in a timely way, reinforce success
or ’terminate for cause’.

16.

A contingency amount based on the size of the programme should be retained in
the budget for discretionary spending (nominally 10 percent). This contingency
should be included in the approval process and final commitment decisions
should be made within four months of year-end or the funds should be reallocated. This contingency would offer flexibility to the programme officer to
exploit opportunities, reinforce success or address problem areas. A back up list
of project with short execution times should be available for easy re-allocation of
funds.

17.

A significant mine action programme should include a clearly defined
communication strategy and detailed plan to guide both reactive and proactive
communication requirements. This would encourage and facilitate better
exploitation of Canada’s mine action successes and allow a controlled, positive
and timely response to media inquiries and incidents.

18.

A significant CMAP should include sufficient financial resources to permit regular
monitoring and assessment missions (minimum of once per year) by the
programme officer as well as specific evaluations as required. These are
essential to understand the local environment, build a working relationship with
post personnel and key partners, monitor progress and facilitate timely
interventions should problems arise.
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Annex A

ITINERARY
CIDA VISIT
NOVEMBER 18 – DECEMBER 2002

OTTAWA

November 12

Arrive Ottawa from Vancouver

November 13

CIDA
- Meeting with David Rushton
- Evaluation Team – Mission preparations

November 14

CIDA
- Evaluation Team – Mission Preparations

November 15

CIDA
- Meeting with Alison Clement, Program Coordinator, Mine Action Team, DFAIT/ILX
- Meeting with Denise Labelle, CIDA /Mine Action Unit

CROATIA

November 17

Arrive Zagreb from Ottawa

November 18

CIDC, MDD Training Facility, Skabrnja
- Meeting and site tour with Sid Murray, CIDC Chief Instructor plus CROMAC Liaison Officer
CROMAC, Project Site, Zadar Highway
- Site tour of CROMAC clearance/verification project using Canadian donated MV-3

November 19

CROMAC Headquarters, Sisak
- Meeting with Oto Jungwirth, Head of CROMAC; Miltenko Vahtaric, Head of Finance; Nikola
Pankovic, A/Director Planning, Analysis and R&D; Mirko Invanusic, A/Director International
Relations; Ljiljana Zalic-Amiric, Mine Awareness and Mine Victim Assistance Adviser; and
Harald Wie, UNDP Senior Technical Advisor
ITF for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance
- Meeting with Goran Gacnik, Deputy Director; and Eva Veble, Head of international Relations
UNHCR, Zagreb
- Meeting with Gunther Scheske, Chief of Mission and Field Coordinator; Mario Paulovic,
Associate Field Officer; and Lada Blagaic, Associate Program Officer
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Croatian Association of Mine Victims (CAMV) / Rovinj Project
- Meeting with Madame Plestina, Prime Minister’s wife and Special Advisor for Mine Action to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Martina Belosovic, Assistant

November 20

Croatian Red Cross, Zagreb
- Meeting with Vijorka Roseg, MD, Program Manager for Mine-Risk Education.
UNDP, Zagreb
- Meeting with Tanja Rzehak, National Program Officer; and Davor Brkic, incoming National
Program Officer
Norwegian Embassy, Zagreb
- Meeting with Knut Toraasen, Ambassador; and Henrick Malvaerk, Political Officer
European Commission, Zagreb
- Meeting with Alfons Peeters, Project Manager
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Zagreb
- Meeting with Paul Collinson, NPA Program Manager
Canadian Embassy
- Meeting with Dennis Snider, Ambassador; and Vanja Sikirica, Technical Cooperation
Consultant

BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA

November 20

Arrive Sarajevo from Zagreb

November 21

Canadian Embassy, Sarajevo
- Meeting with Emil Baran, Counselor/ Head of Technical Cooperation; Almir Tanovic, Program
Officer; and Elma Sarajlic, Assistant
BiH Demining Commission, Sarajevo
- Meeting with Darko Vidovic, Commissioner; and Dragis a Stankovic, Commissioner
APM Demining Operation, Sarajevo Canton
- Visit to demining project completion ceremony with Mayor of Sarajevo
BHMAC, Sarajevo
- Meeting with Dusan Gauran, Director
- Meeting with David Rowe, UNDP Chief Technical Advisor
Embassy of USA, Sarajevo
- Meeting with John Cohen, Political Officer

November 22

UN Office of the High Representative (OHR)
- Meeting with Rear Admiral Hugh Edleston, Military Representative to the High Representative;
and Major Robert Strazisar, Staff Officer
SFOR Engineer Branch
- Meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Jim Greaves, Chief of SFOR/EAF Demining Program; and
Major James Gladwin, Chief Mines/ Intel; and Dijana Trivakovic –Lucic, Senior Engineer
Consultant
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UNHCR, Sarajevo
- Meeting with John Farvolden, Assistant Chief of Mission; and Lejla Ridanovic, Assistant
Program Officer

Housing Verification and Monitoring Unit
- Meeting with Elizabeth Hughes, Program Manager

November 23

Travel to Dubrovnik

November 24

Rest

November 25

CIDC MDD Program, Trebinje
- Meeting and site tour with Oliver Mitrevski, Operations Manager

November 26

CIDC MDD Program, Trebinje
- Meeting with Oliver Mitreuski, Operations Manager
SFOR EAF Demining, Republica Srpska
- Site tour of EAF demining operation west of Trebinje
Travel to Sarajevo

November 27

Queen’s University, ICA CBR, Sarajevo
- Meeting with Malcom Peat, Executive Director, ICACBR; Sanela Sadikovic, Education
Coordinator and Nazif Bogdanic, Goradze Peer Support Group Leader
Handicap International (HI), Sarajevo
- Meeting with Emmanuel Sauvage, Director; and Almedina kovic, National Operations
Coordinator
BiH Government, Ministry of European Integration
- Meeting with Nedeljko Maslesa, Assistant Minister
NPA, Sarajevo
- Meeting and tour of facilities with Stephen Bryant, Regional Mines Action Manager

November 28

International Children’s’ Institute (ICI)
- Meeting with Dr. Mirsad Muftic, Rehabilitation Specialist/Program Director, Mevlida Ovuka,
Prof., Program Coordinator; and Samra Tozo, Program Officer
HELP/EC Civil Protection Organization (CPO)
- Meeting with Peter Sutcliffe, Program Manager, CPO Development

November 29

UNDP, Sarajevo
- Meeting with Henrick Kolstrup, UNDP Resident Representative; and Seid Turkovic, Portfolio
Manager Institutional Capacity Building
- Meeting with David Rowe, UNDP Chief Technical Advisor to BHMAC
HI/Akcija Protiv Mina (APM), Sarajevo
- Meeting with Senad Nuhic, Program Manager

November 30

Depart Sarajevo to Vienna
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KOSOVO

December 1

Arrive Pristina from Vienna / Sarajevo

December 2

UNMIK / Directorate for Civil Protection (DCP)
- Meeting with Mr. Steve Saunders, UNMIK, EOD Management Operations Officer
HI UNMIK Mine Assistance Team
- Meeting with Aidan Thornton, Program Manager
- Site tour of CBU strike area clearance project, Germia Park

December 3

HI, Pristina
- Meeting with Drito Ukmata, Director of Kosovo operations, HI
Canadian Mission
- Meeting with Tamara Sorger, Head of Technical Cooperation; and Iliriana Gashi, CIDA
Program Officer

December 4

Depart Pristina to London, UK

December 5 – 7

UK personal

December 8

Depart London to Ottawa

OTTAWA

December 9

CIDA / CEEB
- Meeting with Evaluation Team to develop tasks for report completion and assemble research
results

December 10

CIDA/CEEB
- Meeting with Evaluation Team continued
- Debriefing of Gille Rivard, Director General; Helene Corneau, Director; and David Rushton,
Program Manager

December 11

Depart Ottawa to Vancouver
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ANNEX B
ADVISOR
Canadian Mine Action Program in the Balkans
(Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia)
CIDA Southern Europe and Humanitarian Assistance Division (RZE)
=======================================================================

1.0

REFERENCE
The RZE/CEE Branch Mine Action Advisor for the Balkans' overall Terms of Reference for
the duration of the contract period are described in full detail in the Advisor's Contract
Appendix B - Statement of Services and are valid and in effect (QM/ Z020326).

2.0

FOURTH MAJOR ASSIGNMENT - EVALUATION of the CANADIAN MINE ACTION
PROGRAM in the BALKANS 1998/99 - 2002/03
The Advisor is asked to conduct an evaluation of the Canadian Mine Action Program (CMAP)
in the Balkans 1998/99 - 2002/03, which include integrated country programs in BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia.

3.0

PURPOSE OF THE ASSIGNMENT
The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the performance of the CMAP in the Balkans
(both in terms of development and operations) and to identify lessons learned challenges and
opportunities for future programming. The work will focus on the assessment of the program
as a whole.
3.1 Overview
The evaluation of the CMAP in the Balkans will focus on the key results achieved and
lessons learned. The emphasis is on validating the design, implementation and effectiveness
of the numerous projects that comprise the program. The lessons derived from the evaluation
will be focused on improving program development, and project selection and design for
similar MAP initiatives in the future. The aim is to produce programming principles that will
provide strategic orientation for future mine action decisions, including the definition of
preferred areas for Canadian intervention, i.e. Canada’s mine action ‘niche’.

4.0

METHODOLOGY / DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES
The evaluation is to be conducted using CIDA’s Evaluation Guide, 2000, and the Framework
of Results and Key Success Factors, as tools for the assessment of the results. The work will
be structured to include two distinct parts.
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4.1 CMAP Balkans Project Performance Review:
The first part of this evaluation is to review of the projects and their progress towards results
consisting of a brief analysis of the 36 projects (45 sub-projects), grouped by country and
thematic area of programming. The evaluation will include review of CIDA documentation as
well as direct consultation with CIDA HQ and post personnel, beneficiaries, local authorities,
executing agency personnel and other stakeholders. This review will take into consideration
the following:
a.
b.
c.

consistency with CEE’s program objectives and with cross-cutting themes;
consistency with CIDA’s priorities of individual security, economic and social
development, and sustainability; and
what worked and what didn’t work in terms of project design, planning, implementation
and reporting (management factors and design factors), along with an assessment of the
capacity of the executing agencies, the synergies and partnerships.

4.2 CMAP Balkans Program Performance Review:
The second part of this evaluation is to conduct an assessment of the overall program
performance consisting of a review of the program implemented in each country with
comparisons among the types of programs across the target countries. The program review
will focus on:
a.

b.
c.

5.0

development results (focusing on the achievement of results, cost-effectiveness,
relevance and the degree of sustainability achieved) and the success factors (including
appropriateness of design, resource utilization, and informed and timely action);
strengths and weaknesses, focusing on what worked and what didn’t work in terms of
program design, planning, implementation, management and reporting; and,
challenges and lessons learned, focusing on programme-level development and
implementation with a view to recommending a framework for future programming.

EVALUATION TEAM - ROLES & RESPONSIBILITY
The evaluation team is comprised of the Evaluation Manager, Lisanne Garceau-Bednar,
Senior Program Officer, Peace and Security, Eastern Adriatic Division, Central and Eastern
Europe Branch; Evaluator/Technical Advisor, Roger St. John from St. John & Associates
Projects Inc; Performance Review Advisor, Claudia Marcondes; plus a Research Assistant,
Jeff Naylor.
The CEE-RZE Demining Technical Expert-Advisor, Mr. Roger St. John, is the lead evaluator.
As such, he has the lead responsibility for the production of the CMAP Balkans Evaluation
Report. Detailed responsibilities of each team members are as follows:
a.

Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, CIDA Evaluation Manager, has overall responsibility and
accountability for the evaluation. She is responsible for overseeing and controlling the
evaluation process, providing guidance and direction throughout all phases of execution
and approving all deliverables. She will conduct a field evaluation mission to the Balkans
to collect information (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).

b.

Roger St. John, CIDA Demining Technical Advisor, is responsible for conducting the
evaluation, including the day-to-day management of operations, review of program
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documentation, development of the workplan, regular progress reporting to CIDA's
evaluation manager, and the preparation of the evaluation report. As well, he will
participate in the field evaluation mission to the Balkans to collect information and provide
evaluation technical support (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo). He will
elaborate a workplan on the broad parameters initially set out in the evaluation, by adding
precision, scope and refinements to the operational planning.
c.

Claudia Marcondes, Performance Review Advisor, is responsible for providing expert
program evaluation advice to the team in the areas of results measurement and
professional evaluation methodologies. She will review relevant program documentation
to extract key elements such as expectations, results, issues and lessons learned. She
also will provide input to the evaluation workplan and is responsible for the development
of a comprehensive evaluation questionnaire for key project partners in the Balkans, in
order to confirm project results and obtain critical follow up information regarding the
impact of the program on the defined beneficiary population.

d.

Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant, is responsible for assisting in the review of all
documentation related to projects that comprised the Balkans CMAP, with a view to
providing a comprehensive summary including key project parameters, results achieved,
issues and lessons learned. This review will be reflected in a set of key results tables that
will provide a comprehensive summary of results by country and thematic mine action
programming area.
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FIELD MISSION - LIST OF CONTACTS
CROATIA

Canadian Embassy, Zagreb, Croatia
Vanja Sikirica
CIDA, Technical Cooperation Consultant

Tel: 385-1-488-1235
Fax: 385-1-488-1230
e-mail: vanja.sikirica@dfait-maeci.gc.ca

Croatian Mine Action Center
Oto Jungwirth
Head of CROMAC

Tel: + 385 44/554-110
Fax: + 385 44/554-111
e-mail: oto.jungwirth@hcr.hr

Mine Action Centre
Miljenko Vahtaric
Head of Financial Department

Tel: ++ 385-44-554-109
Fax: ++ 385 44/554-138
e-mail: mvahtaric@hcr.hr

Croatian Mine Action Centre
Mirko Ivanušic
Assistant Director for International Relations

Tel: +385-44-554-103
Fax: +385-44-554-142
e-mail: mirko.ivanusic@hch.hr

Croatian Mine Action Centre
Ljiljana Calic-Žmiric
Mine Awareness & Mine Victims Assis tance Adviser

Tel: ++ 385 44/544-144
Fax: ++ 385 44/544-142

United Nations Development Program
Harald Wie
Senior Technical Advisor/CROMAC

Tel: 385 44/530-791
Fax: 385 44/534-773
e-mail: haraldw@unopsmail.org

United Nations Development Program
Representative Office Croatia
Tanja Ržehak
National Program Officer

Tel: 385 1 3712 681

International Trust Fund
for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance
Eva Veble
Head of Department for International Relations

Tel: +386 1 479 65 86

International Trust Fund
for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance
Goran Gacnik
Deputy Director

Tel: +386 1 4796 580

European Union
Alfons Peeters
Project Manager

Tel: +385 1 4895 581
Fax: +385 1 4896 555
e-mail: alfons.peeters@cec.eu.int

Norwegian Embassy
Knut Tøraasen
Ambassador of Norway

Tel: 4922 829

Norwegian People’s Aid
Mine Action Program
Paul J. Collinson
Program Manager

Tel: +385 23 68 22 00

Hrvatska Udruga Žrtava Mina

Tel: 01/3454-304

Fax: 385 1 3712 634
e-mail: tanja.rzechak@undp.org

Fax: +386 1 479 65 90
e-mial: veble@itf-fund.si

Fax: +386 1 4796 590
e-mail: gacnik@itf-fund.si

Fax: +385 23 68 22 01
e-mail: paulcollinson@npaid.hr
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Croatian Mine Victim Association
Martina Beloševic
Tajnica
Republic of Croatia
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dijana Plestina, PhD
Advisor to the Minister for Mine Action
United Nations High Commissioner
For Refugees
Maro Pavlovic
Associate Field Officer

BiH

e-mail: martina.belosevic@huzm.hr

Tel: +385 1 45 97 708
Fax: +385 1 45 69 971

Tel: 385 1 3713 508
Fax: 385 1 3713 442
e-mail: pavlovic@unhcr.ch

United Nations High Commissioner
For Refugees
Günther Scheske
Head of Office & Field Coordinator

Tel: 385 44 523 411

United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees
Lada Blagaic
Associate Program Officer

Tel: +385 1 3713 441

Croaitan Red Cross
Vijorka Roseg, MD
Program Manager

Tel: + 385 1 46 55 814
Fax: + 385 1 46 55 363
e-mail: vijorka.roseg@hck.hr

Canadian Embassy
Dražen Focic
Technical Coooperation Program Officer

Tel: 3 85 1 488 1214
Fax: 385 1 488 1230
e-mail: drazen.focic@dfait-maeci.gc.ca

Canadian Embassy
Emil Baran
Counsellor / Head Technical Cooperation

Tel: +387 33 222-033
Fax: +387 33 222-044
e-mail: emil.baran@dfait-maeci.gc.ca

Canadian Embassy
Almir Tanovic
Program Officer

Tel: + 387 33 222-3952
Fax: + 387 33 222-044
e-mail: almir.tanovic@dfait-maeci.gc.ca

Headquarters
Peace Stabilization Force
Major James Gladwin
Chief Mines / Intel

Tel: 00387 33 40 ext 5184

Fax: 385 44 523 684
e-mail: scheske@unhcr.ch

Fax: +385 1 3713 484
e-mail: blagaic@unhcr.ch

e-mail: james.gladwin@sfor.nato.int

Headquarters Peace Stabilization Force
LCol Jim Greaves
Chief Countermines/EOD
Headquarters Stabilization Force
Dijana Trivakovic-Lucic, B.ScM.Eng.
Senior Engineer Consultant
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mine Action Centre
Duš an Gavran
Director

Tel: PTT +387 33 495 191
Tel: VSAT 941 5191
Fax: PTT +387 33 495 180
Fax: VSAT 941 5180
e-mail: trivakovicdi@sfor.nato.int
Tel: + 387 33 667 310
Fax: + 387 33 667 311
e-mail: BHMAK@bhmac.org
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication
BiH Demining Commission
Dragiša Stankovic
Commissioner

Tel: 387 33 456 503

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication
BiH Demining Commission
Darko Vidovic
Commissioner

Tel: 387 33 281 102: 281 120

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Lejla Ridanovic
Assistant Program Officer

Tel: +387 33 290 322
Fax: +387 33 290 565, 470 171
e-mail: ridanovi@unhcr.ch

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
John Farvolden
Assistant Chief of Mission (Operations)

Tel: +387 33 290 344
Fax: +387 33 290 565, 470 171
e-mail: farvolde@unhcr.ch

Office of the High Representative
Rear Admiral Hugh Edleston
Military Representative to the HR

Tel: +387 33 752346
Fax: +387 33 752354
e-mail: hughe@oscebih.org

Office of the High Representative
Major Robert Strazisar
Staff Officer

Tel: +387 33 752344
Fax: +387 33 752354
e-mail: Roberts@oscebih.org

Housing Verification and Monitoring Unit
Elizabeth Hughes
Program Manager

Tel: ++387 33 215 510
Fax: ++387 33 215 550
e-mail: ehughes@rrtf-hvm.org

Canine Countermine
Oliver Mitrevski
Operations Manager

Tel/Fax: 00387 0 59 261 231
e-mail: mdd@paleol.net
e-mail: mdd@spicanet.net
e-mail: oliver_m6@hotmail.com

Handicap International
Emmanuel Sauvage
Director

Tel: + 387 33 266 880
Fax: +387 33 266 881
e-mail: lis.director@hibosnia.com.ba

Handicap International
Almedina Komic
National Operations Coordinator

Tel: + 387 33 266 880
Fax: + 387 33 266 881
e-mail: lis.operations@hibosnia.com.ba

Queen’s University
Malcolm Peat, MBE, MCSP, MSc, PhD
Executive Director
International Centre for the Advancement of Community
Based Rehabilitation (ICACBR)

Tel: 613 533-6881
Fax: 613 533-6882
peatm@post.queensu.ca

Norwegian People’s Aid
Stephen Bryant
Regional Mine Action Manager

Tel: +387 33 436 530
Fax: +387 33 436 533
e-mail: spb@bih.net.ba

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ministry of European Integration
Nedeljko Masleš

Tel/Fax: ++387 0 33 217 882
e-mail: mei_ups@bih.net.ba
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Assistant Minister

KOSOVO

University of Alberta
Terry Mackey
Director, International Programs

Tel: 780 492-8100
Fax: 780 492-1488
e-mail: terry.Mackey@ualberta.ca

International Children’s Institute
Samra Tozo

Tel/Fax: +387 33 20 88 53
e-mail: ici-bih@utic.net.ba

International Children’s Institute
Mvlida Ovuka
Program Coordinator

Tel/Fax: +387 33 20 88 53
e-mail: ici-bih@utic.net.bc

Center for Medical Treatment and Rehabilitation M.H.S.
Prim. Mirsad dr. Muftic
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation

Tel: 387 33 65 50 57
Fax: +387 33 65 35 10
e-mail: mirsadmuftic@hotmail.com

European Commission
J. Peter Sutcliffe
Program Manager

Tel: +387 33 642 512
Fax: +387 57 340 264
e-mail: jpetersutcliffe@hotmail.com

United Nations Development Program
Henrik Kolstrup
UNDP Resident Representative

Tel: +387 33 276 840, 841, 842
Fax: 387 33 665 681
e-mail: hkolstrup@undp.ba

United Nations Development Program
Seid Turkovic
Portfolio Manager
Institutional Capacity Building Portfolio

Tel: +387 33 276 843
Fax: +387 33 665 681
e-mail: hkolstrup@undp.ba

Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre
Darvin Lisica
Deputy Director

Tel: + 387 33 667 310
Fax: + 387 33 667 311
e-mail: BHMAK@bhmac.org

Handicap International
Aidan Thornton
Program Manager, Mine Action, Kosovo

Tel: + 381 0 390 21 523
e-mail: hi.demin@eunet.yu

Liaison Office of the Government of Canada
Tamara Sorger
Head of Technical Cooperation

Tel: + 381 0 38 249 545
Tel: + 381 0 38 243 003
Fax + 381 0 38 248 197
e-mail: tamara.sorger@dfait-maeci.gc.ca

Liaison Office of the Government of Canada
Iliriana Gashi
CIDA Program Officer

Tel: + 381 0 38 249 545
Tel: + 381 0 38 243 003
Fax: + 381 0 38 248 197
e-mail: iliriana.gashi@dfait-maeci.gc.ca

Handicap International
Driton H. Ukmata
Country Manager

Tel: + 381 0 38 549 316 518 433
Fax: +381 0 38 518 432
e-mail: hikosdir@handicapkos.org
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AP (mine)

Anti-personnel mine

APM

Akcija Protiv Mina (BiH demining NGO)

APPR

Annual Project Performance Review

AT (mine)

Anti-tank mine

BHMAC

Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre

BiH

Bosnia and Herzegovina

CAMV

Croatian Association of Mine Victims

CBR

Community Based Rehabilitation

CBU

Cluster Bomb Unit

CEE(B)

Central and Eastern Europe (Branch) CIDA

CF

Canadian Forces

CIDA

Canadian International Development Agency

CIDC

Canadian International Demining Corporation

CLF

Canadian Landmine Fund

CMAP

Canadian Mine Action Program

CPO

Civil Protection Organization (BiH)

CROMAC

Croatian Mine Action Centre

CTA

Chief Technical Advisor

DCP

Directorate of Civil Protection (Kosovo/UNMIK)

DCSEP

Department for Civil Security and Emergency Protection (Kosovo –
UNMIK)

DFAIT

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

DND

Department of National Defence

DSL

Defence Systems Limited (UK)

D-1

EAF

Entity Armed Forces (BiH)

EC

European Commission

ELS

European Landmine Solutions (commercial mine action company)

EMAC

Entity Mine Action Centre (BiH)

EOD

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EU

European Union

FMAC

Federation Mine Action Centre (BiH)

FRY

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

GICHD

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

GIS

Geographic Information System

GLS

Global Landmine Survey

HALO

Hazardous Area Life-Support Organization

HANDIKOS

Association of Disabled Persons – Kosovo

HELP

Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V..

HQ

Headquarters

ICACBR

International Centre for the Advancement of Community based
Rehabilitation (Queen’s University)

ICBL

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

ICI

International Children’s Institute

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross (INGO)

IDAC

International Demining Alliance of Canada

IDP

Internally Displaced Persons

IMAS

International Mine Action Standard(s)

IMSMA

Information Management System for Mine Action

ITF

International Trust Fund for Demining and Victim Assistance (also
known as the Slovenia Trust Fund
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JNA

Yugoslav National Army

KFOR

Kosovo Force (NATO)

KLA

Kosovo Liberation Army

KPC

Kosovo Protection Corps

KVM

Kosovo Verification Mission

MAC

Mine Action Centre

MACC

Mine Action Coordination Centre

MAG

Mines Advisory Group (mine action NGO)

MAP

Mine Action Program

MDD

Mine Detection Dog

MNB

Multi-National Brigade

MRE

Mine Risk Education

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

NPA

Norwegian People’s Aid

OA

Official Assistance (Canada)

OCHA

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODA

Official Development Assistance

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PWDs

Persons with Disabilities

RBM

Results Based Management

RSMAC

Republica Srpska Mine Action Centre

SAC

Survey Action Centre

SWG

Survey Working Group

TA

Technical Advisor

UNDP

United Nations Development Program
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UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

UNMAS

United Nations Mine Action Service

UNMIK

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNOPS

United Nations Office for Project Services

UXO

Unexploded Ordnance

VJ

Yugoslav Army

VTF

Voluntary Trust Fund (UN)

VVAF

Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation

WFP

World Food Program

WHO

World Health Organization
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ANNEX E

BALKANS CMAP KEY RESULTS MATRIXES
Prepared by: Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant

The following matrixes organized by country and area of mine action provide a summary of key
results achieved for the principal projects undertaken as part of the balks CMAP from 1998 to
2003. The information is necessarily brief and was gleaned from a comprehensive review of the
APPRs as well as other file documentation and programme reports.
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
DEMINING
RESULTS

EXPECTED
OUTCOME
RESULTS
1. Safer
conditions
for
returnees

Actual Results
Z-011296, Z-020217,
Z-020340 Ackja Protiv
Mina (APM) Demining
I, II, III

Z-011298,
Z-020341 NPA
Sarajevo Canton
Mine Clear I and II

-CIDC trained
MDDs cleared
734,141 m2
-33 MDDs in
BiH trained by
CIDC
(of a total of 86)

Year Area Cleared
1997 5,955 m2
1998 49,362 m2
1999 114,172 m2
2000 125,105 m2
2001 116,216 m2
2002 227,500 m2
- Many important areas
cleared including
school access, houses,
and water sources.
- Most minefields
inhibiting refugee
returns in northwest
Bosnia are cleared.

1999- NPA CMAP
91,890 m2
2001- NPA CMAP
73 450 m2, (a slight
reduction due to
work in harder
terrain)

1999 593,062 m2
2000 –
896,000 m2
2001 800,000 m2
2002 1,200,000 m2

- In 2001, incountry
participation of
international
personnel was
reduced to one
Chief instructor

- APM has good
technical capacity to
conduct mine
clearance operations
and its managerial and
administrative skills to
be self-sustainable
have improved.

- In 1999, the
project manager
position was
passed to a
Bosnian staff
member and
training for Bosnian
staff in language,
management and
computer skills
progressed

- Bozena mini
flail units (2 of
5 provided by
Canada)
increased
efficiency
- CIDA funding
for insurance
allowed EAF to
operate and
increased BiH
demining
capacity 25%

Z-011295,
Z-020339

Z-011296, Z-020217,
Z-020340

Z-011298,
Z-020341

Z-011299,
Z-020342

Performance
Indicators
1. Changes of
mine clearance
efficiency rates
2. Number of
potential and
actual returnees
benefiting
directly and
indirectly from
demining actions
3. Number and
type of areas
cleared

2.
Indigenous
demining
capacity

Z-011299,
Z-020342
SFOR/EAF
Demining
I and II

Z-011295, Z020339: CIDC
Mine Detection
Dog I & II

4. Quantitative
and qualitative
changes in the
level of
assistance
provided for
demining/ MAC
operations

Projects’ Success at
Achieving Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:
Achieved Results:

ü

ü

Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost
Effectiveness, Partnerships
and Appropriateness of
Design

-Many past
human resource
and
management
problems but
situation
improved in last
year.
-USA/BiH
regional MDD
centre is a
definite threat

- APM is competent
and has recently
shown willingness to
become self-sufficient
-Some discrepancy in
planned and actual
activities resulted from
BHMAC monopoly on
assigning tasks

ü
-Lack of steady
funding from the
international donor
community
prevents fully
sustainable mine
planning
-NPA develops well
qualified personnel
and good planning
-Good indigenous
capacity building

ü
- Results were
met and EAF
teams show
good gain in
productivity
-BiH gov’t did
not provide
EAF supplemental pay
for demining
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA MAC PROGRAM RESULTS – Institutional Support
(Z-020519 Support to MACs V / Z-020353 Support to MACs IV / Z-020216 Support to MACs III / Z-011303
Institutional Support- MACs II / Z-020160 UNDP Task Manager in Deming / Z-011297 Support to Mine Action
Centres)
EXPECTED
OUTCOME
RESULTS
1. Enhanced
and
strengthened
capacity of
BHMAC as
indigenous
Bosnian
institution

Performance
Indicators

Actual Results

1. BHMAC is a
central mine
action
coordinating
body

-Increased capacity of BHMAC to the point where it was able to manage the mine
action activities in BiH
- With the 2002 BHMAC restructure the Entity MACs became regional and the
BHMAC is now the primary mine coordination institution centre in BiH
- Cdn and international pressure precipitated a state of Law on Dem ining passed in
Feb 2002 that regulates mine action activities in BiH.
-BiH government took control of paying the salaries of BHMAC staff, indicating
increased ownership and control.
-Local staff sustainable, the number of foreign advisors has decreased from 40 to 1
and a strategic demining plan to 2010 has been created.
-A new committed, transparent Demining Commission was appointed in 2001

2. Mine
clearance
activities
focus on
priority areas
for return of
refugees and
displaced
persons

3. Coherence
of mine
clearance
operations

2. Quality of
staff
knowledge and
abilities

Projects’ Success at
Achieving Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:
Achieved Results:
Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost
Effectiveness, Partnerships
and Appropriateness of
Design

-Early in the program (2001), a series of 425 threat assessments, 204 completion
reports, 73 survey reports, 13 incident data, 86 minefield data were produced. 900
minefield maps were issued. BH MAC is now sustainable in such operations

ü
-Short tenure of international advisors reduced their effectiveness
-The original division of responsibilities among three indigenous MACS (BHMAC
plus the two entity MACs) reduced efficiency and clarity of responsibilities
-Overall, the program was cost effective, encouraged partnerships and was
extremely well designed. Great improvements have been realized.
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
VICTIM ASSISTANCE RESULTS

Z-011464 ICI Support
To Children Landmine
Victims

Z-011414 ITF
Landmine Victim
Assistance

1. Number of
people
participating in
the program

150 children who have
undergone a major
medical intervention,
parents, senior and
front-line hospital and
education professionals

12 landmine victims
medically rehabilitated
over 10 months

2. Greater
understanding
and support
among medical
staff, family
members and /
or policy makers
of disability
issues

2. Number of
education and
health
professionals
trained/ using
appropriate
techniques
3. Evidence of
understanding of
disability issues
through use of
language and
development of
policies sensitive
to the needs of
PWDs

-39 health
professionals, 36
teachers and 11
parents attended focus
groups identifying
issues and needs
relating to psychosocial
care of children.
-Workshops and
meetings held with 30
residents from family
medicine centres, 100
health professionals,
and 25 school
facilitators about
psychosocial needs

3. Increase
capacity to
deliver psychosocial services
to victims

4. Number of
education and
health
professionals
trained/ using
appropriate
techniques

See above

EXPECTED
OUTCOME
RESULTS
1. INCREASED
ACCESS FOR
VICTIMS TO
MEDICAL /
PSYCHOLOGICAL

Z-020336 Queen’s U
Landmine Victim Peer
Counselling II

Performance
Indicators

SUPPORT

Projects’ Success at Achieving
Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:
Achieved Results:
Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost
Effectiveness, Partnerships and
Appropriateness of Design

Z-011464

ü
- The project was
slightly behind
schedule
- Good reach and
sustainability
- Expansion to
RS/Croatia
- Good
advocacy/awareness
results
- Gender addressed

-10 Peer Counselling
(PC) groups reached
approximately 1000
PWDs
-151 PWDs referred
beween centers/ PC
programs
- Community and public
relations initiatives were
organized and
implemented by PWDs
- 12 training sessions
held for 91 health
professionals to increase
knowledge
- Marketing workshops
led to awareness, 2
brochures (2000 copies),
3 posters (1500 copies),
60 media contacts
- Program expanding

-Professional
rehabilitation and socioeconomic reintegration
of victims aided through
donations from other
sources
Z-011414

ü
- Fully achieved results
in a cost-effective
manner.
- Increased
collaboration between
CIDA and ITF

-PC groups identified
vulnerable populations

Z-020336

ü
- PC groups gathered
funding from other
sources
- A 9 month delay in CIDA
funding between this and
M-010054 project
endangered program
- Leadership by PWDs
- Good Reach and
sustainability
- Inter-entity cooperation
- Addresses gender
- PWDs advocacy
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA MINE AWARENESS
RESULTS
SHARED
Performance Indicators
EXPECTED
OUTCOME
RESULTS
1. Reduced
1. UNICEF, UNMAC, Red Cross and other
incidence of
agencies dealing with mine accidents
mine-related
report a decrease in mine-related
deaths and
incidents.
injuries
2. Subsequent investments in mine
awareness in years 1998 and 1999 go
ahead based on success of 1997 program.
3. Utilization of PIUs for project
implementation continues.
Projects’ Success at Achieving Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:
Achieved Results:

Actual Results
Z-010437 Mine Awareness

-Delivery of 600 mine awareness education sessions
-6000 posters, 32,000 booklets, 2000 notebooks, 1,000
T-shirts distributed in 100 municipalities in the
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Republica
Srpska
-Live reports, video and radio broadcasts were also
utilized to reach the population
-40,000 people including 18,000 pupils, 800 teachers
and 400 refugees were reached
Z-010437

ü

Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships
and Appropriateness of Design

The PIUs performed reasonably well in terms of project
management and reporting requirements
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CROATIA DEMINING RESULTS
SHARED EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS
1. Strengthened Capacity of CIDC to
assist PHD in becoming an
autonomous and sustainable local
(indigenous) org. in support of
CROMAC and Croatian mine-action in
general

Performance Indicators
1. Number of Croatian Employees
trained and retrained on staff relative to
the number of CIDC’s int’l staff
employed in Croatia
2. % increase mine clearance
efficiency rate, as well as the
acceleration rate of manual &
mechanical demining compared to
teams without mine detection dogs

2. Enhanced personal safety for
deminers, residents and visitors in the
area

Number of potential and actual
returnees that benefit from demining
activities
Reduction of suspected area/ increase
in efficiency

Projects’ Success at Achieving Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:

Z-020339- 02 Mine Detection
Dog Trng II
Actual Results
- MDD teams have increased to
10, with 6 MDD teams separately
funded by Austria and Belgium
- Croatian handlers selected
- Testing facilities constructed
and MDD training occurred
- CROMAC capacity has not
been enhanced to date due to
project delays
- MDD teams not yet utilized due
to project delays

Z-020339-02

ü

Achieved Results:
Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost
Effectiveness, Partnerships and
Appropriateness of Design

- Serious differences between project partners, due to disagreement over
the responsibilities and training methodology delayed the beginning of
training. The project’s results should be achieved by Feb 2003
- The ability of CROMAC to take over the management of the MDD training
program has been questioned
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CROATIA MACC PROGRAM RESULTS
Z-020337 (001) Suprt UN/ Cromac Transition Program /(002) CROMAC Nat’l Managers Training & Dev’t, /(003)
Cdn. Mine Action Program CROMAC Automation and Office Equipment, /(004) Cdn Mine Action Program
Support to CROMAC Survey, Verific. Projects, /(007) CROMAC Survey, Verific. Projects
SHARED
Performance
Actual Results
EXPECTED
Indicators
OUTCOME
RESULTS
Improving
Number of Croatian - Canada provided a mini-flail (mv-3) and protective gear. The mv-3 was used
institutional
Employees trained
survey and verification work on a future highway route. 161 000 m2 surveyed
capacity of
and retrained on
to June 2002.
MACCS.
staff relative to the
- Communications, computer, database, management coordination and office
number of int’l staff
equipment was purchased, which will be used to improve database,
employed in
communication and management.
CROMAC.
- A Decision Support System was developed and delivered which helped
coordinate survey efforts, which reduced suspected areas from 4000 km2 to
1700 km 2.
- A technical survey allowed the release of 200 000m2 of agricultural land.
Projects’ Success at Achieving
Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:
Achieved Results:
Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost
Effectiveness, Partnerships and
Appropriateness of Design

ü
- Projects have achieved goals. A key contributor to success was good project
planning done in conjunction with the CROMAC.
- UNDP lacked the resources to conduct sufficient monitoring.
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CROATIA VICTIM
ASSISTANCE RESULTS
EXPECTED
Performance
OUTCOME
Indicators
RESULTS
1. Improved
attitudes of
PWDs,
service
providers and
policy makers

Actual Results
Z-020337 006 Cdn Mine Action Program Mine Victim Assistance Program

- Mine Victims Needs Assessment Report was produced, which will serve as a tool
for decision-making and strategic planning.
- Workshops were held for 17 children and 7 adults
- Participants reported better attitudes

2. Expanded
services

Reduced
demands for
local treatment

-Reconstruction of a wing of the Rovinj Centre Hospital involved 5 rooms with 20
beds

Expected
Result:
3. Increased
skills of PWDs

Reintegration
monitored and
documented

- The adult workshops included computer literacy

Projects’ Success at
Achieving Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:
Achieved Results:
Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost
Effectiveness, Partnerships
and Appropriateness of
Design
CROATIA MINE AWARENESS
RESULTS
EXPECTED
Performance
OUTCOME
Indicators
RESULTS
-Reducing the 1. Number of
number of
mine-related
preventable
accidents
mine incidents 2. Number of
and of long
Returnees
term donor
enrolment
Projects’ Success at
Achieving Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:
Achieved Results:
Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost
Effectiveness, Partnerships
and Appropriateness of
Design

Z-020337-006

ü
- Overall, the project is a great success and achieved above expected results

Actual Results
Z-020337-005 Cdn Mine Action Program Mine Awareness Program

- A “Mine Awareness and Needs Assessment Report” and survey was completed
in March 2002 and was translated into Croatian in July

Z-020337-005

ü
- The Mine Awareness Needs Assessment has already, and will continue to,
provide an excellent resource for maximizing scarce Mine Awareness resources . It
will allow for better coordination and collaboration among various organizations
- The project is well on its way to having a lasting impact and achieving its
expected results
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KOSOVO DEMINING
RESULTS

Actual Results

Z-020013 Rapid
Response
Demining
EXPECTED
OUTCOME
RESULTS
Significant
Impediment to
the return of
refugees and
displaced
persons
removed in
Kosovo

Z-020027 Int’l
Demining Alliance

Z-020200 Cdn
IDAC Mine / UXO
Clearance Project

Z-020350
United
Nations
Mine Action
Service

Performance
Indicators
Area cleared
or declared
safe by
surveys

Projects’ Success at
Achieving Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:
Achieved Results:

Cleared:
71 schools,
46 homes,
7 medical clinics
a few TV/ Radio
transmission
stations
a water pump
house
4 power plants

- 37 000 m2 cleared
- Over 1 000 000
m2 released by
level I and II
surveys
- Demining focus on
schools, water
sources, farm
complexes, houses,
power lines,
agricultural land,
electrical
substations

- VJ Minefields:
- 4 Completed
- 6 Released by
Survey
- 6 Issued with no
action taken
- 6 completed but
NOT accepted
- 6 Suspended
- Focus on the
mountainous region
along the
Macedonian and
Albanian borders

CMAP
funded
UNMACC
acquisition of
core
demining
assets.
- 204 287 m2
cleared by
MDD,
manual and
mechanical
teams
- 6,750 m2
released by
Level I/II
Survey and
EOD teams
- Use of Land
Cleared:
72%
agricultural
17%
forest
6%
school
grounds
4% forest
tracks

Z-020013

Z-020027

Z-020200

Z-020350

ü

ü

ü

Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost
Effectiveness, Partnerships
and Appropriateness of
Design

Numerous
difficulties in
effective
management,
partnerships,
technical expertise,
monitoring and
reporting

Numerous
difficulties in
effective
management,
partnerships,
technical expertise
and monitoring and
reporting

Delayed by
contractual process
but well designed
and delivered.
Management and
safety problems.

ü
A resounding
success, cost
effective, well
designed and
effective
coordination
of activities

E-9

KOSOVO MACC RESULTS
Actual Results
Z-20066 MACC in Kosovo- Data Entry
Z-020091 Institutional Support to
Clerks
MACC in Kosovo*
EXPECTED
OUTCOME
RESULTS
Enhanced
Capacity of
the UN
MACC.

Performance
Indicators
UNMACC’s
reports on the
progress and
results
achieved by
the overall
mine action
program in
Kosovo.

- $ 65,000 provided to cover the
incremental costs of technical experts data
entry Clerks from the Department of
National Defense to the MACC in Kosovo.

- Project connected to Z02035 to
provide for UNMACC demining core
capabilities.
- 101 hectares of land cleared of 768
mines and 6 items of UXO.
- MINE-TECH cleared 61 minefields
and conducted surveys on a further
76 areas.
- MDD teams deployed as needed to
support MACC operations.
- MDD teams conducted training on
days not deployed.
- Med evacuation exercises
conducted monthly.

Projects’ Success at
Achieving Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:
Achieved Results:

Z-020066

ü

Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost
Effectiveness, Partnerships
and Appropriateness of
Design

Z-020091

ü

No reporting on results is available.

Well designed and focused. The
project resulted in improved access
to agricultural land water sources,
and a reduction in the loss of human
life and livestock.
* CIDA provided funding to MACC with the provision that it invest in an integrated mine clearance team comprising
manual, mechanical and explosive detection dog
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KOSOVO VICTIM
ASSISTANCE RESULTS
EXPECTED
OUTCOME
RESULTS
To Improve
the health and
well-being of
disabled
persons in
Kosovo,
Albania and
Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Actual Results
M-010054 Disabled Population and Landmine Victim Assistance - Queen’s

Performance
Indicators
No
Performance
Indicator listed

Projects’ Success at
Achieving Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:
Achieved Results:

- Three five-week educational programs delivered to the Association of Disabled
People in Kosovo (HANDIKOS).
- 3 Seminars for rehabilitation professionals from Pristina Hospital were held.
- 16 classes taught to 100 physiotherapy students.
- 62 client site visits, 15 seminars with NGO CBR workers (241 participants).
- 48 case conferences to review challenging cases.
- Agreement for including staff members with disabilities in the ten CBR centres
was reached.
- Meetings and patient home visits with nurses identified needs.
- ICACBR raised awareness of disability issues through education programs and
meetings with health professionals, and through advocacy at political and private
organizations.
M-010054

ü

Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost
Effectiveness, Partnerships
and Appropriateness of
Design
KOSOVO MINE AWARENESS
RESULTS
EXPECTED
OUTCOME
RESULTS
None Listed

The project achieved its goal, however, the actual impact of the project on the
disabled population is difficult to access. Approximate numbers of beneficiaries
would be useful and were not provided. Training of locals provided for good
sustainability.
Actual Results
M-010022 Balkan/ UNICEF/ Second Grant Kosovo Crisis

Performance
Indicators
No
Performance
Indicator listed

Projects’ Success at
Achieving Expected Results:
Failed to Achieve Results:
Achieved Results:
Exceeded Expected Results:
General Evaluation of Cost
Effectiveness, Partnerships
and Appropriateness of
Design

- 400 000 mine/ UXO awareness posters and leaflets distributed through NGOs
- 3 locally produced TV spots in Albanian and Serbian which were aired by Radio/
Television Kosovo
- UNICEF conducted an assessment of accident victims and group discussions
with villagers to better understand behavior causing mine/UXO accidents
Z-010022

- The project is multilateral and no evaluation of the program is available.
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ANNEX F

BALKANS CMAP EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES
Prepared By: Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant

The following tables provide a summary of the responses received from the CMAP Evaluation
Questionnaire. Also included for information is a copy of the questionnaire. It should be noted that
the questionnaire was sent to all partners and executing agencies and formed the basis of the
interviews that were conducted during the evaluation field mission and in most cases, responses
were oral. The respondents listed below provided written responses that have been included in the
report and are summarized in the following matrixes:
SURVEY RESPONDENTS
Respondent(s) and Position(s)

Organization

CIDA
Projects(s)

Oliver Mitrevski, Operations Manager

CIDC

Z-011295
Z-020339

David Horton, Executive Director

CIDC

Z-011295
Z-020339

Dzevad Hadzic, Program Manager

APM

Z-020217

Stephen Bryant

NPA

Z-020341

Almedina Komic, Emanuel Sauvage, Landmine Impact
Survey National Operation Coordinator, Director

Handicap International
Mission in BiH

Z-011296
Z-020217
Z-020340

Lt Col Jim Greaves UK Army, Maj James Gladwin UK
Army, MsDijan Trivakovic-Lucic, Chief Countermines,
EOD, Chief Mines, Intel, Senior Engineer Consultant

SFOR Engineer Branch (EAF
Demining)

Z-011299
Z-020343

Malcolm Peat, Project Manager, Executive Director

ICACBR and Queen’s University

Z-010280

Dennis Snider, Ambassador

Canadian Embassy, Zagreb

All Croatia
Projects

Sid Murray, Training Manager

CIDC

Z-020339 (02)

David Rowe, Program Manager and Strategic Advisor

UNDP

MAC projects in
BiH

Alison Clement, Program Coordinator et al

DFAIT/ILX Mine Action Team

Entire CMAP

*NB: Questionnaire response from DFAIT/ILX, Mine Action Tream applied to overall Balkans CMAP
and for ease of input was incorporated directly into the Evaluation Report (see footnotes for
reference).
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PARAPHRASED RESPONSES OF SURVEYS OF PARTNER AGENCIES FOR CMAP IN
CROATIA
RESPONDER
ORGANIZATION

CANADIAN EMBASSY, COVERING ALL CMAP
PROJECTS IN CROATIA

CIDC MDD PROJECT

Question 2.1
Project Effectiveness

- Projects have achieved their primary goals of
institution building.
- A key reason for success is good project planning
in cooperation with the CROMAC.
- UNDP performed satisfactory administration of
projects overall but could have invested more in
monitoring.

- There were problems in
dealing with CROMAC staff.
- It is questionable whether
CROMAC has the capability of
taking over the CIDC MDD
program.

Question 2.2
Key Issues

- Issues with projects success include CROMAC’s
ability to locate funding for managing MDD teams.
- Management training at the CROMAC was focused
on technical skills but some higher-level staff may
still require management skill.

Question 2.3:
Examples of key results

- CMAP has provided the greatest level of support
for building the capacity of the CROMAC.
- CMAP contributions covered approximately 10% of
total contributions to Victim Assistance.
- A technical survey allowed the release of 200,000
m 2 of agricultural land.

Question 2.4:
Future needs

- Areas of need include general management
training.
- Mine victims assistance and awareness may
require an infusion of funds.

Question 3.3:
Consistency with local
needs

- The Needs Assessment conducted with the
CROMAC and other mine action agents created a
strong foundation for successful programming.

Question 3.2:
CMAP Effectiveness

- Programs managed and funds used satisfactorily,
with some delays in the payment of suppliers
providing a mild problem.

Question 3.3:
Recommendations

- Program would have benefited from more
involvement from the Canadian Embassy. The
UNDP staff is often overextended and it would
have allowed for Canada to gain greater visibility.
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BiH – CMAP DEMINING PARTNER – SUMMARY OF RESPONSES
RESPONDER (S)

Responses: CIDC

Question 2.1:
Project Effectiveness

- Project was successful
- 33 of 86 MDDs in BiH
trained by CIDC in 2002
- High accreditation rate
- Difficulties of previous
1.5 years gone in last 5
months
- Funding of program 59%
CIDA, 23% CIDC, 18%
other donors. Also,
program now generates
$140,000

Question 2.2:
Key Issues

- Staff turnover of
international instructors
can create problems.
- Human resource
management and poor
candidate selection are
key problems. 6
Canadian instructor
trainees, 3 local
instructors and 9 local
dog handlers failed.

Question 2.3:
Examples of key results

- Succeeded in training 5
women dog handlers (an
extremely good record)
and encouraged interethnic cooperation

Question 2.4:
Future needs

- Maintenance of
accredited MDD teams.
- Train local instructors.
- Renewal of MDDs
- Build non-mine related
canine uses.
- Use MDDs in other
countries.

Question3.1:
Consistency with local
needs

- BiH needs CMAP
activities and results are
good.
- Focus on indigenous
capacity building
effective.

Question 3.2:
CMAP effectiveness

- CIDA/CIDC
management very
satisfactory

Question 3.3:
Recommendations

- Program results will
mostly manifest over the
next 2 years.
- Canada/CIDA do not
gain due recognition

Responses NPA

Effective Demining
needs steady
funding. BiH to
conduct good
planning.

BiH government
needs to provide
funding to take
ownership of mine
action.

Responses AM and
HI

Responses SFOR/EAF

HI – CIDA funds helped
APM approach
financial, administrative
and technical
sustainability

- SFOR distributes CIDA
donation, but NATO
contract rules create
complications.
- CIDA should consider
making donations directly
to the insurance service
provider.

HI – No major
difficulties.

- Time is needed to plan
spending. Notification of
funding levels is often
insufficient.
- ‘EAF’s’ work is
unrecognized by the
government in
pay/bonuses.
- Number insured now
matches equipment
available.

APM – some
discrepancy in planned
and actual activities
resulted from BHMAC
having monopoly on
assigning tasks.

HI - rationalize and
prioritize tasks.
HI - reinforce mine
awareness.
HI - landmine impact
survey will help set
needs & priorities
APM - Few donors.

- CIDA funding is
necessary for insurance,
without which 20-25% of
BiH demining capacity
would be lost.

APM - CMAP was
important for APM

- Integrated demining is
most effective but CIDA
contribution may be best
spent on c ivil companies
for mechanical
preparation and MDD
work.
- Insurance is essential for
maintaining BiH demining
capacity.

HI – CMAP and other
MAPs can strengthen
indigenous mine action.

- When SFOR leaves,
CIDA will have to do
contracting.
- EAF strength in manual
demining. Also, Bozena
flails are too small for the
task. Contracting
commercial dogs and
mechanical demining a
good idea?
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BiH – CMAP MAC and MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE PARTNERS – SUMMARY OF RESPONSES
RESPONDER
Question 2.1:
Project
Effectiveness

UNDP RESPONSE ON MACC
- The project’s aim was to increase BiH’s indigenous MAC
capabilities.
- The BiH MAC under UNDP supervision managed it by UNDP, or.
- The projects were effective.
- They aided the establishment of a unified, indigenous BH MAC.
- A state of Law on Demining was passed regulating mine action.
- The Bosnian government gained ownership of MAC by taking over
the payment of staff.

-

QUEENS RESPONSE ON VICTIM
ASSISTANCE
The Project was the continuation of Queen’s
ICACBR project from 9-1999 to 3-2000.
Successful at forming 10 Peer Counseling
groups.
A gap in funding between two initiatives
existed from June 2000 to March 2001.
Each PC group largely managed their
organization through consensus/discussion.
A small business development component
existed in partnership with SOL WBO and the
Economic Institute, the University of Sarajevo.

Question 2.2:
Key Issues

- The tenure of international advisors w as often too short to make an
impact.
- The original division of responsibilities among three MACs
(BHMAC + 2 entity MACs) and lack of donor confidence from
delays in adopting the Demining Law placed constraints on
management.

- Peer Counseling groups identified vulnerable
populations, not just mine victims.
- The two project coordinators were strong
leaders.
- The 9-month financing delay caused financial
and personal difficulties.
- The relationship with SOL WBO was effective
professionally but unnecessarily complex.

Question 2.3:
Examples of key
results

- The project increased indigenous capacity, created the State Law
on Demining, and encouraged the Bosnian authorities to fund
MAC staff salaries.
- Field contributions and training increased MACs capability to
coordinate operations.

- The 10 PC groups involved approx. 1,000
PWDs.
- PWDs organized and implemented community
and public relations initiatives.
- Federation and RS groups integrated into a
single disability initiative and women PWDs
were involved in a productive small business.
- PC groups gained funding from new sources.
- A PC group for mothers of children PWDs
formed.
- Coalition of Associations of PWDs
successfully lobbied for a Law on Building
(Accessibility).
- Survey on attitudes of school children on
PWDs (positive).

Question 2.4:
Future needs

- Effective mine action needs to become a highlighted consideration
at the highest levels of the government.
- The Demining Commission should be able to influence their
minister.
- The Commission should have a support team for special
administrative and communication functions.
- -BHMAC requires more capable information and operational
management systems.

- PC groups are sustainable. They will need
legal registration as a national PC
organization, which is complicated by F8iH
and RS’s legal systems.
- Enhanced knowledge, attitudes and
behaviours of the general population towards
PWDs.
- International agencies are rarely physically
accessible or employ PWDs.
- CIDA should take a leadership role by
finalizing a disability policy framework.
- Canada-Japan Queen’s CBR initiative
identifies peer support, providing opportunities
to incorporate previous PC experience.

Question 3.1:
Consistency with
local needs

- The Canadian program effectively identified needs, was
compatible with local efforts and contributed directly to the work of
other organizations.

- CMAP is excellent in that it targets all aspects
of mine action, including victim assistance.

Question 3.2:
CMAP
effectiveness

- The CMAPs ability to provide responses tailored to needs is a
definite strength.

- CIDA delay in funding was problematic and
seemed extreme for the size of funds
requested.

Question 3.3:
Recommendations

- Canada should encourage BiH government to improve awareness
and ownership of mine action.
- Focus on educational and support needs of the Demining
Commission.
- Additional investment in the management function of the BHMAC.
- CIDA could continue to monitor progress in the development of
BiH mine action capabilities.

-

Longer term funding.
No gap in the funding of two project phases.
Centralize administration of projects.
Landmine survivors should be brought into
broader disability arena.
- Good leadership at the grassroots level is key.
- Decentralization promotes local ownership.
- Review clause of CIDA contracts on Health
Protection that may be grounds for
discrimination against PWDs .
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DRAFT
November 13, 2002
Name
Title
Organization
Address
Dear <name>
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is presently conducting an evaluation of its Mine
Action Program (MAP) in the Balkans. This five-year, $ 20 M (CAD) Program comprised 34 individual
projects in the areas of: mine/UXO survey, marking and clearance; mine resistance education/awareness
(MRE); institution and capacity building; and mine victim assistance. The projects were located primarily in
Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo with some residual programming support undertaken in Slovenia and Albania.
This unique, multi-faceted and responsive program provided for the achievement of many results and a
number of valuable lessons. The evaluation of the MAP in the Balkans intends to capture these to improve
future programming, particularly in light of the possible revitalization of Canadian Landmine Fund in 2003
and in terms of Canada’s assistance to mine-affected countries in Africa.
An important aspect of the MAP evaluation in the Balkans is to carry out consultations to get the opinion of
key stakeholders on certain elements of the program as well as to collect complementary information about the
performance of the program. As such, the consultations aim at gathering input for the purpose of enhancing
program effectiveness by refining project design parameters, monitoring requirements, reporting protocols and
the type of results that should be expected.
The consultations will take place through an evaluation questionnaire and interviews to be conducted during
an evaluation field mission to take place between November 15 and December 03, 2002. We are enclosing a
copy of the questionnaire that we would like you to complete. We intend to use this as the basis for our
discussions and interview with you during our field visit and the completed questionnaires will be included as
part of the evaluation database.
Please do not hesitate to contact Jeff Naylor, Research Advisor, Canadian International Development Agency
at phone number (819) 994-3564 or e-mail: JEFF_NAYLOR@acdi-cida.gc.ca if you need any additional
clarification or assistance in responding to these questions.
Thank you for your participation in this important evaluation. We look forward to receiving your input.
Lisanne Garceau-Bednar
Senior Program Officer
Eastern Adriatic Division
Central and Eastern Europe
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
Tel: 819-956-8330
Fax: 819-994-3669
E-Mail: lisanne_garceaubednar@acdi-cida.gc.ca
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